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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's treatment of the first
amendment's religion clauses' over the last fifty years has gener-
ated considerable controversy. While few religion clause cases
reached the Supreme Court prior to 1940,2 the number steadily
multiplied once the first amendment was incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment.3 The Court's doctrinal development was
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
2. Indeed, until 1960 only eight cases involving the establishment clause reached the Su-
preme Court, of which only five really raised an establishment issue. Moore, The Supreme
Court and the Relationship Between the "Establishment" and "Free Exercise" Clauses, 42
TEX. L. REV. 142, 142 (1963).
3. The incorporation of the first amendment into the fourteenth made the first amend-
ment applicable to state action. Concerning the question of whether the fourteenth amend-
ment extended those same limitations to the states, see Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?: The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5
(1949). See historical references cited in note 28 infra and the limitations on interpreting
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incremental and uncertain, but by 1971 the Court had developed a
test for each of the religion clauses4 to evaluate the constitutional-
ity of challenged state action. Although these tests have not been
followed with perfect fidelity,5 they have been the starting point
for virtually all of the religion clause cases decided by trial dnd
appellate courts in the last fifteen years. Only recently has a ma-
jority of the Court shown willingness to depart from the basic phi-
losophy contained in these two tests.
The controversy surrounding the religion clauses has been char-
acterized as a conflict between the ideals of equality in treatment
and equality in result.6 Hence, when state action will have an effect
upon religious activity, either by aiding it7 or hindering its the
question is whether the state should seek to neutralize its impact9
or simply treat all parties alike?10
This article uses the term "affirmative action"" to describe the
position favoring equality of result, and "nondiscrimination" to de-
legislative history, note 31 infra. Although this article does not purport to address the mer-
its of the historical controversy, it is worth observing that those who claim to promote a
"wall of separation" have frequently championed an "affirmative action" approach, which
(because it requires such frequent involvement in theological controversy) breaches the
"wall of separation" more frequently than the nondiscrimination principle proposed here.
4. Where a state action is challenged as violating the establishment clause, the Court has
employed what has come to be known as the Lemon test, which declares state action uncon-
stitutional unless it: (1) has a secular purpose, (2) has an effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion, and (3) avoids excessive entanglement between government and religion.
See infra text accompanying notes 169-76.
Where a state action is challenged as a prohibition of the free exercise of religion, the
Court has employed a test based on the Sherbert case, which asks whether state action
creates a burden upon the free exercise of religion, and if so, is it justified by a compelling
state interest? See infra text accompanying notes 302-11.
5. For example, the Lemon test was not used in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
For a discussion of the Marsh decision, see infra text accompanying notes 520-29.
6. Note, Developments in the Law Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1606, 1719
(1987) (tension exists between Professor Kurland's model of "formal equality" and Justice
Brennan's vision of "substantive equality").
7. For example, by providing textbooks to religious schools.
8. For example, by requiring applicants for unemployment to work on Saturdays.
9. The state can try to neutralize the impact of state action by forbidding the aid to
religious schools and granting an unemployment law exemption to Sabbatarians.
10. Regarding equal treatment, the state could give aid to all schools, and require all
applicants to work on Saturdays.
11. The same terminology is used in Garvey, Freedom and Equality in the Religion
Clauses, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 193, 209. Although the analogy is not perfect, it is useful to
compare the differing attitudes toward equal treatment of racial groups. While some con-
tend that the proper approach is "affirmative action"-paying close attention to the effects
of state action on racial groups-others insist upon a "color-blind" approach whereby the
state generally may not consider race as an appropriate criterion for decisionmaking.
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scribe the position favoring equality of treatment. Sections IV and
V of this article trace the development of both of the Court's tests
and suggest that, until quite recently (and continuing in important
respects) the Court has adopted the affirmative action approach,
mistakenly attempting to equalize the effects of state action on re-
ligious activity. 2 The "nondiscrimination" approach, first articu-
lated by Professor Philip Kurland, 3 would instead focus primarily
upon whether the state action is discriminatory. 4
One of the consequences of the "affirmative action" approach is
that it tends to create conflict 5 between the two clauses. As Jus-
tice Rehnquist has noted, the overlapping demands of the two
clauses have become a "Scylla and Charybdis' 1 6 through which
government authorities navigate at their peril. This results in doc-
trinal incoherence and the appearance of arbitrariness. 7
12. See Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 156-68 (1977) (Court has employed an "impact
test" for both the establishment and free exercise clauses).
13. It seems appropriate to credit Professor Kurland with whatever there is of value to
this article, because he proposed its foundation nearly 30 years ago, in an article, Kurland,
Religion and the Law: Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm. L. REV. 1
(1961). This article was published in 1962 as a book by the same title. The function of the
present article is largely to demonstrate that the concerns raised by Kurland's original arti-
cle, far from receding in the intervening years, have become even more acute. Moreover, this
article attempts to demonstrate through specific application that the nondiscrimination
principle would both produce acceptable results and promote the neutrality toward religion
that the Court espouses. Of course it parts company with Professor Kurland in specific
cases, particularly the "hard cases" considered in section VI. As with the traditional dis-
claimer in such matters, he should be held responsible for anything good, but nothing bad,
within this article.
14. In the words of Professor Kurland, whether the state has utilized a "classification in
terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden." Kurland, supra note 13,
at 6.
15. "[T]his court repeatedly has recognized that tension inevitably exists between the
Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses, . . . and that it may often not be possible to
promote the former without offending the latter." Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973).
16. "By broadly construing both Clauses, the Court has constantly narrowed the channel
between the Scylla and Charybdis through which any state or federal action must pass in
order to survive constitutional scrutiny." Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 721 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This metaphor was recently employed by five members of the
Court in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890, 906 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring) ("Justice Scalia rightly points out ... that the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses often appear like Scylla and Charybdis, leaving a State little room to maneuver
between them"); id. at 914 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("By saying that what is not required
cannot be allowed, Justice Brennan would completely block off the already narrow 'channel
between the Scylla [of what the Free Exercise Clause demands] and the Charybdis [of what
the Establishment Clause forbids] .... ') (bracketed material in original).
17. As Justice Scalia recently wrote:
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An extended argument could be made that courts should confine
themselves to passing upon the means utilized by the state in seek-
ing its goals, rather than upon the ends whose achievement is be-
ing sought. Professor Bickel made this argument eloquently in the
course of a critique of the Warren Court:
More than once, and in some of its most important actions, the
Warren Court got over doctrinal difficulties or issues of the alloca-
tion of competences among various institutions by asking what it
viewed as a decisive practical question: If the Court did not take a
certain action which was right and good, would other institutions do
so, given political realities? The Warren Court took the greatest
pride in cutting through legal technicalities, in piercing through pro-
cedure to substance. But legal technicalities are the stuff of law, and
piercing through a particular substance to get to procedures suitable
to many substances is in fact what the task of law most often is.18
Translated into the context of the debate over equality in treat-
ment versus equality in result, the Bickel position would counsel
that courts are ill-equipped to judge whether a particular state ac-
tion has a positive or negative effect upon religious liberty. Such a
standard invites both inappropriate defeience19 and inappropriate
usurpation.20 Instead, the Court should focus upon whether or not
Our cases interpreting and applying the purpose test have made such a maze of the
Establishment Clause that even the most conscientious governmental officials can
only guess what motives will be held unconstitutional. We have said essentially the
following: Government may not act with the purpose of advancing religion, except
when forced to do so by the Free Exercise Clause (which is now and then); or when
eliminating existing governmental hostility to religion (which exists sometimes); or
even when merely accommodating governmentally uninhibited religious practices, ex-
cept that at some point (it is unclear where) intentional accommodation results in the
fostering of religion, which is of course unconstitutional.
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1981) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
For commentators' complaints, see Note, supra note 6, at 1609, 1634; Paulsen, Religion,
Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause
Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 368 (1986); Choper, The Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 673, 680 (1980) ("applica-
tion of the Court's three-prong test has generated ad hoc judgments which are incapable of
being reconciled on any principled basis"); Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First
Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L. Rav. 817, 839 (1984); Marshall, "We Know it
When We See It": The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 495, 495
(1986) ("In the forty years since Everson, the Court has reached results in establishment
cases that are legendary in their inconsistencies.").
18. A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 120-21 (1975).
19. For example, where the Court approves the end despite an illegitimate means toward
achieving the end.
20. For instance, where the Court disagrees with the wisdom or value of the end being
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the state action represents a nondiscriminatory means of achieving
some appropriate goal. However, the debate over generalized con-
stitutional philosophy is far beyond the scope of this article. In-
stead, this article focuses upon the fact that the process of employ-
ing the affirmative action standard does substantial damage to
religious liberty by entangling the Court in sensitive theological is-
sues. Moreover, it has required constant skirmishing over the pre-
cise "balance" to be struck in particular cases. For example, in
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union,2 the
Court was markedly split over whether a creche and/or a menorah
constituted an establishment of religion if displayed in a public
building.
Since the affirmative action approach requires close scrutiny of
the effects of state action upon religion, it requires courts to make
judgments about what theological consequences-either to particu-
lar individuals or to a religion as a whole-will follow from
whatever state action is being challenged.2 2 This kind of theologi-
cal inquiry has been routinely eschewed in a long series of cases
involving church control and other issues. Justice Stevens has
identified the "overriding interest in keeping the govern-
ment-whether it be the legislature or the courts-out of the busi-
ness of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious
claims."23 As Dean Ely has noted, "[A]n impact test of any variety
would force legislators and administrators to make judgments of
just the sort the framers of the First Amendment sought to dis-
courage by the inclusion of the religious provisions. ' 24 I call this
concept the "no-entanglement" principle.
sought.
21. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989); see infra note 397.
22. See Paulsen, supra note 17, at 332-33.
The resulting "primary effect" test has focused on the comparative impact of a given
policy on religion as opposed to "nonreligion," a basis of distinction that has more
than its share of problems .... If defining religion is impractical, defining its oppo-
site (its inverse? its complement?) borders on the absurd. And discerning a law's dif-
ferent impact on each of these nether-regions involves the court in a positively cos-
mological quagmire.
Id.
23. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice
Stevens later cited this language in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 513 n.6 (1986)
(Stevens, J., concurring), an opinion in which Justices White and Powell also joined. The
same language was also relied upon in Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Texas
Monthly, Inc., v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890, 902 (1989), in which Justices Marshall and Stevens
also joined.
24. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE LJ.
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Section II of this Article will briefly review the general outlines
of the affirmative action/nondiscrimination dispute, and provide an
overview of the major Supreme Court opinions on the religion
clauses. Section III reviews the sources of the "no-entanglement"
principle. Then sections IV and V demonstrate the entanglement
caused by the "affirmative action" approach in two areas: (1) the
school aid cases, where "sectarianness" of a school must be mea-
sured to determine how much benefit is derived from state aid to
education; and (2) the free exercise cases, where "theological dam-
age" must be measured to determine whether state action has in-
terfered with free exercise. Finally, section VI describes how the
alternative approach of nondiscrimination would resolve the very
cases that have troubled the Court to date.
II. THE DISPUTED DEFINITION OF NEUTRALITY
A. The Ideal of Neutrality
Most courts and commentators 25 agree that neutrality should
characterize the state's treatment of religion. In Epperson v. Ar-
kansas,26  the United States Supreme Court stated that
"[g]overnment in our democracy, state and national[,] must be
neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice."27
What has divided the courts and commentators is the definition of
that prized neutrality. The language and legislative history of the
religion clauses themselves are far from conclusive. While some
1205, 1316 (1970).
25. See, e.g., Lieder, Religious Pluralism and Education in Historical Perspective: A Cri-
tique of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 22 Wake Forest L. Rev.
813, 815 (1987) ("neutrality is impossible"); Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal
Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266,
331 (1987) (substantive establishment doctrine cannot be deduced from the ideal of neutral-
ity); Toscano, A Dubious Neutrality: The Establishment of Secularism in .the Public
Schools, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV. 177 (1979) (prefers "religious balance" to "religious neutral-
ity"); Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. Pirr. L.
REV. 83, 89 (1986) (Court and commentators "have become victims of the Establishment
Clause neutrality muddle because they do not fully understand the concept of neutrality");
Mansfield, Book Review, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 212, 214 (1964) (Kurland's "doctrine of govern-
mental neutrality as among religions or between religion and unbelief, is not in any helpful
sense a 'neutral' doctrine").
26. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
27. Id. at 103-04; see Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985); see also Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) ("In the relationship between man and religion,
the State is firmly committed to a position of neutrality."); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 679, 728 (1872) ("[T]he law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no
dogma, the establishment of no sect.").
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:253
scholars have suggested that the religion clauses were intended to
protect rather than prevent state aid to religion,2 s the received wis-
dom has been that the religion clauses were designed to erect "'a
wall of separation between church and State.' "29 Even assuming
that the framers'30 intent could be more precisely defined, there is
28. Several historians have argued that the religion clauses were a compromise between
the views of Jefferson and Madison and the views of those who favored state support of
religion. The compromise consisted of deferral in matters of religion by the national govern-
ment to the states, which would then be free to establish (or presumably also to prohibit)
religion as they saw fit. See, e.g., W. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 9 (1964);
M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITIcs: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 10 (1978); Van Alstyne, What Is "An Establishment of Religion"? 65 N.C.L. REV. 909,
910 (1987) (intent of first amendment may have been simply to prevent federal government
from usurping states' power to establish religion).
For a treatment of the Supreme Court's use (and alleged abuse) of original intent, see
Bradley, Imagining the Past and Remembering the Future: The Supreme Court's History
of the Establishment Clause, 18 CONN. L. REV. 827 (1986). Dunsford, Prayer in the Well:
Some Heretical Reflections on the Establishment Syndrome, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 1, 20
("[A]s a fountainhead for doctrine, Everson is a polluted source. The opinion is shabby
history and unacceptable legal analysis."). See generally Berman, Religion and Law: The
First Amendment in Historical Perspective, 35 EMORY L.J. 777, 793 (1986) (historical recon-
sideration "would permit government support of any or all belief-systems, whether religious
or irreligious, so long as such support does not discriminate among belief-systems (and
therefore does not constitute an establishment) and so long as it is non-coercive (and there-
fore does not restrict free exercise."); Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Paro-
chial Schools, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 260, 268 (1968); Cord, Church-State Separation: Restoring
the "No Preference" Doctrine of the First Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 129
(1986). But see L. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
XI (1986) (nonpreferentialists have "flunked history"). Justice Rehnquist departed from the
Supreme Court's tradition of acquiescence to the received wisdom in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 99 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False
Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875 (1986).
29. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879) (quoting Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptist Association)).
30. One of the principal problems lies in identifying who the framers were. The most
common source of authority is the framers of the first amendment. See infra note 133. How-
ever, it is universally accepted that the framers of the first amendment intended to permit
the states to establish religion or to prohibit free exercise. Thus, their intent is of limited
value to anyone attempting to frame a rule that would limit states and federal government
equally. As far as the intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment, almost no scru-
tiny has been given to their understanding of what "privileges and immunities" with respect
to religion were protected against abridgment by the states. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
1. One commentator has argued persuasively that when the Blaine Amendment was de!
bated, less than 10 years following the passage of the fourteenth amendment, it was evident
that the fourteenth amendment was not understood to prevent the establishment of religion
by a state. See O'Brien, The Blaine Amendment 1875-1876, 41 U. DEw. L.J. 137, 200 (1963).
Indeed, if one of the "privileges" of citizenship prior to the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment was to receive state aid for religion, how could that privilege be "incorporated"
by the fourteenth amendment so as to exclude such aid?
Even Justice Brennan, whose concurrence in Schempp attempted to justify the incorpora-
tion doctrine, acknowledged the historical ambiguity. See infra note 133. He simply con-
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an additional question of whether their understanding of the reli-
gion clauses is binding upon later generations.3' Thus, those who
proffer theories of the religion clauses are well advised to spend
less time scrutinizing the language of the clauses and their legisla-
tive history, and more time demonstrating that a proposed theory
operates in a logical and consistent fashion to generate acceptable
results.32
B. The Rise of "Affirmative Action"
As noted above, the religion clauses commanded almost no at-
tention from the United States Supreme Court before 1940. Since
then, however, the Court has steadily moved toward what this arti-
cle terms an "affirmative action" view of the religion clauses. This
cluded that "it is certainly too late in the day to suggest that [the fourteenth amendment's
framers'] assumed inattention to the question dilutes the force of these constitutional guar-
antees in their application to the States." Schempp, 374 U.S. at 257 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
31. See, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L.
REv. 204, 238 (1980) ("[O]ne can better protect fundamental values and the integrity of
democratic processes by protecting them than by guessing how other people meant to gov-
ern a different society a hundred or more years ago."). But see Porth & George, Trimming
the Ivy: A Bicentennial Re-examination of the Establishment Clause, 90 W. VA. L. REV.
109 (1987). In addition to the generic interpretivist/noninterpretivist battle, the problem of
changed circumstances is particularly acute in dealing with the religion clauses:
[A]ny thoroughgoing effort to interpret the religion clauses of the first amendment by
resorting to the original understanding of the authors and ratifiers of the Constitution
is apt to be regarded as a misguided, if not dangerous enterprise. . . [E]ven though
such resort [to the thinking of Madison] would provide an answer, it is unlikely that
this answer would be both a constitutionally appropriate and politically satisfactory
resolution of present-day problems. For when we turn to Madison's theories concern-
ing religious freedom and nonestablishment, we must inevitably find them encrusted
with certain implicit assumptions which were products of prevailing social, political,
and economic conditions. Doctrinal formulations designed to achieve certain ends
may achieve indifferent or perverse results when the assumptions on which they rest
change.
Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part L The
Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1381, 1383 (1967); see also T. CURRY, THE
FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
221 (1986) (framers' generation "passed to subsequent generations the task of working out
the consequences of the principle that the state had no competence in religious matters.").
32. The religion clauses have generated a great deal of academic commentary precisely
because the Court has been unsuccessful in articulating workable tests for deciding such
cases. One essential feature of any proposed theory is that it contain principles of sufficient
simplicity and particularity to generate predictable results. The second essential feature is
that those results are, on the whole, acceptable. Although there will inevitably be dissatis-
faction with particular results in particular cases, the overall pattern of results must engen-
der the feeling that the spheres of both religion and politics have been protected from un-
due influence by the other.
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thesis is graphically demonstrated by Table 1, which summarizes
the important religion clause cases in the last fifty years 3 About
half of the cases in Table 1 consist of a facially neutral state action
that was attacked by a party claiming that the effect of the statute
was to promote or inhibit religion. Sometimes state action was
challenged because it conferred a benefit or imposed a burden
based on a religious classification,34 but more often the complaint
was that the state action should have done so and did not. The
remaining cases concerned such issues as church control,35 and
other general first amendment principles.36
Although the Court ultimately found the state action constitu-
tional in many cases, it usually did so only after evaluating the
effect of the state action: it found either the advancement (or inhi-
bition) of religion was not present, or that under the circumstances
it was "acceptable. 3 7 This "ad hoc balancing process"38 is trouble-
33. Table I is in the appendix, immediately following the text of this article. The justices
are listed in order of their position on the Court, beginning with the chief justice's position.
For justices who share common initials, the following table identifies them:
WB: Chief Justice position: Warren Burger (1969-1986)
WB: Position Number 4: William Brennan (1956-
HB: Positon Number 2: Hugo Black (1937-1971)
HB: Position Number 3: Harry Blackmun (1970-
HB: Position Number 9: Harold Burton (1945-1958)
34. These cases fall generally into three categories: (1) challenges to prayer or religious
instruction in a public environment; (2) challenges to a practice with religious origins but
allegedly transformed into a secular phenomenon, and (3) challenges to differential treat-
ment based on religious belief or lack thereof. These cases are discussed in Section VI, infra,
which describes the treatment of "hard cases" under the nondiscrimination principle.
35. See infra cases cited in Section III.
36. In Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), for example, a New Hampshire resident
placed tape over the portion of his license plate that proclaimed "Live Free or Die," the
state motto. He challenged his conviction as a violation of his first amendment rights. The
Court sustained his challenge, but without reliance upon a free exercise rationale. In reach-
ing its decision, the Court stated that Maynard simply had a "First Amendment right to
avoid becoming the courier for [an ideological] message." Id. at 717. Although one might
question the soundness of the Court's holding in Maynard, it was appropriate to consider it
a case involving general freedom of speech questions rather than specifically religious liberty
issues. See, e.g., West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
37. For example, in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481 (1986), a blind student at a religious school applied for financial benefits under a state
vocational rehabilitation assistance program. Under the "affirmative action" approach, the
Court has required that a statute must not have the effect of advancing religion. If a signifi-
cant number of the beneficiaries of a program would use the benefits as part of a program
designed to advance religion, the aid is barred. In Witters, the court found that "nothing in
the record indicates that. . . any significant portion of the aid expended under the Wash-
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some as a matter of judicial philosophy,3 but the difficulty is mag-
nified by the Court's conclusion that there is tension between the
establishment and free exercise clauses.40 Any state action that af-
fects religion may be attacked either because it fails to help reli-
gion, or because it helps religion too much. While the cases do not
reflect a consistent pattern, the votes of the individual justices are
quite revealing. For example, of twenty-seven cases decided be-
tween 1971 and 1988, Justice Brennan found the challenged state
action constitutional in only three of them.41 Justice (now Chief
Justice) Rehnquist, on the other hand, found the state action un-
constitutional in only one of those cases, and that was the denial of
equal access by religious groups to a state university's facilities.42
The most fundamental difference in the attitudes of different
members of the Court is thus not between so-called "strict separa-
tion" and "accommodation," 43 but between those who tend to
strike down otherwise neutral state action which produces an un-
desirable result, and those who permit state action to affect reli-
gion so long as its operation is nondiscriminatory. On balance,
those who favor nondiscrimination have been in the minority.
However, recent trends indicate that they may now constitute a
majority of the Court.44
ington program as a whole will end up flowing to religious education." Id. at 488. It there-
fore found that the effect of the statute was not to advance religion. Id. at 489.
38. See Choper, supra note 28, at 280.
39. If "the method of weighing constitutional objectives in order to choose among them
affords no guidance for further action, except on what Holmes called a 'pots and pans'
basis," then subjective assessment of the multitudinous elements at issue here is pre-
sumptively inappropriate for an independent judiciary as we know it.
Id. at 324, (footnote omitted) (quoting Kurland, supra note 13, at 96). See also Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1, 12 (1959).
40. See supra note 15.
41. Justices Stevens and Marshall have a similar voting record.
42. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). Widmar is a good example of the hazards of
the "effects" approach. When a student group requested space in a state university's facili-
ties to hold worship services, the university refused, claiming that to do so would constitute
an impermissible aid to religion. Id. at 265. The Supreme Court correctly noted that since
the university facilities were available on an "open forum" basis, the university had engaged
in content-based discrimination by excluding religious speakers. Id. at 277. The university's
mistake was understandable, however, since in the context of aid to parochial schools the
Court has required analysis of the content of the schools' speech in proscribing otherwise
neutral state aid to promote education. See infra text accompanying notes 117-210.
43. See, e.g., Cornelius, Church and State The Mandate of the Establishment Clause:
Wall of Separation or Benign Neutrality? 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 11-13 (1984); Mott, The
Supreme Court and the Establishment Clause: From Separation to Accommodation and
Beyond, 14 J.L. & EDUc. 111 (1985); Comment, Religious Activity in Public Schools: A Pro-
posed Standard, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 379, 392 (1980).
44. See infra text accompanying notes 120-24.
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Since the "affirmative action" practiced by the Court requires
constant supervision of state action to insure that it neither aids
nor hinders religion' unduly, it is not surprising that the court finds
"tension" between the two religion clauses. The Court has "strug-
gled to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses,
both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if
expanded to a logical extreme, would clash with the other."4 On
more than one occasion, the Court has been forced to decide
whether an action required by one clause would simultaneously vi-
olate the other clause. For example, in Sherbert v. Verner," the
Court held that South Carolina could not refuse to pay unemploy-
ment compensation to a Seventh-Day Adventist where her failure
to accept a job requiring Saturday work was religiously motivated.
In so holding, the Court found that there was no violation of the
establishment clause.4" Similarly, in Committee for Public Educa-
tion & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,4s the Court held that aid to
private, mostly religious schools, violated the establishment clause,
even though the state had designed the aid in part to foster free
exercise values.49 Such cases dredged out the narrow channel be-
tween "Scylla and Charybdis" of which Justice Rehnquist
complained. °
The characterization of the case as an "establishment clause"
case or a "free exercise" case can be decisive. 1 In Caldor, Inc. v.
Thornton,52 for example, employers challenged a Connecticut stat-
ute requiring them to accommodate employees' religious scruples
against working on their Sabbath. The Supreme Court held the
statute to be an impermissible advancement of religion. Although
the Court had held in Sherbert that a state unemployment benefits
system was constitutionally required to do the same,53 Sherbert
was not even mentioned in the Court's opinion. Despite the doctri-
45. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970); see infra text accompanying notes
111-13.
46. 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see infra text accompanying notes 302-11.
47. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); infra text
accompanying note 328.
48. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
49. Id. at 788.
50. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 721 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
51. See Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 15-17 (1979); Note, supra note 6,
at 1633-34.
52. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
53. See infra text accompanying notes 302-311.
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nal frustrations created by its "ad hoc" approach, the Court has
regarded its flexibility not as an embarrassment, but as a source of
pride.5 4
C. The Alternative of Nondiscrimination
Most of the criticism of the Court and the related debate on the
religion clauses has resulted from differences of opinion as to how
best to balance the apparently competing clauses. Several com-
mentators suggest that the Court should recognize one clause (usu-
ally free exercise) as more important or fundamental than the
other, and thereby reduce the apparent conflict.5 But there is an
alternative. Almost thirty years ago, in a widely noted-but uni-
formly rejected 6 article and book, Professor Kurland suggested a
procedurally neutral approach to the religion clauses:
The proper construction of the religion clauses of the first amend-
ment is that the freedom and separation clauses should be read as a
single precept that government cannot utilize religion as a standard
for action or inaction because these clauses prohibit classification in
terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden.""
"[I]n short, the first amendment requires government to be 'reli-
gion-blind,' as the fourteenth requires it to be colorblind." 9 To-
day, of course, there is deep division over whether in fact the four-
teenth amendment requires government to be colorblind.
Proponents of affirmative action in matters of race suggest that
only by making special allowance for past discrimination can gov-
54. "The course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an absolutely straight
line; rigidity could well defeat the basic purpose of these provisions. . "Walz v. Tax Com-
mission, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
55. See, e.g., Giannella, supra note 31, at 1389; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 14-7, at 833 (1978) ("[T]the free exercise principle should be dominant in any conflict with
the anti-establishment principle").
This position is criticized by those who favor a unitary view of the religion clauses. Pfef-
fer, Freedom and/or Separation: The Constitutional Dilemma of the First Amendment, 64
MINN. L. REV. 561 (1980); see also Comment, A Non-Conflict Approach to the First Amend-
ment Religion Clauses, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1983) (first amendment favors both
pro-minority religions and anti-majority religions).
56. This is Professor Kurland's own description of his article. Kurland, supra note 51, at
24.
57. See supra note 13.
58. Kurland, supra note 13, at 6.
59. Pfeffer, Religion-Blind Government, 15 STAN. L. REV. 389, 392 (1963).
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ernment be truly neutral with respect to race. 0 The race analogy is
a useful one, because it is clear that the Court has generally re-
jected the "religion-blind" approach in favor of one which looks
toward religious motivation of the affected party, as a factor in dis-
tributing benefits and burdens.
It bears repeating that the purpose of this article is not to argue
that the nondiscrimination alternative is more closely attuned to
the intent of the framers6 of the religion clauses, or that it is bet-
ter social policy. The contention here is that only the nondiscrimi-
nation approach will minimize the substantial damage done to reli-
gious liberty when government attempts to resolve essentially
theological questions. This damage occurs whenever government is
required to determine: (1) whether a belief is religious; (2) what
effects state action will have upon the religion; and (3) whether the
state interest is more or less important than the religious interests
at stake. As the next section indicates, this type of determination
has generally been found inappropriate for the government.
III. SOURCES OF THE "No-ENTANGLEMENT" 6 2 PRINCIPLE
Despite the tendency of the Court's tests to enmesh the judiciary
in theological measurement, elsewhere the Court has firmly stated
that the judiciary should avoid wading into theological controver-
60. See Farrell, Integrating by Discriminating: Affirmative Action that Disadvantages
Minorities 62 U. DET. L. REV. 553 (1985); Morris, New Light on Racial Affirmative Action,
U.C. DAVis L. REv. 219 (1987).
61. See supra notes 28-31. However, there is no reason to think that the nondiscrimina-
tion alternative is any less in tune with the framers' intent than other proposals or current
doctrine. Although some have criticized the Kurland thesis for having no historical founda-
tion, in fact the nondiscrimination approach articulated here imitates the results that the
framers likely would have reached. See infra note 377. Comparatively speaking the nondis-
crimination approach requires less court intervention to "neutralize" the effects of state
action religion and is relatively tolerant of state action. Similarly, the framers were com-
pletely tolerant of state action that either established or forbade religion. See supra note 23.
Thus, although this article does not argue for the nondiscrimination principle on the basis
of framers' intent, the reason for doing so is brevity rather than the outcome of such an
analysis.
62. In this article, the principle of avoiding theological controversies is denominated the
"no-entanglement" principle. While it is not exactly the same notion, a similar form of
words was used by the Court in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970), where
one of the major goals of the religion clauses was described as the avoidance of "excessive
government entanglement with religion." Walz, 397 U.S. at 674; see infra text accompany-
ing notes 111-13; see also Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interfer-




sies. First, in the "church63 control" cases, the Court has consist-
ently declared questions of orthodoxy and heresy off-limits, even
where struggles for control of church property appear to require
determination of whether one group or another is correct as to the
founding tenets of the church. Second, where criminal liability
hinged upon religious beliefs, the Court has not permitted juries to
examine the truth or falsity of the religious beliefs themselves.
Third, in distributing state benefits or burdens, such as tax exemp-
tions, the Court has proscribed "excessive government entangle-
ment with religion. '6 4 Finally, recent Court opinions have explic-
itly recognized the danger of using religious beliefs as a basis for
government action.
A. The Church Control Cases and "Neutral Principles"
In the church control cases, the no-entanglement principle was
developed incrementally. It began with the not uncommon case of
dissension within a church body leading to a dispute over the right
to control church property. In Watson v. Jones,65 the Court distin-
guished three different forms of church organization: (1) those that
derive authority from a particular doctrine; (2) those that derive
authority from local congregations, (3) and those that are governed
hierarchically.e6 The Court asserted the authority to decide ques-
tions of doctrine where doctrine itself was the source of authority,
but it held that in cases involving hierarchically or congregation-
ally organized bodies courts had a duty to defer to the structure
used by the church to decide disputes.6 ' Otherwise, the civil courts
would inject themselves into essentially religious controversies,
63. "Church" is used throughout this article as a shorthand term for any religious
institution.
64. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
65. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). The Court actually based its holding upon an interpre-
tation of federal common law rather than federal constitutional law. The opinion predated
both the incorporation of the first amendment into the fourteenth, and the abandonment of
federal common law in diversity cases pursuant to Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938). In fact, two justices suggested that since the federal court lacked any superior juris-
diction to that of the state court, the proper rule was for the second court to abstain from
interfering with the first court's action. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 735-38 (Clifford &
Davis, JJ., dissenting). Again, because no constitutional claim was asserted, the objection to
jurisdiction seems well taken. However, the principles expressed, particularly because of
their later adoption by the Supreme Court as a matter of constitutional law, see infra note
68, are important regardless of whether jurisdiction was properly exercised.
66. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
67. See id. at 723-27.
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thereby violating the principle of freedom of religion.68
In 1969, the Court made its withdrawal complete when it specifi-
cally rejected the authority initially claimed in Watson v. Jones to
decide issues of doctrine. In Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church,69
the Court was again confronted with a local congregation that had
decided it was no longer bound by the authority of the general
church body. Under Georgia law, an implied trust theory applied
to church property: local churches held property for the benefit of
the general church, but the general church retained control upon
condition that it adhered to the "tenets of faith and practice ex-
isting at the time of affiliation by the local churches."7 When
there was a "departure from doctrine," the general church's inter-
est in the trust property terminated. The local churches in this
case had alleged precisely such a departure, and the Georgia courts
agreed." The jury was asked to determine whether the actions of
the general church "amount[ed] to a fundamental or substantial
abandonment of the original tenets and doctrines of the [general
church], so that the new tenets and doctrines are utterly variant
from the purposes for which the [general church] was founded."7 "
A unanimous Court reversed the Georgia Supreme Court. Justice
Brennan's opinion noted that, although there might be cases in
which a court could appropriately involve itself in doctrinal dis-
68. In Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), just as in Watson, the Court
was confronted with two sets of claimants to a piece of real estate. As in Watson, the Court
found that the hierarchical organization of the ecclesiastical body in question required def-
erence to the decisions of that body. The importance of Kedroff was that it decided the
issue as a matter of constitutional law, not simply as a matter of federal common law. More-
over, it affirmed that the constitutional guarantee of religious liberty was superior to the
purported authority of the state to regulate church organizations. Justice Frankfurter's con-
curring opinion commented on the necessity for vigilance: "The long, unedifying history of
the contest between the secular state and the church is replete with instances of attempts
by civil government to exert pressure upon religious authority." Id. at 124-25 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
69. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
70. Id. at 443.
71. The Georgia Supreme Court listed the offending practices of the general church as
including "ordaining of women as ministers and ruling elders, making pronouncements and
recommendations concerning civil, economic, social and political matters, giving support to
the removal of Bible reading and prayers by children in the public schools, adopting certain
Sunday School literature and teaching neo-orthodoxy alien to the Confession of Faith and
Catechisms, as originally adopted by the general church. ... Id. at 442 n.1 (quoting Pres-
byterian Church v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, 224 Ga. 61, 62-63, 159 S.E.2d 690,
692 (1968)).
72. Id. at 443-44.
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putes,73 there are important first amendment limitations. When
forced to decide a question of the legal right to control property,
courts must rely upon "neutral principles of law" to resolve such
disputes, because "First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized
when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution
by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and
practice. '7 4
The next step in the evolution of the no-entanglement principle,
as applied to church control cases, came in Serbian Eastern Ortho-
dox Diocese v. Milivojevich.7 ' The Serbian Orthodox Church,
which was conceded to be a hierarchically organized church, sus-
pended and ultimately defrocked a bishop by the name of Dion-
isije. In the process it also revoked some of the organizational
changes made by Dionisije."6 Dionisije sued, claiming that the
church had not followed proper church procedure in defrocking
him. The Illinois Supreme Court granted him relief. However, the
United States Supreme Court reversed. In Milivojevich, the Court
extended first amendment protection beyond substantive theologi-
cal issues 8 but also to the procedural decisions made by the high-
est ecclesiastical tribunals of a hierarchical church. 9
73. For example, in Gonzalez v. Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929), the Court had affirmed the
dismissal of a complaint by a Philippine citizen that he was entitled to be appointed chap-
lain by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. In that case Justice Brandeis had said
that in ecclesiastical matters the decisions of the "proper church tribunals" are final, but
prefaced that statement with the qualifying phrase, "[i]n the absence of fraud, collusion, or
arbitrariness .. " Id. at 16. This sentence was quoted with approval by Justice Brennan.
Hull, Church 393 U.S. at 447. However, in the Court has since then essentially declined to
review cases alleging fraud, collusion or arbitrariness. See infra note 77.
74. Hull Church, 393 U.S. at 449.
75. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
76. Id. at 702-03.
77. Id. at 706-07. It might appear that these facts could bring him within the language of
the Gonzalez case, supra note 73, if he could show fraud, collusion or arbitrariness. But
Justice Brennan rejected the language in Gonzalez as "dictum only." Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
at 712.
78. See Hull Church, 393 U.S. at 440.
79. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 709. Justice Rehnquist dissented in an opinion joined by
Justice Stevens. He thought that the decisions in Kedroff Kreshik and Hull Church only
required that the state abstain from matters of doctrine. Regarding procedural issues, Jus-
tice Rehnquist felt that no more deference was required to the ecclesiastical courts than
would be required in a case involving a secular voluntary association. Id. at 734 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). Indeed, he thought that in some cases precisely such issues would be
inescapable:
Suppose the Holy Assembly in this case had a membership of 100; its rules provided
that a bishop could be defrocked by a majority vote of any session at which a quorum
was present, and also provided that a quorum was not to be less than 40. Would a
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Thus, the church control cases have followed a relatively consis-
tent pattern,80 which has moved the Court further away from in-
volvement with theological controversies. Not only is involvement
in the substance of theological disputes forbidden to civil courts,
but even jurisdiction over "procedural" disputes must be severely
limited to prevent a civil court from usurping the right of a church
to self-governance.
B. The "Religious Belief" Cases
Tending in the same direction away from involvement with theo-
logical controversies, though not so decisively, have been the cases
raising the issue of individual belief. This issue arises most fre-
quently where the free exercise of religion is asserted as a defense
or basis for exemption from the enforcement of civil or criminal
decision of the Holy Assembly attended by 30 members, 16 of whom voted to defrock
Bishop Dionisije, be binding on civil courts in a dispute such as this?
Id. at 727. Justice Rehnquist argued that if two parties presented themselves to the court,
both claiming to be the ruling body of the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Court would be
required to analyze church procedure to determine which was entitled to control of church
property. Justice Rehnquist suggested that the Illinois Court was simply asking "if the real
Bishop of the American-Canadian Diocese would please stand up." Id. at 726. Justice Rehn-
quist's hypothetical requires different treatment, however, since it portrays an entire church
fragmented along doctrinal lines. In this case the party before the Court conceded that the
hierarchically organized church was still legitimate, but merely questioned a particular deci-
sion. As a result, Dionisije stood in no different position from the disgruntled parishioners
whose appeal was rejected in Hull Church. In such cases the court has a constitutional duty
to defer to the decision.
80. In Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979), the Supreme Court split sharply over the appli-
cation of the "neutral principles" doctrine to a dispute over control of a church in Georgia.
The majority of a local congregation voted to separate itself from the Presbyterian Church
in the United States (PCUS), with which it had formerly been affiliated. The minority and
PCUS sued to recover control, claiming that as a hierarchically organized church the deter-
minations of PCUS were controlling. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 598-99. The Georgia Su-
preme Court looked to the property deeds and other documents describing the relationship
between the two entities, and ruled that the majority of the local church was entitled to
control the property. Id. at 599. The United States Supreme Court affirmed, finding the
reliance upon secular indicia of control more in keeping with the "neutral principles" ap-
proach. Id. at 604.
The dissenting justices thought the majority's approach too narrow, and a departure from
the Watson direction to classify the church as "hierarchical" or "congregational." Id. at 610-
11 (Powell, J., dissenting). There is some merit to the dissent's complaint, although as a
practical matter the majority's holding requires only that religious bodies make their form
of organization explicit when they record the deeds of ownership of local church property.
But despite the disagreement over the application of the principle of "no-entanglement,"
the Court's decision in Jones emphasized the continuing commitment to avoid entry of the
courts into the theological controversies surrounding struggles for church control. For a re-
view of the case, see Adams & Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf: Church Autonomy and the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (1980).
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law. To evaluate whether the free exercise of religion is implicated,
the courts must consider at the outset whether a belief is "reli-
gious." They must also consider what effect the state action at is-
sue would have upon religious practice. Such cases clearly present
courts an opportunity to engage in theological reckoning. However,
the Supreme Court has expressed great reluctance to do so."
1. United States v. Ballard
In United States v. Ballard,2 Guy Ballard s" claimed to have su-
pernatural powers, such as the ability to cure diseases.8 4 Based on
these claimed powers, he formed the "I am" movement, and sup-
ported it by soliciting funds and memberships. After some disaf-
fected members complained, he was charged with mail fraud. The
indictment charged that Ballard had made representations of such
ability which he knew to be false. At trial, the judge instructed the
jury that they were not to consider whether the defendants' repre-
sentations were true, only whether Ballard "honestly and in good
faith believed them."' 5 Ballard was convicted and appealed. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the
ground that it was error for the court to withhold the issue of the
truth of the representations from the jury." The government then
appealed.
Ballard presented the Supreme Court with a nasty dilemma.
The Court could agree with the court of appeals and permit the
defendant to defend the truth of his theological assertions, thus
allowing juries to sit in judgment of which religious beliefs are true
or false. Or, it could require the defendant to defend his good faith
81. The Court's expressed reluctance to engage in such theological inquiry has not pre-
vented it from adopting a standard in free exercise cases that makes the Court's involve-
ment all but inevitable. See infra Section V. However, a recognition of this conflict has
prompted several members of the Court to question the appropriateness of an affirmative
action approach in free exercise cases. See infra text accompanying notes 123-24.
82. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
83. Guy W. Ballard, apparently the chief object of the prosecution, died before trial. His
wife Edna and son Donald were also named in the indictment, and the prosecution contin-
ued against them. For convenience the defefidants will be referred to simply as "Ballard."
See id. at 79-80.
84. For a discussion of Ballard's significance as a religious figure, see B. CAMPBELL, AN-
CIENT WISDoi REVIVED 161-62 (1980).
85. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 81.
86. Id. at 83. Chief Justice Stone pointed out that defense counsel did not object when
the trial court withdrew from the jury the issue of the truth of Ballard's beliefs. Id. at 91
(Stone, C.J., dissenting).
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in making the representations without regard to whether the repre-
sentations were true or not. Except for Justice Jackson, all the jus-
tices thought the latter approach preferable."' However, Justice
Douglas and four other justices remanded the case to the Ninth
Circuit for reconsideration of other issues raised by Ballard on ap-
peal. The Court held that the first amendment precluded the op-
tion of considering the truth of defendants' religious
representations."8
In sidestepping the question of whether Ballard's beliefs were
true, the Court did not solve the problem. If the jury in such cases
is instructed that the beliefs are to be presumed true, then there
could be no fraud, since the representations would no longer be
false. On the other hand, if the jury is told nothing about the be-
liefs they will follow their own hunches, which in the case of an
unpopular religion like Ballard's will incline them to believe that
the representations were in fact false and Ballard a charlatan. Only
Justice Jackson recognized the unfairness of this result by pointing
out that it is impossible to:
separate an issue as to what is believed from considerations as to
what is believable .... How can the Government prove these per-
sons knew something to be false which it cannot prove to be false? If
we try religious sincerity severed from religious verity, we isolate the
dispute from the very considerations which in common experience
provide its most reliable answer.8 9
Moreover, Justice Jackson doubted that representations concern-
87. Chief Justice Stone and two other members of the Court appeared prepared to simply
reinstate the conviction, presumably because they were convinced that Ballard was a palpa-
ble fraud. Id. at 92 (Stone, C.J., dissenting); cf. W. BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE
FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 41 (1976). But there is other authority indicating that,
whether a con artist or not, Ballard's followers understood him to be a genuine religious
figure. B. CAMPBELL, supra note 84, at 161-62. The perception turns out to be a more impor-
tant factor than the reality, because measuring it is less likely to result in entanglement. See
infra text accompanying note 428.
88. Id. at 86; see supra text accompanying notes 65-68. The Court went on to state:
The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the estab-
lishment of no sect.. . . Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may be-
lieve what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious
doctrines or beliefs .... The miracles of the New Testament, the Divinity of Christ,
life after death, the power of prayer are deep in the religious convictions of many. If
one could be sent to jail because a jury in a hostile environment found those teach-
ings false, little indeed would be left of religious freedom.
Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86-87 (citation omitted).
89. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 92-93 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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ing spiritual phenomena are believed in the same fashion as repre-
sentations concerning secular matters."0
2. United States v. Seeger
The next invitation to evaluate individual beliefs came in
United States v. Seeger."' Seeger was convicted of draft evasion
after he applied for conscientious objector status and was refused.
The Universal Military Service Act92 exempted from military ser-
vice anyone "who, by reason of religious training and belief, is con-
scientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." 3 Section
456(j) defined "religious training and belief" as "an individual's be-
lief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to
those arising from any human relation, but does not include essen-
tially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely per-
sonal moral code."'94 Seeger claimed that he was conscientiously
opposed to military service, but could not commit himself to a be-
lief in a Supreme Being. However, "his 'skepticism or disbelief in
90. Id. at 93-94. On this point Justice Jackson stated:
Some who profess belief in the Bible read literally what others read as allegory or
metaphor, as they read Aesop's fables. Religious symbolism is even used by some with
the same mental reservations one has in teaching of Santa Claus or Uncle Sam or
Easter bunnies or dispassionate judges. It is hard in matters so mystical to say how
literally one is bound to believe the doctrine he teaches and even more difficult to say
how far it is reliance upon a teacher's literal belief which induces followers to give
him money.
Id. at 94. Justice Jackson was clearly correct. In attempting to protect religious liberty the
Court has stripped religious defendants and them alone of the opportunity to demonstrate
that their beliefs are in fact true. Enforcement of the Court's approach invites discrimina-
tion against unpopular groups, whose beliefs are not widely shared. One doubts that a par-
ish priest would be indicted for confessing that, despite his fund-raising campaign to build a
new education building, he himself thought that the Resurrection was a fairy tale. A prose-
cutor would select for indictment only those, like Ballard, whose religious teachings would
strike an average juror as incredible. Justice Jackson concluded: "I would dismiss the indict-
ment and have done with this business of judicially examining other people's faiths." Id. at
95. "[T]he Court has never decided whether jurors can decide whether religious solicitors
really believe their own claims. But Justice Jackson's view seems to have prevailed in prac-
tice." Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 409,
420 (1986).
For a further discussion of the Ballard case, see Heins, "Other People's Faiths": The
Scientology Litigation and the Justiciability of Religious Fraud, 9 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q.
153 (1981), Kurland, supra note 13 and Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection: "Reli-
gion" in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593 (1964). For a resolution of the Ballard case under the
nondiscrimination principle, see infra text accompanying notes 421-31.
91. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
92. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451-73 (1958) (Current version at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451-73 (1982).
93. Id. § 456(j).
94. Id.
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the existence of God' did 'not necessarily mean lack of faith in
anything whatsoever;'" he had a "belief in and devotion to good-
ness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a
purely ethical creed." 95
The court of appeals reversed Seeger's conviction, finding that
the requirement of belief in a Supreme Being violated the due pro-
cess clause of the fifth amendment.98 The Supreme Court affirmed
but based its holding upon an interpretation of congressional in-
tent rather than constitutional grounds. In construing the lan-
guage, the Court found that Congress intended to make its cate-
gory of "religious training and belief" inclusive rather than
exclusive.97 Despite an intent to exclude nonreligious views, Con-
gress did not intend to "classify different religious beliefs, exempt-
ing some and excluding others."98 The Court thought it particu-
larly inappropriate for Congress or a court to attempt such a
classification.9 9 But while a governmental body is prohibited from
determining the theological validity of a person's beliefs, this does
not eliminate the need to examine whether those beliefs are
sincere. 00
In reaching its decision, the Court relied upon a quote from the
theologian, Dr. Tillich. 101 One would hope that the Court was not
95. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166 (quoting the record).
96. Id. at 167.
97. Id. at 176.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 184. "The validity of what he believes cannot be questioned. Some theologians,
and indeed some examiners, might be tempted to question the existence of the registrant's
'Supreme Being' or the truth of his concepts. But these are inquiries foreclosed to Govern-
ment." Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 185. Even an examination of sincerity is troubling, because sincerity of belief is
difficult to sever from the truth of the thing believed. See supra text accompanying notes
80-81. One commentator suggests that the problem can be solved by treating all free exer-
cise claims as a subspecies of the protection for freedom of expression. Marshall, Solving the
Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REv. 545 (1983). Profes-
sor Marshall does not indicate whether this principle would be applicable to a case like
Ballard; nor does he indicate whether a state could make some exemptions available only to
religious as opposed to secular claimants. See infra text accompanying notes 432-56.
101. In summary, Seeger professed "religious belief" and "religious faith." He did not
disavow any belief "in a relation to a Supreme Being"; indeed he stated that "the
cosmic order does, perhaps, suggest a creative intelligence." He decried the tremen-
dous "spiritual" price man must pay for his willingness to destroy human life. In light
of his beliefs and the unquestioned sincerity with which [Seeger] held them, we think
the Board, had it applied the test we propose today, would have granted him the
exemption.
We think it clear that the beliefs which prompted his objection occupy the same
place in his life as the belief in a traditional deity holds in the lives of his friends, the
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adopting Tillich's theological views by judicial notice.102 Instead,
the Court's opinion should be read as demonstrating the Court's
recognition that when legal rights are made dependent upon theo-
logical categories, a court cannot make a legal determination with-
out at the same time becoming entangled in the most sensitive of
theological issues.
3. Welsh v. United States
After adopting Tillich's broad definition of religion, the Court
provoked yet more controversy in another draft exemption case,
Welsh v. United States.0 3 Conscientious objectors could be ex-
empted from the draft only if their objection was based on "reli-
gious training and belief." But Welsh crossed out the words "reli-
gious training and" and rested his claim solely upon his "belief."' 1 4
Conceding that the claimant would not describe his beliefs as reli-
gious, the Court thought that should not prevent the draft board
from doing so.'05 The decision can be best understood as an ex-
pression of the Court's extreme reluctance to define or quantify
religious belief.
Quakers. We are reminded once more of Dr. Tillich's thoughts:
And if that word [God] has not much meaning for you, translate it, and speak of
the depths of your life, of the source of your being, of your ultimate concern, of
what you take seriously without any reservation. Perhaps, in order to do so, you
must forget everything traditional that you have learned about God ....
Id. at 187. (quoting P. TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 57 (1948).
102. One could easily accuse the Court (and Tillich) of circular logic. If every man's "ulti-
mate concern" is by definition his religion, then every man is religious. The Court would
then be holding that Congress intended to extend the exemption to every conscientious
objector, of whatever stripe. This would have the effect of reading Congress' requirement of
a religious basis for conscientious objection out of the statute.
103. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
104. Id. at 335-37.
105. "[A] registrant's statement that his beliefs are nonreligious is a highly unreliable
guide for those charged with administering the exemption. Id. at 341.
Justice Harlan concurred, finding the Court's purported reliance upon statutory construc-
tion to be illegitimate, but the holding nonetheless compelled by the religion clauses: Con-
gress was not required by the first amendment to make any exemptions, but "having chosen
to exempt, it cannot draw the line between theistic or nontheistic religious beliefs on the
one hand and secular beliefs on the other." Id. at 356 (Harlan, J., concurring). The constitu-
tionality of limiting exemptions to religious objectors is considered below. See infra text
accompanying notes 432-56.
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4. Thomas v. Review Board
In Thomas v. Review Board,106 the Court reversed the denial of
unemployment compensation to a Jehovah's Witness who quit his
job for religious reasons. Thomas had been employed at a roll
foundry that phased out its non-military production and assigned
Thomas to work on tank turrets. After this assignment Thomas
quit and applied for unemployment compensation. Thomas was
denied unemployment compensation because his termination was
not based upon "good cause."' 017 The Court decided that the free
exercise clause protected Thomas' right to compensation. Although
only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise
Clause,"' 018 the Court would take a broad view of the definition of
what is religious. 09 Finally, the Court declined to require that
Thomas show that his belief was shared by other members of his
sect, some of whom did not have scruples about working on tank
turrets."0
C. The "Excessive Entanglement" Prohibition
A third source of authority for the proposition that the state
should not take positions on theological issues is the line of cases
in which the Supreme Court declared the state's obligation to
avoid "excessive entanglement." The leading case in this area is
Walz v. Tax Commission."' In Walz, the Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of a tax exemption for property used solely for religious
purposes. In doing so it described its task as a struggle "to find a
neutral course between the two Religion Clauses.""' In its view the
religion clauses seek "to mark boundaries to avoid excessive entan-
glement" between church and state." 3
106. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
107. Id. at 712.
108. Id. at 713
109. Id. at 714.
110. "Intrafaith differences of that kind are not uncommon among followers of a particu-
lar creed, and the judicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve such differences. ...
Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation." Id. at 715-16.
111. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
112. Id. at 668.
113. Id. at 670. While some had suggested that the social welfare function of many
churches might be the touchstone of the exemption, the Court thought such an approach
fraught with peril:
To give emphasis to so variable an aspect of the work of religious bodies would intro-
duce an element of governmental evaluation and standards as to the worth of particu-
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The avoidance of "excessive entanglement" was incorporated
into the now familiar Lemon test, adopted in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man114 and its companion case, Tilton v. Richardson."5 These two
cases will be considered in detail in section IV. For the moment it
is sufficient to point out that the Court based its rejection of two
different programs of state aid to parochial schools on the finding
that Rhode Island and Pennsylvania could not administer the pro-
grams in question without "excessive and enduring entanglement
between church and state."""' Similarly, the Court has been reluc-
tant to identify "religious" speech as opposed to other forms of
protected speech. In Widmar v. Vincent,"1 the Court considered
whether a student group's access to a state university's facilities
could be limited simply because it was religious activity rather
than some other kind of speech:" s
[E]ven if the distinction drew an arguably principled line, it is
highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial competence to
administer. Merely to draw the distinction would require the univer-
sity and ultimately the courts to inquire into the significance of
words and practices to different religious faiths, and in varying cir-
cumstances by the same faith. Such inquiries would tend inevitably
to entangle the State with religion in a manner forbidden by our
cases.
1 9
Recent statements of Justice Stevens in Goldman v. Wein-
berger120 recognize the importance of these principles in free exer-
cise cases. In Goldman, an Air Force captain (who was also a Jew-
ish rabbi) sued to enjoin the enforcement of an Air Force
regulation which prohibited the wearing of unauthorized headgear.
lar social welfare programs, thus producing a kind of continuing day-to-day relation-
ship which the policy of neutrality seeks to minimize.
Id. at 674. Moreover, taxing churches might cause as much entanglement with churches as
granting exemptions. "In analyzing either alternative the questions are whether the involve-
ment is excessive, and whether it is a continuing one calling for official and continuing sur-
veillance leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement." Id. at 675.
114. 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see infra text accompanying notes 169-76.
115. 403 U.S. 672 (1971); see infra text accompanying notes 191-97.
116. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619 (Rhode Islana). See also id. at 621-22 (Pennsylvania).
117. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
118. Justice White attempted in his dissent to distinguish religious worship from other
forms of speech protected by the first amendment. Id. at 282 (White, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 269 n.6 (citations omitted).
120. 475 U.S. 503 (1986); see also United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (Amish em-
ployer denied exemption from Social Security taxes, because of overriding governmental
interest in the preservation of the soundness of the social security system).
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Goldman complained that his religion required him to wear a yar-
mulke, and that forbidding him to do so would force him to violate
his religious beliefs.'21 Justice Stevens concurred in the Court's
opinion upholding the Air Force regulation, but wrote a separate
opinion noting that any alternative would involve the Court in
evaluating the character and sincerity of the faith of persons re-
questing exemptions.' 22
More recently, the Court considered a free exercise claim by Cal-
ifornia Indian Tribes whose worship sites were threatened by pro-
posed development within a national forest.123 Justice O'Connor,
joined by four other justices, rejected the dissenting justices' sug-
gestion that the Forest Service weigh the inconvenience to the gov-
ernment against the harm that would be inflicted upon the tribes'
religious tradition, finding that "such an approach cannot be
squared with the Constitution or with our precedents, and ...
would cast the judiciary in a role that we were never intended to
play. 124
In short, the Court has routinely held that the religion clauses of
the first amendment were intended to keep the state neutral with
respect to theological matters. Even where a theological contro-
versy flowers into a legal dispute, the state is required to deal with
such disputes neutrally, so as to avoid even the appearance of
favoring one set of theological views. However, the affirmative ac-
tion approach frequently requires that this principle be honored in
the breach rather than the observance, as the next two sections of
this article demonstrate.
IV. ENTANGLEMENT WITH RELIGION BY PROHIBITING AID TO
"SECTARIAN" INSTITUTIONS
The issue of "aid to parochial schools" was highly controversial
even before the Court directly addressed it for the first time in
1947.123 Although the Court ostensibly adopted its prohibition
against aid to "sectarian '126 private'27 schools and colleges2 " in or-
121. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 504-06.
122. "The Air Force has no business drawing distinctions between such persons when it is
enforcing commands of universal application." Id. at 513. (Stevens, J., concurring).
123. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
124. Id. at 458.
125. See infra note 286.
126. See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976) ("[No state aid
at all [may] go to institutions that are so 'pervasively sectarian' that secular activities can-
[Vol. 24:253
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der to avoid "excessive entanglement" '129 with religion, the Court's
standard has the opposite effect. No clear understanding of the
problem is possible without a review of the path by which the
Court arrived at its current approach.
A. Everson and Allen: The Statement of the Problem
1. Everson v. Board of Education
The court first addressed the issue of aid to parochial schools in
the celebrated case of Everson v. Board of Education.' Everson
dealt with a New Jersey taxpayer who challenged the constitution-
ality of a resolution by the local board of education appropriating
funds to reimburse parents for the expense of transporting chil-
dren to and from the Trenton and Pennington High Schools and
the Catholic Schools.'' Justice Black, writing for a narrow major-
ity, found that this form of aid did not breach the "wall between
church and state."' 32 Justice Black first set forth the legislative
history of the religion clauses as a basis for interpreting them.133
not be separated from sectarian ones.. .. ")
127. While the issue has usually been framed in terms of "aid to parochial [i.e. religious]
schools," a significant question is whether the asserted unconstitutionality applies to the
state's distribution of aid to any private schools, or just to those institutions that are "secta-
rian." Thus there are two different questions: (1) whether aid should be distributed to "sec-
tarian" schools, assuming we could identify them; and (2) whether the state can identify
which schools are "sectarian" and which are not.
128. For clarity, the term "schools" will be used to refer to elementary and secondary
schools and "colleges" will be used to refer to colleges and universities.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 180-81.
130. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
131. Id. at 62 n.59 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Although this was the first case involving aid
to private schools, the question of aid to religiously-affiliated organizations was far from
new. In 1899, for example, the Supreme Court held that a hospital operated by a Catholic
order of nuns was not disqualified from receiving subsidies from Congress. The Court held
that the "fact that the hospital is conducted under the auspices of said church, [is] wholly
immaterial." Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 298 (1899).
132. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
133. According to this history, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson were the leading
figures in the drafting of the religion clauses, which had "the same objective and were in-
tended to provide the same protection against governmental intrusion on religious liberty"
as the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty. Id. at 13. The Virginia Bill had earlier been de-
scribed as based upon "the conviction that individual religious liberty could be achieved
best under a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to
assist any or all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual or
group." Id. at 11. In fact, even supporters of the "wall of separation" interpretation of the
religion clauses have acknowledged that its limitations were intended to apply only to the
federal government. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 253 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("No one questions that the Framers of the First Amendment
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He concluded that the establishment clause "was intended to erect
'a wall of separation between church and State.' "2134 The "wall of
separation" metaphor has had many critics,1"' and Justice Black's
reliance upon Jefferson's and Madison's personal views has been
criticized as inappropriate.' s6 However, no opinion challenged Jus-
tice Black's reading or the conclusion that he drew from it. Justice
Black concluded that "New Jersey cannot consistently with the
'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment contrib-
ute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution which teaches
the tenets and faith of any church.'13 7
Nonetheless, Justice Black cautioned, "[W]e must be careful, in
protecting the citizens of New Jersey against state-established
churches, to be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit New
Jersey from extending its general state law benefits to all its citi-
zens without regard to their religious belief."'3 s Exactly how to dis-
tinguish the one from the other was never spelled out. Based upon
Justice Black's dissenting opinion more than twenty years later in
Board of Education v. Allen,'3 9 it appears he had in mind some
sort of distinction between general welfare programs and those
designed to assist the educational function of the school. 4"
It was the dissenting opinions that looked ahead to future cases
intended to restrict exclusively the powers of the Federal Government.").
134. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)
(quoting Thomas Jefferson's Letter to the Danbury Baptists)).
135. Hutchins, The Future of the Wall, in THE WAL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 25 (D.
Oaks ed. 1963); see also Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 247
(1948) (Reed, J., dissenting) ("A rule of law should not be drawn from a figure of speech");
J. O'NEILL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION (1949); Note, Jefferson and
the Church-State Wall: A Historical Examination of the Man and the Metaphor, 1978
B.Y.U. L. REV. 645.
136. See supra note 28.
137. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
138. Id.; see also Costanzo, Federal Aid to Education and Religious Liberty, 36 U. DET.
L.J. 1, 42 (1958) (federal aid policies implicate similar concerns).
139. 392 U.S. 236 (1968); see infra text accompanying notes 159-68.
140. Justice Black distinguished the provision of police and fire protection because they
were "so separate and indisputably marked off from the religious function. . . ." Everson,
330 U.S. at 18. That is, although police and fire protection were even more essential to the
school's operation than bus transportation, they were acceptable forms of aid because they
were in his mind at least not related to the practice of religion. Of course, any attempt to
disqualify religious organizations from the receipt of otherwise universally provided services
would amount to precisely the form of discrimination he earlier suggested would be im-
proper. Id. at 16. In later cases Justice Black subordinated this principle to the concept that
some forms of "state law benefits"-educational assistance-were so closely tied to the reli-
gious function that they violated the principle of separation of church and state.
[Vol. 24:253
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and attempted to state how the broad principles announced by the
Court might be applied. Justice Jackson dissented because he felt
the specific reference to "the Catholic schools" was "an essentially
religious test."14' But the other dissenting opinion objected to the
inclusiveness of the appropriation, rather than its exclusivity. 142
Joined by Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton, Justice Rut-
ledge relied on two major premises. The first was that the first
amendment, as applied by the fourteenth, was intended to provide
"complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious ac-
tivity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every
form of public aid or support for religion.' 14 The second premise
was that the education provided at Catholic schools was in fact
"religion.' 4 4 Justice Rutledge could discern no constitutional mid-
dle ground between permitting all aid and permitting none, 45 be-
cause no rational line could be drawn between the reimbursement
of transportation costs and the entire cost of parochial
education. 41
One might easily quarrel with the first of Justice Rutledge's two
major premises, 41 but the more interesting is the second. Justice
Rutledge assumed that providing aid to a school run by the Catho-
lic church was indistinguishable from providing aid to the church
itself. His argument was quite simple and was based on past Court
decisions 48 which had provided protection to all forms of religious
practice, including street preaching and the distribution of
tracts. 49 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,5 ' the Court recognized the
141. Id. at 25 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
142. It seems relatively clear that the majority considered the intent of the appropriation
to be nondiscriminatory, and in any event would require it to be such. Id. at 4 n.2.
143. Id. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). The Court quoted this language with approval
in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 217 (1963).
144. Everson, 330 U.S. at 32-33.
145. Justice Rutledge favored the latter approach. "Legislatures are free to make, and
courts to sustain, appropriations only when it can be found that in fact they do not aid,
promote, encourage or sustain religious teaching or observances, be the amount large or
small." Id. at 52-53 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 48. The Court eventually recognized the force of Justice Rutledge's argument.
Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985) (court struck down a program
for the "loan" of public school remedial reading teachers to private schools, noting that
"there is no principled basis on which this Court can impose a limit on the percentage of the
religious school day that can be subsidized by the public school.").
147. See supra notes 28 and 133.
148. The decisions cited by Justice Rutledge were: Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946); Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Martin
v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); and Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
149. Everson, 330 U.S. at 32-33 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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freedom to send children to parochial schools as a right protected
by the first amendment. Since the word "religion" was used only
once in the first amendment it should be interpreted symmetri-
cally, and thus if a practice was constitutionally protected as an
exercise of religion it could not be aided.151
There are two problems with this argument. The first lies in the
use of the Pierce decision for the "symmetry" requirement, since
Pierce was based broadly upon the authority of parents to deter-
mine the education of their children, not upon any special protec-
tion for religious education. 152 The second problem lies in deter-
mining which institutions are "religious" either for purposes of the
rights granted in Pierce or for the disqualification Justice Rutledge
believed was required here. Because Everson involved Catholic
schools, perhaps it appeared simple to distinguish the religious
schools from secular ones. In his dissenting opinion in Everson,
Justice Jackson attempted to articulate the sharp difference be-
tween the education in Catholic schools and the education in pub-
lic schools. 53
150. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
151. Everson, 330 U.S. at 33 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
152. The successful appellants in Pierce were parents who wanted to send their children
to private school. While one was a religious school, the other was a military academy; they
were not differentiated in the level of constitutional protection afforded by the Court. Thus,
the reading of the case as a "religious liberties" case is unwarranted. See Kurland, supra
note 13, at 14.
153. Justice Jackson's position is striking, perhaps because he was not entirely unsympa-
thetic with the Catholic viewpoint.
It is no exaggeration to say that the whole historic conflict in temporal policy be-
tween the Catholic Church and non-Catholics comes to a focus in their respective
school policies. The Roman Catholic Church, counseled by experience in many ages
and many lands and with all sorts and conditions of men, takes what, from the view-
point of its own progress and the success of its mission, is a wise estimate of the
importance of education to religion. It does not leave the individual to pick up reli-
gion by chance. It relies on early and indelible indoctrination in the faith and order of
the Church by the word and example of persons consecrated to the task.
Our public school, if not a product of Protestantism, at least is more consistent
with it than with the Catholic culture and scheme of values. It is a relatively recent
development dating from about 1840. It is organized on the premise that secular edu-
cation can be isolated from all religious teaching so that the school can inculcate all
needed temporal knowledge and also maintain a strict and lofty neutrality as to reli-
gion. The assumption is that after the individual has been instructed in worldly wis-
dom he will be better fitted to choose his religion. Whether such a disjunction is
possible, and if possible whether it is wise, are questions I need not try to answer.
I should be surprised if any Catholic would deny that the parochial school is a vital,
if not the most vital, part of the Roman Catholic Church. If put to the choice, that
venerable institution, I should expect, would forego its whole service for mature per-
sons before it would give up education of the young, and it would be a wise choice. Its
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Even if one were to accept Justice Jackson's dichotomy, or Jus-
tice Rutledge's reasoning, 15 4 the problem of identifying which
schools are "religious ' ' 155 remains. It seems obvious that a private
school which was not religious in any way 56 should have no diffi-
culty qualifying for state aid. If the disqualifying feature of the
sectarian school was that it did an inferior job in providing secular
knowledge or skills, the Constitution might require that aid be
conditioned upon proof that the state's purposes were being ac-
complished.157 However, it seems clear that Justices Rutledge and
Jackson objected not to the job that religious schools did in ad-
vancing the state's interest in education, but to the religious per-
spective and/or teaching of religious beliefs that comes with the
secular education in a religious schobl. Even assuming that it is
appropriate for the state to withhold aid from those who advance
religious perspectives along with secular education, how does the
state know when an institution is doing so? It may appear obvious
in the case of a Catholic school, but what about a military academy
like the one in Pierce? What if the military school were to employ
a chaplain, or build a chapel, or require attendance at chapel?
When would the school become "religious" for purposes of Justice
Rutledge's ban? As we shall see below, no line can be drawn which
growth and cohesion, discipline and loyalty, spring from its schools. Catholic educa-
tion is the rock on which the whole structure rests, and to render tax aid to its
Church school is indistinguishable to me from rendering the same aid to the Church
itself.
Everson, 330 U.S. at 23-24 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). It is of course true
that the "aid" goes to the church itself. But see Choper, supra note 28, at 288-89 (state is
not "aiding" the church school, but rather buying a secular service education). But even if
the education subsidy is conceded to be aid, it still must be distributed in a nondiscrimina-
tory fashion. If the state subsidizes some activity libraries, for example it cannot withhold
that aid from some individual or group simply because the recipient will use it for religious
purposes. A priest is entitled to a library card even if he uses it only to prepare his weekly
homily.
Moreover, if Justice Jackson's dichotomy between the Catholic view and the Protestant
view is accurate, has the Court in effect declared that the Constitution requires adoption of
the Protestant view?
154. The Court eventually did so in large measure. As to Jackson's dichotomy, see infra
text accompanying note 197; as to Rutledge's reasoning, see supra note 146.
155. What the Court was later to call "sectarian."
156. An example may be the military school which was one of successful appellants in
Pierce. See supra note 152.
157. In fact, quite the contrary appears to be the case. Professor Laycock contends that
there is a "compelling state interest" in permitting religious schools to educate disadvan-
taged children because they do a better job of it than the public schools. Laycock, Towards
a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the
Right to Church Autonomy, 81 CoLuM. L. REv. 1373, 1387-88 (1981).
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will keep the state (or the courts) from measuring the amount of
theological benefit received, and thereby engaging in precisely the
kind of inquiry which it has otherwise eschewed. 5 "
2. Board of Education v. Allen
While Justice Rutledge expressed his opinions in dissent, noth-
ing in the majority opinion rejected his views in principle, only
their application, to the facts in Everson. In the next case to con-
sider the problem, Board of Education v. Allen,159 the underlying
conflict surfaced. In Allen, the issue was the constitutionality of a
New York statute requiring local school districts, upon request, to
loan textbooks free of charge to "all children residing in such dis-
trict who are enrolled in grades seven to twelve of a public or pri-
vate school which complies with the compulsory education law."'' 0
The majority opinion agreed with Justice Rutledge that form of
aid made a difference, but reached the opposite conclusion,' sus-
taining the constitutionality of the statute. Writing for the major-
ity, Justice White stated that although books, unlike bus fares, are
"critical to the teaching process," and although "in a sectarian
school that process is employed to teach religion ... this Court
has long recognized that religious schools pursue two goals, reli-
gious instruction and secular education."' 62 Thus the majority re-
jected Justice Rutledge's assumption that support of education in
religious schools was tantamount to support of the religion itself.
Justice Black, issued a furious dissent on this issue. 6 3 He under-
stood Everson to have permitted only "a general and nondiscrimi-
natory transportation service in no way related to substantive reli-
158. See infra text accompanying notes 211-57.
159. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
160. Id. at 240 n.3.
161. Professor Katz, initially a supporter of the Everson opinion, had occasion to recon-
sider it, and concluded that the "no aid" position was untenable. "Like the dissenters in the
bus fare case, I am not now able to distinguish between the minor payments there involved
and payments for educational costs. I believe, therefore, that none of such nondiscrimina-
tory uses of tax funds are forbidden by the First Amendment." Katz, Freedom of Religion
and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 426, 440 (1953).
162. Allen, 392 U.S. at 245.
163. Justices Douglas and Fortas also dissented, but did not join Justice Black's opinion.
They believed that the mechanism for implementing the program would create confronta-
tions between religious schools and school districts. Id. at 256 (Douglas, J., dissenting). This




gious views and beliefs.' ' 164 He thought state-provided textbooks
fell into a completely different classification:
I still subscribe to the belief that tax-raised funds cannot constitu-
tionally be used to support religious schools, buy their school books,
erect their buildings, pay their teachers, or pay any other of their
maintenance expenses, even to the extent of one penny. The First
Amendment's prohibition against governmental establishment of re-
ligion was written on the assumption that state aid to religion and
religious schools generates discord, disharmony, hatred, and strife
among our people, and that any government that supplies such aids
is to that extent a tyranny. And I still believe that the only way to
protect minority religious groups from majority groups in this coun-
try is to keep the wall of separation between church and state high
and impregnable as the First and Fourteenth Amendments provide.
The Court's affirmance here bodes nothing but evil to religious
peace in this country. 65
Justice Black was understandably upset at the failure of the Court
to follow his dicta in Everson. But it is difficult to understand his
attempt to make an absolute dichotomy between the two cases.
The only new development in Allen was that aid went to the edu-
cational function of the school as opposed to its logistical opera-
tion. In neither case was the aid dependent on substantive reli-
gious views and beliefs.
Apparently it is the similarity between the subsidized activity
and religious activity that Justice Black found critical. He was con-
tent to subsidize the parochial school in Everson by supplying all
school children with bus fares and midday lunches,'66 because that
was not similar to practicing religion, but he became apoplectic at
supplying geometry textbooks.6 While the school bus fare could
164. Id. at 253 (Black, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 253-54.
166. Id. at 252.
167. This is apparently because geometry textbooks directly promote the educational mis-
sion of the schoool, whereas transportation and lunches might be motivated to preserve
health and safety. Even commentators who have attempted to justify Justice Black's ap-
proach have suggested that some support would be acceptable. For example, one article
suggests that "[a] theory of strict neutrality would mean just this: that no aid should be
allowed to flow from the state to religious organizations either indirectly or directly, except
when embodied in a general welfare grant benefitting society as a whole." Note, Rebuilding
the Wall: The Case for a Return to the Strict Interpretation of the Establishment Clause,
81 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1475 (1981). Would not a program designed to extend funds to
parents for the education of their children qualify as a "general welfare grant benefitting
society as a whole"?
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certainly be justified on another basis, such as assuring children's
safety, at what point is the state required to consider what the re-
cipients of state aid will do with it? Justice Black wanted to pre-
vent the aid designed to promote education from being diverted to
the support of religion. But the same diversion occurs when the
state promotes safety by subsidizing bus fares. 16 8 Moreover, the
same problem of diversion occurs when the state hands out free
library cards to those who use them to further their own religious
goals, or welfare checks to those who use the money to go to
church.
B. The Adoption of the Prohibition: Lemon and Tilton
Given the fact that the Supreme Court had never held aid to a
private school in violation of the establishment clause, and the
Court's broad basis for the holding in Allen, the ruling in Lemon v.
Kurtzman" may have come as something of a shock. While the
Court approved aid to religiously affiliated colleges in the compan-
ion case of Tilton v. Richardson,'1 0 it struck down similar aid to
religiously affiliated schools in Lemon.1 ' The centerpiece of both
cases was the now familiar three-pronged test. A statute challenged
under the establishment clause will survive only if it: (1) has a
"secular legislative purpose";1 2 (2) has a "principal or primary ef-
168. Justice Marshall attempted to make the distinction between bus fares and textbooks
when he suggested in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), that Allen should be over-
ruled. See infra note 186.
169. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
170. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
171. The form of aid was slightly different in the two cases that were consolidated into
Lemon. In No. 569/70, Rhode Island, taxpayers challenged the Rhode Island Salary Supple-
ment Act, which provided a 15% salary supplement to teachers in nonpublic schools at
which the average per-pupil expenditure was below the public school average. To qualify, a
teacher was required to teach courses offered in the public schools and could not teach
religion. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 608. In the second case (No. 89), a taxpayer challenged Penn-
sylvania's Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which authorized "con-
tracts" for the purchase of "secular educational services" from nonpublic schools. Reim-
bursement was limited to courses "presented in the curricula of the public schools," and
precluded reimbursement "for any course that contains 'any subject matter expressing reli-
gious teaching, or the morals or forms of worship of any sect.'" Id. at 610.
172. Id. at 612. This "test" was an amalgam of tests used in earlier establishment clause
cases; the first two elements were derived from Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243
(1968), which in turn had followed the approach used in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. The third element was derived from
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970), discussed supra at text accompanying
notes 111-13. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
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fect that neither advances nor inhibits religion";7 3 and (3) does
not "foster 'excessive government entanglement with religion.' "M74
The Lemon test has served as the starting point for application of
the establishment clause ever since,7 5 but its announcement was
prefaced by a warning that bright lines or tidy distinctions could
not be expected. 1 6
In applying the three-pronged test in Lemon, the Court found
that the first prong was easily satisfied.17 As to the second prong
of the test, the Court was not prepared to declare itself. It hinted
that it might find a violation of the second prong, noting that in its
limitations, the state had implicitly acknowledged 7 8 "that these
programs approached, even if they did not intrude upon, the for-
bidden areas under the Religion Clauses."'' 9 Under the third prong
173. Lemon 403 U.S. at 612.
174. Id. at 613.
175. "[S]tate action alleged to violate the Establishment Clause should be measured
against the Lemon criteria." Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985).
176. 403 U.S. at 612 ("Candor compels acknowledgement, moreover, that we can only
dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitu-
tional law.")
177. "[TIhe statutes themselves clearly state that they are intended to enhance the qual-
ity of the secular education in all schools covered by the compulsory attendance laws. There
is no reason to believe the legislatures meant anything else." Id. at 613.
In fact, the Court has repeatedly taken for granted that in providing aid to religious
schools, the states were not acting out of a hidden desire to aid religion, but rather wanted
to advance secular aims. This was to become a familiar refrain in school-aid cases. See
Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985) ("As has often been true in
school aid cases, there is no dispute as to the first test."). Thus, the condemnation of school
aid is entirely a creature of the "affirmative action" focus upon effects; if the Court aban-
doned the affirmative action approach to the religion clauses the problem of "aid to religious
schools" would disappear entirely. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 363 (1975) ("We accept
the legitimacy of this secular legislative purpose"); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236
(1977) ("[W]e have no difficulty with the first prong of this three-part test"); Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973) ("We do not question
the propriety, and fully secular content, of New York's interest in preserving a healthy and
safe educational environment for all of its schoolchildren").
178. See supra note 171.
179. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. This assumption was crucial, since the "entanglement"
problems which the Court found to doom the programs could have been easily cured by
reducing some of the restrictions. By assuming that these restrictions had been put in place
because they were constitutionally required, the Court closed off the logical avenue for cur-
ing the constitutional infirmities it found. The Court eventually held in Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), that even more limited aid failed
the second prong of the Lemon test, because its "effect, inevitably, is to subsidize and ad-
vance the religious mission of sectarian schools." Id. at 779-80.
The "effect" finding in Lemon was made easy by the fact that the schools themselves
would admit that their primary purpose was the inculcation of religion. As we shall see,
however, that is a different question from whether or not the principal or primary effect of
the state's aid of those schools is to advance or inhibit religion. Nonetheless, because of the
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the Court found that "the cumulative impact of the entire relation-
ship arising under the statutes in each State involves excessive en-
tanglement between government and religion."'' s0 The essential
vice of the programs was that to enforce the "no teaching of reli-
gion" prohibition, the states would be required to police the reli-
gious schools.'81
Although it claimed to apply an objective test that was based
upon earlier holdings of the Court, the opinion made it clear that
the Court saw the Lemon case as one which ultimately required
the kind of value judgment extolled in Walz. is2 After paying trib-
ute to the social benefit derived from church-related schools, the
opinion concluded:
The merit and benefits of these schools, however, are not the issue
before us in these cases. The sole question is whether state aid to
these schools can be squared with the dictates of the Religion
Clauses. Under our system the choice has been made that govern-
ment is to be entirely excluded from the area of religious instruction
similarity between these two factors, it was easy to make the logical leap.
180. Lemon 403 U.S. at 614. The use of the entanglement prong as a separate test has
been reviewed and criticized in Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion Clauses A
Ten Year Assessment, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1195 (1980).
181. An additional form of entanglement was the "divisive political potential of these
state programs." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622. In the process of determining the amount of the
subsidy for private schools, "many people ... will find their votes aligned with their faith."
This is another forbidden form of entanglement, since "political division along religious
lines was one of the principal evils which the First Amendment was intended to protect." Id.
The Court did not clarify the operative significance of this form of entanglement whether by
itself it could doom an otherwise acceptable program, or whether it was one of several "fac-
tors" to be weighed in making a determination. In Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 798, the Court cited
this form of entanglement as a "warning signal" of unconstitutionality.
For a critique of the use of the "divisiveness" test to invalidate otherwise constitutional
legislation, see Gaffney, Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of
the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 205, 230 (1980)
("the inconsistent and incoherent use and nonuse of the political divisiveness test by the
Supreme Court suggests that the utility of this test as a tool of constitutional adjudication is
dubious"); Paulsen, supra note 17, at 346 (the establishment clause "does not grant govern-
ment an affirmative power to expunge the potentially explosive presence of religious views
from public and political life"); Note, Abortion Laws, Religious Beliefs and the First
Amendment, 14 VAL. U.L. REV. 487, 513 (1980) ("If. . .persons of particular faiths have a
right to take a stand on public issues, then religious motivation, and political divisiveness
alone would seemingly not be sufficient to present Establishment Clause problems.") (foot-
notes omitted). But see Note, Political Entanglement as an Independent Test of Constitu-
tionality Under the Establishment Clause, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1209 (1984) (suggesting
that the Lemon test be supplemented by a fourth prong that would invalidate legislation
that results in division of the political body along religious lines).
182. See supra text accompanying note 54.
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and churches excluded from the affairs of government. The Consti-
tution decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individ-
ual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and that while
some involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines must be
drawn.1 8
3
But Lemon declined to specify exactly what line was being drawn.
While making it clear that open-ended aid to religiously-affiliated
schools was now out of the question, the validity of Everson's sanc-
tion of bus fares or Allen's approval of textbook purchases was not
questioned. Subsequent cases attempted to classify aid according
to permissible and impermissible types. Tax benefits were initially
disapproved,18 4 then rehabilitated.185 Statutes providing for in-
structional materials as well as textbooks, or field trips as well as
bus fares, produced a hopelessly divided court which could not
agree on whether filmstrip projectors or maps and globes were dis-
tinguishable from textbooks, and if so, on what principle. 186 Even-
183. Lemon 403 U.S. at 625.
184. In Nyquist, the Court struck down a provision of a New York statute which would
have provided tax relief for parents who sent their children to private schools. The Court
professed uncertainty as to whether it was dealing with a tax credit or tax deduction, but
concluded that "the constitutionality of this hybrid benefit does not turn in any event on
the label we accord it." 413 U.S. at 789. It was unconstitutional because "'the money in-
volved represents a charge made upon the state for the purpose of religious education.'" Id.
at 791 (quoting 350 F. Supp. 655, 675 (Hays, J., dissenting)).
185. In Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), the court found constitutional a deduction
against Minnesota state income tax for the costs of tuition, transportation, and textbooks at
elementary and secondary schools. Two aspects of the case are notable. First, the Court
attempted to distinguish Nyquist, with limited success. 463 U.S. at 398-99. But second, it
seems in retrospect astonishing that the vote (5-4) was so close. Strangely unmentioned in
the majority opinion was this argument: if a contribution to a church's religious education
program would be deductible without much question under Walz, upon what basis is it
unconstitutional to deduct a payment for private school tuition? Could anyone take seri-
ously an argument that "diversion" to religious education would make the program
unconstitutional?
186. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). Only two justices could agree on the
proper disposition of six different forms of aid (secular textbooks; standardized tests; speech
and hearing diagnostic services; therapeutic, guidance and remedial services; instructional
materials and equipment "incapable of diversion to religious use"; and field trips). Justice
Marshall suggested that order could only be achieved by overruling Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968):
By overruling Allen, we would free ourselves to draw a line between acceptable and
unacceptable forms of aid that would be both capable of consistent application and
responsive to the concerns discussed above. That line, I believe, should be placed
between general welfare programs that serve children in sectarian schools because the
schools happen to be a convenient place to reach the programs' target populations
and programs of educational assistance."
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 259 (Opinion of Marshall, J.). Justice Marshall described this as the
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tually, the cases permitting aid (Everson and Allen) were more or
less confined to their facts.
Aside from the fundamental incoherence of the purported dis-
tinctions between bus fares, field trips, textbooks, and filmstrips,
there is an unexamined distinction between eligible and ineligible
institutions. Surprisingly little attention' 87 has been devoted to
this more troubling issue. Assuming arguendo that this disqualifi-
cation of "church-related elementary and secondary schools"'1 8
were constitutionally required, how are such schools to be identi-
fied? As noted above,189 it seems indisputable that if the state
awarded funds to a school having no church ties, no provision of
the constitution would be offended.' Thus, there must be some
kind of "sectarianism" meter that will tell a state agency or court
when the establishment clause has been violated.
This problem is highlighted by Tilton v. Richardson,'9' the com-
panion case to Lemon. Whereas in Lemon there was a challenge to
line that Justice Black thought he was drawing. Id. n.4. But neither Justice Black nor Jus-
tice Marshall could explain why using the schools as a "convenient place" to reach the
state's target population for the purpose of advancing education should be constitutionally
different from using them to promote health or safety. See supra text accompanying notes
166-67. Moreover, it does not answer the question raised in this article of how the ineligible
"sectarian" schools are to be identified.
187. The only significant commentary on this issue was contained in two articles in The
Supreme Court Review. Professor Giannella thought that the Court intentionally used a
"broad-brush" technique, since case-by-case analysis would "involve the judiciary in just the
kind of entanglement that the Court presumably was trying to avoid." Giannella, Lemon
and Tilton: The Bitter and the Sweet of Church-State Entanglement, 1971 SUP. CT. REy.
147, 181. Similarly, Professor Morgan suggested that the Court may have struck down the
entire program in order to avoid "Equal Protection Clause embarrassment if the program
remained in effect with lower courts making a school-by-school determination of eligibility
based on the extent of religious infusion in each." Morgan, The Establishment Clause and
Sectarian Schools: A Final Installment?, 1973 Sup. CT. REv. 57, 92 (footnote omitted).
188. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625.
189. See supra text accompanying note 156.
190. Nonetheless, when permissible aid was mixed with impermissible aid, the Court in-
validated both types. Shortly after Lemon was decided, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted
another tuition reimbursement program, with a severability clause to save whatever in the
program might be constitutional. When the constitutionality of the program was challenged,
the district court ruled that none of the aid, including aid to parents of children registerect
in nonreligious, private schools, was constitutional. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 828 n.1
(1973). On appeal, the Supreme Court treated it as a companion case to Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (see supra note 184). The Court
stated that "valid aid to nonpublic, nonsectarian schools would provide no lever for aid to
their sectarian counterparts. The Equal Protection Clause has never been regarded as a
bludgeon with which to compel a State to violate other provisions of the Constitution."
Sloan, 413 U.S. at 834.
191. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
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receipt by private schools of state financial aid, in Tilton the chal-
lenge was to the receipt by church-related colleges and universities
of federal aid.192 The Court narrowly"'3 sustained the constitution-
ality of the grants, with one minor exception.9 4 The decisive point
for the plurality was a finding9 5 that the church-related colleges
were not "sectarian," thus distinguishing them from the church-
related schools in Lemon. 96 This was significant because it
changed the focus to the primary purpose of the institutions,
which in turn significantly reduced the risk of excessive entangle-
ment. In Tilton, the Court provided valuable insight into what it
meant by "sectarian.' 9 7
192. The Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, 20 U.S.C. § 751(a)(2)(C) (current ver-
sion at 20 U.S.C. § 1132: -1(1988)) provided for construction grants to colleges and universi-
ties, so long as the funds would not be used to construct any facility "to be used for secta-
rian instruction or as a place for religious worship. . ....
193. Only Justices Blackmun, Harlan and Stewart joined Chief Justice Burger's plurality
opinion. Justice White concurred in the judgment and wrote separately, since he had re-
jected the Lemon test which was the starting point for the analysis in Tilton. Lemon, 403
U.S. at 661, 665 & n.1 (White, J., concurring).
194. The statute provided that if the property should be used in violation of its terms
(namely for religious purposes) within the first 20 years of operation, the recipient would be
required to repay to the government the same portion of the building's present value as the
federal grant bore to the original construction cost. The Court held that the ability to use
the facility for any purpose presumably including religious ones after the 20 year period
constituted the gift of a reversionary interest, and was thus void. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 682-84.
195. It is revealing that this "finding" was made by the Supreme Court itself rather than
the trial court. This was one of Justice Brennan's complaints in dissent. He agreed that
constitutionality hinged on whether or not an institution is "sectarian," but he thought that
issue was for the trial court, which made no findings on that issue. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 659
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
The question of whether the determination of "sectarianness" should be made on such a
case-by-case basis is a central ambiguity in the Court's announced standard. See infra text
accompanying notes 250-57. Justice Brennan defined a sectarian university as "an educa-
tional institution in which the propagation and advancement of a particular religion are a
primary function of the institution." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 659-60. While this standard ap-
pears to lean toward the "denominational" definition of "sectarian," by referring to "a par-
ticular religion" it also uses the indefinite article, so that the existence of other "primary
purposes" of the institution would not guarantee eligibility.
196. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 685-87.
197. In DiCenso [Lemon] the District Court found that the parochial schools in Rhode
Island were "an integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic Church." There,
the record fully supported the conclusion that the inculcation of religious values was
a substantial if not the dominant purpose of the institutions. ...
Appellants' complaint here contains similar allegations.... [W]e are not required
to accept the allegations as true under these circumstances, particularly where, as
here, appellants themselves do not contend that these four institutions are
"sectarian."
There are generally significant differences between the religious aspects of church-
related institutions of higher learning and parochial elementary and secondary
schools. The "affirmative if not dominant policy" of the instruction in pre-college
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By highlighting the presence of some characteristics 9 ' and the
absence of others'99 the Court suggested that a "bright line" could
be drawn between sectarian and non-sectarian institutions. But
this dichotomy is illusory. There is a full spectrum of "fervor," and
no line can be drawn without significant entanglement in the most
sensitive religious issues.200 Moreover, because of the large finan-
cial impact of the determination, it is likely to have profound ef-
fects upon educational policy.
Subsequent cases have provided little clarification of what the
Court had in mind, although the Court has routinely approved fi-
nancial aid to colleges.20' For example, in Hunt v. McNair,20 2 tax-
payers challenged the constitutionality of state tax benefits ex-
tended to the Baptist College at Charleston. In deciding that the
church schools is "to assure future adherents to a particular faith by having control of
their total education at an early age." . . . There is substance to the contention that
college students are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrina-
tion. . . .Many church-related colleges and universities are characterized by a high
degree of academic freedom and seek to evoke free and critical responses from their
students.
The record here would not support a conclusion that any of these four institutions
departed from this general pattern. . . .The schools introduced evidence that they
made no attempt to indoctrinate students or to proselytize. . . .In short, the evi-
dence shows institutions with admittedly religious functions but whose predominant
higher education mission is to provide their students with a secular education.
Id.
198. For example, academic freedom and emphasis on secular education.
199. For instance, proselytization and indoctrination.
200. Another significant problem in the test is that it makes a sharp distinction between
aid to religious institutions and aid to individuals who then use their funds at religious
institutions. McConnell, Political and Religious Disestablishment, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 405.
[D]espite the similarities [to "direct aid" programs], indirect aid programs are
sharply differentiated in practice and constitutional doctrine from direct grant pro-
grams .... The individual beneficiary may use the aid in any qualified institution,
and there are no restrictions based on the religious or political affiliations of such
institutions. For example, students may use veterans' benefits, Pell Grants, and other
educational grants and loans at any accredited institution of higher learning, includ-
ing religious schools and even seminaries."
Id. at 424-25.
201. In Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976), a Maryland statute pro-
vided subsidies to all private colleges and universities except those that awarded "only semi -
narian or theological degrees." Id. at 740. Taxpayers challenged the receipt of funds by four
colleges affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church. Although the colleges employed chap-
lains, held religious exercises on campus, and taught mandatory religion or theology classes,
the district court found "clear and convincing evidence that courses at each defendant are
taught 'according to the academic requirements intrinsic to the subject matter and the indi-
vidual teacher's concept of professional standards.'" Id. at 756-57. Based on this factual
finding, a plurality of the Supreme Court affirmed. Id.
202. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
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aid was constitutional, the Court noted that:
[A]id normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advanc-
ing religion when it flows to an institution in which religion is so
pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in
the religious mission or when it funds a specifically religious activity
in an otherwise substantially secular setting.203
Recent cases have reaffirmed the disqualification of "pervasively
sectarian" institutions. In Grand Rapids School District v. Ball,204
the Court struck down remedial programs conducted by public
school teachers in private schools. It placed great weight on the
finding of the trial court that 40 of 41 recipient schools were "per-
vasively sectarian. 205 And in Bowen v. Kendrick, °8 the Court con-
sidered a challenge to the Adolescent Family Life Act,207 which
supplied funding for organizations that provide services and coun-
seling to adolescents. Congress amended the act to require grantees
to coordinate their efforts with other institutions, including reli-
gious and charitable organizations. 208 The act also permitted grants
to religious institutions. Although the Court rejected a facial chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of the act, it remanded the case for
reconsideration of whether any of the grantees were "pervasively
sectarian. 20 9
C. The Ambiguities in the "No Aid to [Pervasively] Sectarian
Institutions" Rule
Though widely accepted as the definitive standard for the con-
stitutionality of aid to private schools, the Lemon test presents
203. Id. at 743. The logical error that the Court makes in its equation of "sectarian"
schools and a "primary effect of advancing religion" is that it isolates the treatment of indi-
vidual recipients and looks at, their purposes, rather than the purpose and effect of the state
action toward all recipients. For example, when the state supplies free fire or police protec-
tion or library cards, there is no question that the state action has a primary effect that is
secular in character. Even though individual institutions may have dominantly or even ex-
clusively religious purposes for their use of the benefit, that does not make the benefit as to
them much less the benefit to all recipients an advancement of religion.
204. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
205. Id. at 385.
206. 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
207. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3002 to 3002-10 (19821 Supp. III 1985).
208. Kendrick 108 S. Ct. at 2567.
209. Id. at 2580. One positive sign in the case is the concurring opinion of Justice Ken-
nedy, expressing skepticism that "the term 'pervasively sectarian' is a well-founded juridical
category." Id. at 2582 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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fundamental inconsistencies. It is almost hopelessly vague, not
only about the difference between permissible and impermissible
types of aid, but more importantly about how to distinguish eligi-
ble from ineligible institutions. The Court seems to take for
granted that "sectarian" institutions may not receive state aid.
Leaving aside the argument that this decision is itself non-neu-
tral,21° two important questions about this standard remain. First,
does the term "sectarian" refer to "denominational" religiosity, or
simply to "intense" religiosity? Second, can class-wide determina-
tions of "sectarianism" eliminate the need for case-by-case
entanglement?
1. Does "Sectarian" Mean "Denominational" or "Intensely
Religious"?
The term "sectarian" had already acquired a meaning before the
Court began using it as the litmus test for eligibility for state aid.
It is not clear that this first meaning was the one the Court in-
tended to carry forward into the aid cases.
When the Court confronted the problem of "sectarianism" in de-
ciding the "school prayer" cases, 1' it was faced with two different
but related arguments. There was not only the fear that the state
would be involved in favoring religion over nonreligion, but a re-
lated fear that organizers of state-sponsored religious exercises
would face a herculean task in attempting to avoid a preference for
one religion. The second kind of favoritism was termed "sectarian-
ism." 2  For example, an expert witness in one case testified that
the Bible was nonsectarian, but he later admitted that he meant
"'non-sectarian within the Christian faiths.' ",213 This kind of sec-
210. See McConnell, supra note 200 at 437-38.
211. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp. 374
U.S. 203 (1963).
212. "Sectarian" is sometimes used in the sociology of religion as a kind of antonym for
"ecumenical." Whereas in an "ecumenical" spirit a religious person will attempt to find
points of commonality with those whose religious viewpoints differ from his own, the "secta-
rian" spirit emphasizes differences. P. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY 163-64 (1967). While'
not necessarily pejorative in itself the term "sectarian" usually implies a kind of favoritism.
213. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 210 (quoting Schempp v. School Dist. of Abington Township,
177 F. Supp. 398, 402 (1959)). Similarly, Jefferson distinguished between the support of
religion and the support of sectarianism. In planning the curriculum at the University of
Virginia, he suggested that there be no professor of divinity, but rather a professor of ethics,
who would teach "proofs of the being of a God .. . to which adding the development of
these moral obligations, of those in which all sects agree, with a knowledge of the languages,
Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, a basis will be formed common to all sects." EARLY HISTORY OF
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tarianism provoked much controversy in the nineteenth century
public schools. 21
4
"Sectarianism" in this sense referred to a partiality of one reli-
gion over another.215 It seems unlikely that in Lemon and subse-
quent cases the Court Was concerned with the denominational
preferences of a particular institution. If the "sectarian" Catholic
schools in Lemon had made the inculcation of religion their pri-
mary goal, but had been less concerned with "assur[ing] future ad-
herents to a particular faith"216 would that have made a difference
in the outcome of the case? One would not think so, but before
dismissing the possibility it is worth noting other references to a
"denominational" interpretation of sectarianism. In deciding that
the college receiving aid in Hunt v. McNair21T was not sectarian,
the Court noted that the percentage of Baptists in the student
body, sixty percent, was "roughly equivalent to the percentage of
Baptists in that area of South Carolina. ' 218 Another reference
which might support the "denominational" interpretation of "sec-
tarian" is found in Justice Brennan's dissent in Lemon, noted
earlier.21 9
On balance, it appears that the Court in the Lemon line of cases
was not focusing upon the "denominational" character of the insti-
tution, but rather upon the intensity of the religious beliefs. In any
case, the "denominational" approach is fraught with peril for two
reasons. First, the definition of which institutions are excessively
"denominational" or "sectarian" will give extremely broad discre-
tion to administrative agencies 220 and trial courts, who are ill-pre-
THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA AS CONTAINED IN THE LETTERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JO-
SEPH C. CABELL 441 (J. Randolph ed. 1856) (quoted in Note, supra note 135, at 670).
214. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 268-269 (Brennan, J., concurring). "The controversy centered,
in fact, principally about the elimination of plainly sectarian practices and textbooks, and
led to the eventual substitution of nonsectarian, though still religious, exercises and materi-
als." Id.
215. See supra note 212.
216. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-86 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission,
397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970)) (emphasis added).
217. 413 U.S. 734 (1973); see supra text accompanying note 202.
218. McNair, 413 U.S. at 744.
219. See supra note 195. Perhaps an additional source of confusion for the court was the
use in the Higher Education Facilities Act of the word "sectarian." See supra note 192.
220. The Court's standards require administrative agencies and other political bodies to
engage in the kind of inquiries heretofore conducted by courts. Wherever the state is other-
wise distributing funds on a neutral basis, it apparently must identify "pervasively secta-
rian" institutions and disqualify them. State departments of education will presumably be
expected to conduct the kind of inquiry engaged in by the court in Lemon. Now that "per-
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pared to handle the complex theological questions involved. Agen-
cies and courts will be prone to inject significant doses of religious
bias into the decisionmaking process. Since "sectarian" groups
often identify themselves in opposition to "mainstream" trends,22'
they are most likely to suffer from the kind of discrimination the
first amendment was designed to prevent. The second peril is that
once standards are articulated for the identification of a "secta-
rian" institution, modest institutional changes will blur the bound-
aries and trigger ongoing skirmishes between funding agencies, re-
cipients, and courts. In any event there will be far more of the
"excessive government entanglement with religion" '22 than the
Court thought permissible in Lemon or Tilton. Each of these
problems is illustrated in a case which, though it predated Lemon
and Tilton by five years, anticipated the Court's approach with re-
markable accuracy.
a. The "Ephemeral" Nature of Sectarianism
In Horace Mann League v. Board of Public Works,2 s the Mary-
land Court of Appeals reviewed the dismissal of taxpayer chal-
lenges to state construction grants for four church-related colleges.
The appellate court reversed as to three of the four colleges, find-
ing that the federal constitution224 prohibited aid to "sectarian" in-
stitutions.225 The court went to some length to attempt a definition
of "sectarianism," while at the same time acknowledging that
"[w]hether or not an educational institution is sectarian in such a
legal sense is a rather elusive matter, being somewhat ephemeral in
nature.' ' 225 "[T]he question of sectarianization depends upon a
consideration of the observances, themselves, and the mode, zeal,
and frequency with which they are made." The court adopted an
astonishing standard which required extensive evaluation of the
vasively sectarian" institutions must be identified for purposes of other grants besides edu-
cation, these determinations may become more frequent and more troublesome. See supra
note 206-09 and accompanying text. For an early example of an attempt by an administra-
tive agency to cope with constitutional limitations, see Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare, Memorandum on the Impact of the First Amendment to the Constitution
upon Federal Aid to Education, 50 GEo. L.J. 349 (1961).
221. P. BERGER, supra note 212, at 164.
222. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
223. 242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51, (1966) appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 97 (1966).
224. The court also considered a challenge under the state constitution but found no vio-
lation. Id. at 690, 220 A.2d at 76.
225. Id. at 684, 220 A.2d at 73.
226. Id. at 678, 220 A.2d at 69.
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"mode, zeal, and frequency" of religious observances.2 ' Fortu-
nately, the court supplemented these broad principles by high-
lighting a number of "factors" that should be considered in making
the final determination.228
The court's application of its standard is instructive.
Of the four colleges involved, two were affiliated with the Catholic
Church, and the court had relatively little difficulty finding them
sectarian,229 The other two colleges, Hood College and Western
Maryland College, were relatively similar, and both had received
$500,000 grants. Nonetheless, the court found only Western Mary-
land to be impermissibly sectarian.
Hood College was affiliated with the United Church of Christ,
which had contributed 2.2% of the college's operating budget.
However, the representation of the church in the faculty, student
body, and administration were not disproportionate.230 Hood Col-
lege apparently required attendance at chapel, but the require-
ments did not "call for frequent services, with the student being
allowed generous 'cuts' without excuse. ' '123 Western Maryland was
affiliated with the Methodist Church, which provided "between 2
and 3% of the [operating] budget" of the college.232 However,
whereas Hood College's "stated purposes in relation to religion are
227. Id. at 671, 220 A.2d at 65.
228. Id. at 672, 220 A.2d at 65-66.
The experts on both sides are in general accord that the following factors are signifi-
cant in determining whether an educational institution is religious or sectarian: (1)
the stated purposes of the college; (2) the college personnel, which includes the gov-
erning board, the administrative officers, the faculty, and the student body (with con-
siderable stress being laid on the substantiality of religious control over the governing
board as a criterion of whether a college is sectarian); (3) the college's relationship
with religious organizations and groups, which relationship includes the extent of
ownership, financial assistance, the college's memberships and affiliations, religious
purposes, and miscellaneous aspects of the college's relationship with its sponsoring
church; (4) the place of religion in the college's program, which includes the extent of
religious manifestation in the physical surroundings, the character and extent of reli-
gious observance sponsored or encouraged by the college, the required participation
for any or all students, the extent to which the college sponsors or encourages reli-
gious activity of sects different from that of the college's own church and the place of
religion in the curriculum and in extra-curricular programs; (5) the result or "out-
come" of the college program, such as accreditation and the nature and character of
the activities of the alumni; and (6) the work and image of the college in the
community.
229. Id. at 684, 220 A.2d at 73. One college described its own program as "'permeated,
motivated, enlarged and integrated by the Catholic way of life.'" Id. at 680, 220 A.2d at 70.
230. Id. at 672-74, 220 A.2d at 66-67.
231. Id. at 674, 220 A.2d at 67.
232. Id. at 677, 220 A.2d at 68.
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not of a fervent, intense, or passionate nature, but seem to be
based largely upon its historical background," Western Maryland
"characterizes itself as a 'religiously oriented institution' and
'make[s] no bones about the fact that our philosophy at Western
Maryland is a Christian philosophy.' "23 The court also found that
Western Maryland "makes a conscious effort to integrate religion,
and specifically Christianity, with the curriculum and extracurricu-
lar life; ' 23 4 and that "the image of the college in the community is
strongly Methodist. 232 These findings led the court to hold that
Western Maryland was "sectarian in a legal sense under the First
Amendment. 23 6
This case bears close examination because it is one of the few
judicial attempts to draw the line between a sectarian institution
and one which is church-related but not sectarian. 37 It initially re-
ceived some attention by commentators,238 whose concerns receded
233. Id. at 675, 220 A.2d at 67.
234. Id. at 677, 220 A.2d at 68. The court did, however, question the significance of this
fact. "Because Methodism does not have the wide range of dogma that one, or more, reli-
gions have, there is less specific religious restriction in regard to curriculum, but the school
endeavors to provide a religious motivation." Id. at 677, 220 A.2d at 68-69.
235. Id. at 678, 220 A.2d at 69.
236. Id.
237. A similar approach was suggested in a note arguing for "strict neutrality":
Strict neutrality would extend the prohibition of aid to cover schools which in any
way promote religion, without requiring that the religious element "pervade" the in-
stitution. . . . Characteristics that indicate that a school promotes religion are: rules
mandating student attendance at chapel services, admission policies that discriminate
on the basis of the religious affiliation of the applicant, inclusion of religious educa-
tion in the school's academic requirements, and the presence of religious symbols in
the classrooms.
Note, supra note 167 at 1480-81.
238. Professor Giannella described the case as "an apt illustration" of the danger of using
a test of religious fervor to disqualify institutions of higher education from receipt of state
aid. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part II
The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARv. L. REv. 513, 588-89 (1968). His own solution to
the problem was to disqualify only those institutions that did not observe academic free-
dom, or those that "tend to distort the educational function and operate as a species of
religious finishing school." Id. at 589. He had two criteria to determine the latter: whether
the institution compelled regular attendance at religious functions, and whether a signifi-
cant number of the student body was preparing for the ministry. Id.
As discussed infra in section VI, a neutral state policy can and should condition its aid
upon the institution's ability to meet requirements that are rationally related to its inter-
ests, such as breadth of curriculum, the qualifications of eligible faculty, types of degrees
offered, and the like. However, restrictions based upon the ideological orientation of the
institution or the religious practices of the students are a form of content-based discrimina-
tion, and therefore would be constitutionally impermissible rather than constitutionally
required.
Another commentator noted, "Evidence that colleges have heeded the message [in Horace
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as Tilton v. Richardson,239 and subsequent cases, made clear that
colleges were presumed eligible for state aid.
Horace Mann demonstrates the confusion between using a "de-
nominational" test and using an "intensely religious" test.2 40 Most
of all it demonstrates that a determination of "sectarianism" is a
hazardous business. Basing the decision in part on community per-
ceptions of whether an institution is "sectarian" invites a bias
favoring "mainstream" religious movements. Groups with rela-
tively unpopular views will inevitably be perceived as more "fer-
vent" or "passionate," whereas those with popular views will ap-
pear to be more moderate. 4' Similarly, institutions whose religious
views are relatively harmonious with secular trends will appear to
have a "laissez-faire" approach to the curriculum, allowing maxi-
mum "academic freedom." Those institutions whose religious views
conflict with secular trends will be more likely to produce an aca-
demic curriculum quite different from "mainstream" institutions.
In short, since "sectarianism" is largely in the eye of the beholder,
the use of such a standard runs a considerable risk of permitting
aid to institutions affiliated with "mainstream" religions, but deny-
ing aid to those operated by minority religions. This can hardly be
defended as a test consistent with the first amendment.
Mann] is plentiful," and that consequently they have begun trading religion for dollars.
Smith, Emerging Consequences of Financing Private Colleges with Public Money, 9 VA.
U.L. REv. 561, 578-79 n.79 (1975); see also Comment, The Establishment Clause and Gov-
ernmental Aid to Colleges: Origin and Evolution of the Establishment Clause, 11 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 464, 472 (1967) ("[I]s a school with religious affiliations to be eligible for state funds
only if it fails to do that for which it exists?"). The case is also discussed, without particular
attention to the determination of "sectarianness," in Costanzo, Wholesome Neutrality: Law
and Education, 43 N.D.L. REv. 605 (1967). One commentator reviewed the case approvingly,
noting that "[tihe drawing of [the line between sectarian and secular] like the drawing of
most lines is difficult, and in such a situation it is almost always possible to urge that the
line should have been drawn somewhat differently." Davidow, Governmental Aid to
Church-Affiliated Colleges: An Analysis of a Possible Answer to the Constitutional Ques-
tion, 43 N.D.L. REv. 659, 686 (1967).
239. 403 U.S. 672 (1971); see supra text accompanying notes 191-97.
240. For example, by emphasizing that Western Maryland College was perceived as
"strongly Methodist," the Court's opinion suggests that a close identification with tradi-
tional denominational lines is an index of sectarianism. On the other hand, most of the
other factors are simply related to how strongly the religious purposes of the college are
emphasized in word as well as in deed.
241. For example, in Horace Mann, Judge Prescott noted the more permissive and secu-
lar orientation of Methodist "dogma." See supra note 240; see also Gianella, supra note 238,
at 589; cf. Note, supra note 6, at 1625-31 (discussing refusal of Pennsylvania courts to recog-
nize MOVE organization as religion).
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b. Administration of State Determinations
It might be thought that potential biases could be limited by the
development of more specific, objective standards for (pervasive)
"sectarianism." Such an approach generates the second major flaw
in the Horace Mann case, which is the need for continued monitor-
ing to ensure the institution's compliance with the standards. If
one examines the critical differences between the eligible Hood
College and the ineligible Western Maryland College, they were
mutable characteristics which included statements in official litera-
ture about the purpose of the college, chapel attendance policies,
and the make-up of college trustees or faculty. Western Maryland
College could easily make itself look more like the eligible Hood
College. 242 Reversing the scenario, suppose Hood College is found
eligible in Year 1, but in Year 2 begins to look more like Western
Maryland.243 The more specific and objective the criteria, the
greater the temptation to make cosmetic changes to gain or retain
eligibility. 44 As in determinations of qualification under various
Internal Revenue Code provisions, 245 there would likely be a run-
ning battle of form versus substance. Some colleges have already
been encouraged to "trade religion for dollars" and have done so.246
The involvement of the state into quintessentially theological is-
sues is strikingly reminiscent of the situation posed in Presbyte-
rian Church v. Hull Church,247 in which Justice Brennan wrote
that "[i]f civil courts undertake to resolve such controversies...,
the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free development of
religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of
242. See Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Bubb, 379 F. Supp. 872
(D. Kan. 1974) (court disqualified several private colleges from receiving state aid because
they could not meet an eight-part standard of religious entanglement, but suggested the
institutions "could again become eligible by eliminating their particular infirmities.").
243. These changes might be occasioned by theological changes within the institution
(such as a resurgence in orthodoxy), or as part of the college's attempt to make itself more
appealing to its church constituency.
244. Professor Greenawalt recounts how he and Professor Gellhorn advised Fordham Uni-
versity to make certain changes to ensure that it would be viewed as "nonsectarian" for
purposes of state funding. Fordham followed their advice "partly for independent reasons,"
and (apparently) lived happily ever after. Greenawalt, Constitutional Limits on Aid to Sec-
tarian Universities, 4 J.C. & U. L. 177, 180-81 (1977); see also Note, Government Neutrality
and Separation of Church and State: Tuition Tax Credits, 92 HARv. L. REv. 696, 704-05
n.51 (1979).
245. See, e.g., 1 B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND Gimrs 4.3.3 at
4-35 to 4-44 (1981).
246. See supra note 244.
247. 393 U.S. 440 (1969); see supra text accompanying notes 69-74.
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purely ecclesiastical concern. ' '1 4s
2. Can Classwide Determinations Avoid Entanglement?
One obvious way to avoid the difficulties of case-by-case deter-
mination of sectarianism would be to determine the constitutional-
ity of aid on a classwide basis.249 Indeed, it appears that the Court
in fact did so in Lemon and Tilton. The Court's blanket judgment
holds that schools may not receive aid, because in the aggregate
they tend to be sectarian, but colleges in most cases may, because
in the aggregate they tend not to be. This "broad brush" 250 ap-
proach may appear to resolve the problems illustrated by a case
like Horace Mann, but it also creates its own difficulties.
First, this approach reduces, but does not eliminate, the neces-
sity of determining the sectarianness of institutions. Blanket judg-
ments present less opportunity for entanglement than individual
determinations for each institution, but they still require a defini-
tion of "sectarian" as it applies to a group of institutions.
The second problem with classwide determinations is that there
is no clear method of defining the group or class. For example, the
possibility exists that a state might institute a "voucher" system
by which parents of school-age children would receive one voucher
for each child, redeemable by any school satisfying the compulsory
education requirements of that state.251 On what basis could a
court decide whether the "class" of aid recipients "tended to be
248. Hull Church, 393 U.S. at 449. Professor Giannella echoed precisely the same con-
cerns as applied to the Horace Mann case. See Giannella, supra note 238 at 589.
249. See, e.g., Note, State Aid to Parochial Schools: A Quantitative Analysis, 71 GEO.
L.J. 1063, 1086-88 (1983).
250. Professor Giannella thought such an approach was necessary precisely to avoid en-
tanglement. See supra note 187.
251. This possibility was suggested soon after Lemon was decided. Morgan, supra note
187, at 31-36. Morgan's pessimistic view of the constitutionality of voucher plans may have
been changed by Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), discussed supra at note 185. The
history of voucher plans is discussed in Comment, The Use of Public Funds By Private
Schools via Educational Vouchers: Some Constitutional Problems, 3 PAc. L.J. 90 (1972).
For more recent discussions of voucher plans, see Note, Rotunda, The Constitutional Fu-
ture of the Bill of Rights: A Closer Look at Commercial Speech and State Aid to Relig-
iously Affiliated Schools, 65 N.C.L. REV. 917, 929-934 (1987); Note, Education Vouchers and
Tuition Tax Credits: In Search of Viable Public Aid to Private Education, 10 J. LEGIS. 178
(1983); Public Funding of Private Education: A Public Policy Analysis, 10 J. LEGIS. 146
(1983). For a defense of the constitutionality of voucher plans and tuition tax credits, even
under existing law, see Note, supra note 244; Note, Education Vouchers: The Fruit of the
Lemon Tree, 24 STAN. L. REV. 687 (1972). But see Note, Educational Vouchers: Addressing
the Establishment Clause Issue, 11 PAc. L.J. 1061 (1980).
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sectarian?" Suppose that Wyoming instituted such a program, but
limited it to providing vouchers for private schools; should the
Court in reviewing the constitutionality of the program look only
at the percentage of private schools in Wyoming that are secta-
rian? What about the percentage of schools expected to be secta-
rian once the program has been in existence for five years?252 One
might argue that the class of schools to be considered should be
private schools nationwide. Would the Court be content to rule on
one state at a time, thereby creating the possibility that one state
would have its program approved while another would not because
of different percentages of sectarian schools? On the other hand,
would the Court prefer to have all states represented in the litiga-
tion so that a final decision could be made?
To compound the problem, what percentage of sectarian
schools-again, an extremely difficult animal to identify-should
suffice to doom an otherwise constitutional voucher system? A
footnote in Aguilar v. Felton253 suggests that the number might be
as low as ten to twenty percent.5 4 If so, a state program admit-
tedly designed to promote secular goals would be struck down as
unconstitutional because a small minority of the recipients would
be furthering a religious purpose.255 Conversely, if a large percent-
age of the recipients were permitted to be sectarian, perhaps thirty
to forty percent or more, then the whole concept of a strict ap-
proach in not aiding sectarian institutions would be abandoned in
the process.
252. More private schools may open, if a voucher system sharply reduced the financial
expense of starting them. A voucher system's defender might argue that most private
schools now are religious, because the great expense of operating such a school means that
only those with the most urgent of motives such as religious conviction will spend the extra
dollars required for private school. With a voucher system, on the other hand, many more
parents would be able to afford private schooling, and it is likely that their religiosity would
be less intense. Of course, only after some experience with such a system assuming the court
would permit it to operate in the first place would more accurate data be available.
253. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
254. Id. at 412 n.8. The court in that footnote cited with approval a remark in Justice
Friendly's opinion for the court of appeals, in which he implied that unless "all, or almost
all, New York City's parochial schools receiving Title I aid have . . . abandoned 'the reli-
gious mission that is the only reason for the schools' existence, the aid would be unconstitu-
tional.'" Id. (quoting Felton v. Secretary, United States Dep't of Educ., 739 F.2d 48, 70
(1984) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 650 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting))).
255. Recall that one vice of this facial or "class-wide" determination is that the Court
cannot save the clearly secular and strike down the "sectarian"; avoiding the identification
of particular recipients as "sectarian" is the whole purpose for using this method rather
than a case-by-case approach.
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Even if sectarian schools comprised a large fraction of all private
schools, an enterprising legislator could follow the lead of Mueller
v. Allen 56 and expand the class to reduce the percentage of secta-
rian schools below any conceivable threshold. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that a state dropped its block funding of public schools and
instituted a voucher program that provided tuition grants to par-
ents of children in any school, public or private; the class, as in
Mueller, would be increased five or tenfold. Since (at least in the
beginning) a very high percentage of the schools redeeming the
vouchers would be public schools, how could it be found that the
recipients "tended to be sectarian"?25 7 The Court has previously
warned that it is on the lookout for "the ingenious plans for chan-
neling state aid to sectarian schools that periodically reach this
Court,' 258 but it is difficult to see how it could strike down such a
plan based on the approach it has taken to date. The Court may be
forced to swallow a camel after having strained so long at gnats.
In addition, a majority of the Court has recently expressed oppo-
sition to determining the constitutionality of a statute based upon
the identity of the recipients; in Mueller, the Court noted that it
would be "loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of
a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to
which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the
law. '259 In Bowen v. Kendrick,2 60 the Court also rejected a facial
challenge to a statute whose beneficiaries included religious organi-
zations, but remanded for further consideration to determine
whether any of the beneficiaries could be characterized as "perva-
sively sectarian." The opinion declared that the remedy for such a
finding by the trial court would be to disqualify the particular
grant in question, rather than the statute as a whole.261 Thus, the
use of a class-wide remedy to avoid case-by-case determinations of
256. 463 U.S. 388 (1983); see supra note 185
257. Such a case would be similar to Mueller where a tax deduction was available to all
parents; in fact, the chief objection in Mueller was that the benefit was much greater for
private school than public school parents. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 400-01. If a voucher were
provided that was redeemable at either a public or private school, the benefits could be
made equal. See supra note 185.
258. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986) (quot-
ing Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Library v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 785 (1973)).
259. 463 U.S. at 401.
260. 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988); see supra text accompanying notes 206-09.
261. "Should the Court [upon remand] conclude that the Secretary has wrongfully ap-
proved certain AFLA grants, an appropriate remedy would require the Secretary to with-
draw such approval." Id. at 2581.
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"sectarianness" may not be a viable option.
In summary, the apparent advantages of determining "sectarian-
ness" on a class-wide rather than case-by-case basis disappear
upon further inspection. Either approach appears fraught with in-
tractable difficulties in implementation. Aside from the question of
whether sectarian schools ought to be treated separately,282 the
problems of identifying them for purposes of that separate treat-
ment appear insuperable, if the Court's principle of avoiding exces-
sive entanglement is to be honored.
V. ENTANGLEMENT WITH RELIGION BY EXEMPTING BELIEVERS
FROM OTHERWISE VALID LAWS
Just as the Court's preoccupation with the effect of state aid for
education led to the adoption of the prohibition of aid to relig-
iously motivated institutions, the preoccupation with the effect of
state action on individuals has led the Court to require exemptions
for religious believers from otherwise valid state laws. Like the
"aid to parochial schools" cases, the "free exercise" cases have fol-
lowed a tortuous path.
A. The Belief/Action Distinction and Its Decline
The Court's treatment of the free exercise clause began on a sen-
sible note. In the first case to address the merits of a free exercise
claim, Reynolds v. United States,2 63 the Court rejected the argu-
ment that religiously motivated acts required special privileges.
Reynolds argued at his trial on charges of polygamy that he was
justified in acting "in conformity with what he believed at the time
to be a religious duty. '264 An instruction to that effect was refused,
and Reynolds appealed his conviction. A unanimous Court 2 5 held
that Reynolds' religious beliefs were no defense, citing Jefferson's
distinction between "the profession or propagation of principles"
262. For an argument that religious schools cannot be denied aid without in effect penal-
izing them for their beliefs, see Paulsen, supra note 17, at 356.
263. 98 U.S. 145 (1878); see also Permoli v. First Municipality, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589
(1846). Earlier cases, such as Permoli had raised free exercise issues, but had been dismissed
because of the Court's holding that the first amendment limited federal power only and did
not affect the actions of the states or subdivisions thereof.
264. 98 U.S. at 162.
265. Justice Field differed on the issue of the admission of certain testimony against




on the one hand the protection of which is the essence of religious
liberty and the time when "principles break out into overt acts
against peace and good order" on the other.2 66 Jefferson intended
the "wall of separation between Church and State"26 to be incor-
porated in the first amendment. This meant that "Congress was
deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left
free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or sub-
versive of good order. '268
In addition, the Court went on to consider the alternate argu-
ment that, assuming Congress had authority to outlaw polyg-
amy, 26 special consideration should nevertheless be given to
polygamists motivated by religious beliefs. The Court rejected this
theory:
Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his reli-
gious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doc-
trines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect
to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government
could exist only in name under such circumstances.7
Reynolds thus generated two principles which could serve to sim-
plify the analysis of conflicts between religious and secular author-
ity. The first was that the government's disability from regulating
beliefs was not a limitation on its ability to regulate actions.2 ' The
second was that claims for exemption based upon religious motiva-
tion should be viewed skeptically, since the assertion of a spiritual
authority superior to the state authority posed a serious threat to
secular government. 7 2 While the first amendment jurisprudence of
the twentieth century consigned both principles to the dust bin of
history, it is time to consider rehabilitating them.
266. Id. at 163.
267. Id. at 164.
268. Id.
269. The Court had little difficulty deciding that since "from the earliest history of Eng-
land polygamy has been treated as an offense against society," id. at 164, its prohibition was
"within the legislative power of Congress." Id. at 166. This observation, while falling short
of proof that polygamy is malum in se, wag at least relevant to the question of whether
Congress was out to "get" the Mormons. Since the prohibition of polygamy long predated
the Mormons' practice of it, the latter conclusion would be difficult to reach.
270. Id. at 166-67.
271. "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free
to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order." Id. at
164.
272. Id. at 166.
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
In Cantwell v. Connecticut,73 the belief/action distinction was
maintained, although the restatement of the principle opened the
door to its later dismantling. The case was decided on broad first
amendment grounds, rather than upon any specific feature of the
religion clauses. However, the Court's opinion contained two signif-
icant statements. First, the Court held that the first amendment's
prohibitions applied to the states as well as Congress because of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 4 Second,
the court restated the belief/action distinction, and in doing so cre-
ated ambiguities that were later translated into affirmative action
principles: "Thus the [first] amendment embraces two con-
cepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute
but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct re-
mains subject to regulation for the protection of society."2' 5
Cantwell moved beyond a simplistic belief/action distinction by
recognizing that beliefs are frequently expressed through physical
action such as preaching. The Court acknowledged the state's
power to regulate conduct in the public interest, but proscribed
content-based discrimination against, and perhaps even for, reli-
gious activity. 7 Thus the Reynolds distinction could be preserved
with this gloss: the expression of religious belief is entitled to the
same stringent protections as other first amendment expression,
but actions motivated by those beliefs are not so protected.
However, this interpretation of Reynolds was ultimately re-
placed by the standard announced in Sherbert v. Verner.Y17  In
Sherbert, a majority of the Court took the step of saying that not
only are beliefs given more or less absolute protection, but actions
motivated by those religious beliefs merit as close to absolute pro-
tection as possible. Thus, conduct motivated by religious beliefs
was to be honored so long as there was no compelling state interest
273. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Cantwell was convicted of violating a Connecticut statute
prohibiting solicitation for religious, charitable or philanthropic causes unless the cause had
been approved. The conviction was reversed because it created a prior restraint upon ex-
pression of protected views. Id. at 304. Cantwell was also convicted of inciting a breach of
the peace for playing a phonograph record which was offensive to Catholics. Because such
conduct presented no "clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the State," it too
was protected, and the conviction reversed. Id. at 311.
274. Id. at 303.
275. Id. at 303-04.
276. The Court was not suggesting that Cantwell's rights derive from the fact that he is
engaged in religious, as opposed to secular, activity; Cantwell's rights flowed from his engag-
ing in protected first amendment expression. See id. at 303-11.
277. 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see infra text accompanying notes 302-11.
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opposing such action."' This development is traced in the follow-
ing pages, but it is important to note that there are actually three
distinct categories to be considered: first, the beliefs themselves;
second, the expression of those beliefs (such as through preaching);
and third, the actions motivated by those beliefs. The Court in
Cantwell does not appear to have intended to invest the third class
with the protection of the "compelling state interest" test, but
such was to be the interpretation placed on it by Sherbert.
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette7 9 sowed the
seeds for the affirmative action approach to the free exercise
clause. Barnette appealed his conviction for refusing to permit his
daughter to recite the Pledge of Allegiance. The majority did not
rely upon religious liberty in particular, but rather on the proposi-
tion that the first amendment protects silence as well as speech. s0
As such, Barnette would be a sensible but not a particularly signif-
icant opinion for purposes of the religion clauses. Initially, it is dif-
ficult to understand Justice Frankfurter's vehement dissent from
the opinion. Frankfurter suggested that the attitude of "judicial
humility" 28' required the court to defer to the legislature's judg-
ment about the need for this patriotic measure. Frankfurter's posi-
tion is perhaps more understandable when viewed in light of the
concurring opinions of Justices Black and Douglas. 8 2 These jus-
tices chose to emphasize the specifically religious nature of the ob-
jection to the flag salute and to broaden the protection of the reli-
gion clauses of the first amendment to encompass actions based on
religious belief as well as the beliefs themselves (including the ex-
pression thereof).2sa
This assertion of a special status for religious beliefs apparently
triggered the major thrust of Justice Frankfurter's dissent. He
thought that, while the state could not discriminate against reli-
gion, the state was not required to refrain from pursuing valid in-
278. 374 U.S. at 403.
279. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The difference between the two opinions is summarized in Jus-
tice Jackson's majority opinion in Barnette; the problem in Minersville School Dist. v. Gobi-
tis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), was that the parties had "assumed . . . that power exists in the
State to impose the flag salute discipline up6 n school children in general." Id. at 635.
280. Id. at 632-34.
281. Id. at 667 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
282. They also joined the majority opinion.
283. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 643-44 (Black and Douglas, J.J., concurring). Justices Black
and Douglas noted that they "are substantially in agreement with the opinion just read [the
majority opinion], but since we originally joined with the Court in the Gobitis case, it is
appropriate that we make a brief statement of reasons for our change of view." Id. at 634.
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terests because of an adverse effect upon religion. "The validity of
secular laws cannot be measured by their conformity to religious
doctrines. It is only in a theocratic state that ecclesiastical doc-
trines measure legal right or wrong. "284 If the propriety of the state
action were conceded, and an individual only sought excuse from
compliance because of religious scruples, it would force the court
to determine what scruples were religious. To do so would "resur-
rect the very discriminatory treatment of religion which the Con-
stitution sought forever to forbid. '2 85
Justice Frankfurter's analysis is prophetic:28 6 in Sherbert and its
progeny287 the Court adopted both errors cited by Justice Frank-
furter. First, it permitted religious beliefs to dictate the enforce-
ability of secular law. Second, it necessitated the Court's definition
of what constitutes a "religion" so as to qualify for exemption.288
The assertion that religiously motivated conduct is entitled to
first amendment protection blossomed289 in Braunfeld v. Brown, e0
and McGowan v. Maryland, which were decided on the same
day.29l Both cases challenged the constitutionality of Maryland's
Sunday Closing Laws. In McGowan the Court held there was no
284. Id. at 654 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 658.
286. He seemed quite conscious of the fact that the decisive cases were to come:
I am aware that we must decide the case before us and not some other case. But that
does not mean that a case is dissociated from the past and unrelated to the future.
We must decide this case with due regard for what went before and no less regard for
what may come after.
Id. at 660-61. He seemed particularly concerned for the potential of the doctrine of special
rights for religiously motivated conduct to justify aid to parochial schools, a problem that
the Court first addressed in Everson. See supra text accompanying notes 136-58. For a sym-
pathetic view of Justice Frankfurter's opinion in the Gobitis case, see Danzig, How Ques-
tions Begot Answers in Felix Frankfurter's First Flag Salute Opinion, 1977 Sup. CT. REV.
257 (1978).
287. See infra text accompanying notes 302-11.
288. Id.
289. In an intervening case, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), the Court re-
jected the contention that a statute burdening religious exercise was invalid unless a "clear
and present danger" was shown. Id. at 167 (quoting Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919)).
The case is murky since it involved the regulation of the activities of children rather than
adults. Id. at 169-70. Also, three of the dissenters, Justices Jackson, Roberts and Frank-
furter, were purporting to be bound by the an earlier opinion of Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943), in which street preaching was held to have the same constitutional
status as conventional worship in a church. Justice Murphy also dissented, finding the inclu-
sion of street preaching within the category of "child labor" to be the prohibition of religion
"under the guise of enforcing its child labor laws." Prince, 321 U.S. at 172.
290. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
291. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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violation of the establishment clause, since the statute was
designed to serve the secular purpose of providing a common day
of relaxation. Although the origin of Sunday Closing Laws was
clearly religious, the secular purpose had superseded the religious
one: "The cause is irrelevant; the fact exists. 2 92
The problem in Braunfeld was different, since plaintiff claimed
that even if the laws were permissible as applied to those who rec-
ognized no other Sabbath, they impermissibly restricted Jews and
others who recognized a different Sabbath than Sunday. While the
plurality293 denied Braunfeld's requested relief, it restated the test
for free exercise challenges in a form closer to the equation of relig-
iously motivated conduct with the expression of beliefs: "The free-
dom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute. . . .How-
ever, the freedom to act, even when the action is in accord with
one's religious convictions, is not totally free from legislative re-
strictions. ' '294 The opinion differentiated cases where the burden
on religion is direct, for example where a statute makes a religious
practice unlawful, from cases where the burden on religion is
merely indirect, making the practice of religion less convenient or
more expensive. Where a case such as Braunfeld's falls into the
latter category, the statute is valid "unless the State may accom-
plish its purpose by means which do not impose such a burden." '295
Citing numerous practical problems associated with granting an
exemption,296 the Court sustained the statute.
Justices Douglas, Brennan and Stewart dissented in separate
opinions. Justice Brennan suggested that the "compelling state in-
terest" test applied in Barnette297 should be used to evaluate
292. Id.
293. Chief Justice Warren's opinion was joined only by Justices Black, Clark, and Whitta-
ker; Justices Frankfurter and Harlan concurred in the judgment in a separate opinion.
294. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 603-04.
295. Id. at 607.
296. Twenty-one of the thirty-four jurisdictions that had Sunday Closing laws granted
exemptions for Sabbatarians. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 514. This seems to contradict the plu-
rality's conclusion that the State could not accomplish its purpose if it permitted the re-
quested exemption.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 279-87. Justice Brennan was applying the com-
pelling state interest test not to the expression of protected views, such as preaching or, as
in Barnette, the correlative refusal to express such views but rather to conduct motivated
by religious beliefs. A colorable argument might be made that in fact Justice Brennan
viewed the Sunday Closing Laws as applied to Jews and other Sabbatarians as a kind of
penalty or prohibition of the worship activity itself. However, it seems more likely that he
was prepared to say that because Braunfeld's desire to work on Sunday was motivated by
his belief in worship on Saturday, it was subject to the compelling state interest test. In any
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Braunfeld's claim. 98 Since no evidence had been produced that the
jurisdictions granting exemptions299 for Sabbatarians had exper-
ienced greater difficulties than those not granting exemptions, the
Court's judgment "exalted administrative convenience" above reli-
gious freedom. 00
B. Sherbert and the Protection of Religiously Motivated
Conduct
Justice Brennan's dissenting position in Braunfeld v. Brown 1
was transformed into a majority opinion in Sherbert v. Verner,302
decided two years later. Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist, ap-
plied for unemployment compensation when she was unable to find
employment not requiring her to work on Saturday. South Caro-
lina's Unemployment Compensation Act provided that a claimant
was ineligible for benefits if she failed "without good cause" to ac-
cept work when offered. Because Sherbert failed to accept employ-
ment requiring her to work on Saturday, the Employment Security
Commission denied her claim, and the South Carolina Supreme
Court affirmed.303 The United States Supreme Court reversed and
remanded.3 0 4
Justice Brennan's opinion30 5 provided a new version of the be-
lief/action distinction: "religious beliefs as such"3 06 may not be reg-
ulated but conduct "prompted by religious beliefs," while "not to-
tally free from legislative restrictions, ' '130 is subject to substantially
the same protection that is afforded to other first amendment ex-
pression. Citing NAACP v. Button,30 8 the Court held:
event, as we shall see in Sherbert, the Barnette limitation that the compelling state interest
test applies to the expression of religious views, not activities motivated by them was not
carried forward. See infra text accompanying notes 302-11.
298. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 611-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
299. See supra note 296.
300. 366 U.S. at 615 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
301. 366 U.S. 599, 610-16 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
302. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
303. Id. at 401.
304. Id.
305. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Goldberg and Clark joined the opinion;
Justices Douglas and Stewart concurred.
306. 374 U.S. at 402 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)) (empha-
sis added).
307. Id. at 403 (quoting Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 603).
308. 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
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If. . . the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is to with-
stand appellant's constitutional challenge, it must be either because
[Sherbert's] disqualification as a beneficiary represents no infringe-
ment by the State of her constitutional rights of free exercise, or
because any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's re-
ligion may be justified by a "compelling state interest in the regula-
tion of a subject within the State's constitutional power to
regulate .... ,309
Anticipating perhaps that this standard might appear novel, Jus-
tice Brennan attempted to demonstrate that wherever regulation
of religiously motivated conduct had been permitted in the past, it
"invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or
order. '310 Where there is no such threat, and the Court found none
in Mrs. Sherbert's case,311 the "compelling state interest" test
applies.
This approach presented two difficulties. The first and most ob-
vious was the need to distinguish Braunfeld; the Court's answer
was that in Sherbert the state could pay the unemployment claim
and still achieve its objective, whereas in Braunfeld an exemption
"would have rendered the entire statutory scheme unworkable. '31 2
A second and perhaps more serious question was whether the spe-
cial solicitude required for religion in Sherbert could be reconciled
with the prohibition against such solicitude decreed the same day
in Abington School District v. Schempp.313 In Schempp, the Court
held that Bible reading or recitation of The Lord's Prayer in public
schools violated the establishment clause. Justice Brennan denied
that requiring an exemption for Mrs. Sherbert constituted an es-
tablishment of religion; it reflected "nothing more than the govern-
309. 374 U.S. at 403.
310. Id.
311. "Plainly enough, appellant's conscientious objection to Saturday work constitutes no
conduct prompted by religious principles of a kind within the reach of state legislation." Id.
312. Id. at 409. This distinction is not persuasive, given the common practice of statutory
exemptions. See supra note 296. On this point Justice Stewart could not agree with the
majority opinion, and while concurring in the result, he thought that Braunfeld should be
overruled. Id. at 418 (Stewart, J., concurring). Indeed, Braunfeld was a more compelling
case for an exemption because it involved a criminal statute and the prospect of forfeiting
one's livelihood. In Sherbert, the maximum penalty was a loss of 22 weeks of compensation
payments. Justice Harlan also was not persuaded by the distinction, and dissented in an
opinion joined by Justice White.
313. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Justice Stewart complained that the "mechanistic concept of
the Establishment Clause" as adopted in Schempp (from which Justice Stewart was the
lone dissenter) would outlaw the favorable treatment of Sherbert, and was "historically un-
sound and constitutionally wrong." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 415 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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mental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences,
and does not represent that involvement of religious with secular
institutions which it is the object of the Establishment Clause to
forestall.314 This is the quintessential statement of the "affirma-
tive action" approach to neutrality, both in result or effect.
In addition to raising questions about distinguishing those forms
of accommodation of religion that are required from those that are
forbidden, 15 this case entails the very kind of "entanglement"
courts should avoid. The Court stressed that special treatment for
Mrs. Sherbert was acceptable because this was not "a case in
which an employee's religious convictions serve to make him a
nonproductive member of society." 1' Justice Harlan in dissent
targeted this comment as an illustration of precisely what was
wrong with the majority opinion:
[S]urely ... the Court cannot mean that the case would have come
out differently if none of the Seventh-day Adventists in Spartanburg
had been gainfully employed, or if the appellant's religion had pre-
vented her from working on Tuesdays instead of Saturdays. Nor can
the Court be suggesting that it will make a value judgment in each
case as to whether a particular individual's religious convictions pre-
vent him from being "productive." I can think of no more inappro-
priate function for this Court to perform. 1
The Court's standard leaves no real escape from Justice Harlan's
criticism. First, by making religious belief the touchstone of a con-
stitutional claim for exemption, the Court has inevitably required
some determination of whether the claimant's beliefs are reli-
gious. 18 Second, the test appears to require some balancing be-
tween the nature of the burden placed upon religion and the na-
ture of the state interest which must be sacrificed in order to
accommodate the religious beliefs. In both areas, courts will be re-
quired to measure and evaluate the sincerity, weight and probably
314. 374 U.S. at 409 (1963).
315. Id. This distinction makes it crucial whether a case is treated as a "free exercise" or
"establishment" case. See supra note 50.
316. 374 U.S. at 410 (citing an earlier footnote indicating that most Seventh-day Advent-
ists in the Spartanburg area were employed).
317. Id. at 420-21 n.2 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan's comments were recently
mirrored by Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in the Indian Cemetery case. See supra
text accompanying note 124.
318. See infra text accompanying notes 331-36.
[Vol. 24:253
1990] RELIGION CLAUSES 313
the social worth of the believer's views.31
The seed planted by Sherbert burst into flower in Wisconsin v.
Yoder,320 which best illustrates the difficulties with the "affirmative
action" approach. James Yoder was convicted of violating the Wis-
consin compulsory attendance statute, requiring parents of any
child between ages seven and sixteen to enroll their children in
school. At trial, Yoder presented evidence of the tenets of his Old
Order Amish. The Amish believed that "by sending their children
to high school, they would . . endanger their own salvation and
that of their children. ' 321 Expert testimony addressed "the impact
that compulsory high school attendance could have on the contin-
ued survival of Amish communities as they exist in the United
States today. ' 322 One expert concluded "that the modern high
school is not equipped, in curriculum or social environment, to im-
part the values promoted by Amish society. ' 323 The trial court de-
nied Yoder's motion to dismiss based on the free exercise claim,
but the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed. On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed. 24
Significantly, the entire Court3 25 endorsed the standard adopted
in Sherbert: "The essence of all that has been said and written on
the subject is that only those interests of the highest order and
those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the
319. Despite the Court's attempt to link religiously motivated conduct to other forms of
"expression" protected as speech by the first amendment, the fit was by no means perfect,
as was quickly demonstrated in Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). Gillette was a
"selective conscientious objector" and challenged the constitutionality of § 6(j) of the Mili-
tary Selective Service Act of 1967, which required claimants to be "opposed to war in any
form" rather than a specific war. Justice Marshall's opinion stated that the free exercise
clause forbids "neutral prohibitory or regulatory laws having secular aims. . . only [where]
the burden on First Amendment values is not justifiable in terms of the Government's valid
aims." 401 U.S. at 462. As applied to Gillette, the Court stated that "[t]he incidental bur-
dens felt by persons in petitioners' position are strictly justified by substantial governmental
interests that relate directly to the very impacts questioned." Id.
320. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
321. Id. at 209.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 212. This expert testimony was "uncontradicted." Id. at 209.
324. Id. at 207.
325. Justices Stewart, White, and Brennan wrote separately, but also joined the opinion
of the Court. Id. at 237 (White, J., concurring). Justices Powell and Rehnquist took no part
in the consideration or decision of the case. Only Justice Douglas dissented, but not from
the application of the Sherbert test. His concern was that the majority's analysis "assumes
that the only interests at stake in the case are those of the Amish parents on the one hand,
and those of the State on the other." Id. at 241 (Douglas, J., dissenting). He thought the
case should be remanded to canvass the children's views. Id. at 246 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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free exercise of religion. ' 326 Since there was little dispute that the
Wisconsin law burdened the exercise of the Amish religion, the
Court focused on whether the state's interests were compelling.
Before turning to that issue, the Court considered the argument
that granting an exemption would constitute a forbidden establish-
ment of religion. The Court acknowledged that risk, but found it
important to adopt a flexible and realistic approach in the applica-
tion of the religion clauses.32 7 The Court quoted its self-congratula-
tion in Walz: "[W]e have been able to chart a course that pre-
served the autonomy and freedom of religious bodies while
avoiding any semblance of established religion. This is a 'tight
rope' and one we have successfully traversed. 3 28
Turning to the "compelling state interest" inquiry, the Court
considered the two objectives of compulsory high school education
proffered by the state. Such education prepared citizens (1) to par-
ticipate "effectively and intelligently in our open political system,"
and (2) to be "self-reliant and self-sufficient. 3 29 The Court held
that neither of these objectives was defeated by granting an ex-
emption, since the Amish culture produced "a highly successful so-
cial unit," whose members "are productive and very law-abiding
members of society."330
In explaining the unique factual pattern of the Yoder case, the
Court made revealing comments about the nature of the rule it was
applying. First, "[i]t cannot be overemphasized that we are not
dealing with a way of life and mode of education by a group claim-
ing to have recently discovered some 'progressive' or more enlight-
ened process for rearing children for modern life. '331 Second, the
Amish had "convincingly demonstrated" that the state's action
posed "hazards" to their "communities and their religious
organization."3 3
2
In other words, the two errors which Justice Frankfurter had
warned of in his dissenting opinion in Barnette had now been
unanimously embraced. First, theological doctrine was now deter-
mining the enforceability of state law; second, the Court was now
326. Id. at 215.
327. Id. at 221.
328. Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970)).
329. Id.
330. Id. at 222.




required to measure the pedigree, sincerity and worth of the indi-
vidual's belief system."' 3 For example, it appears critical to the
Court's opinion that the Amish thought salvation was at stake in
the contest between milking cows and programming computers.
Their claim for exemption would have been weakened if, like Mo-
handas Gandhi, they had only believed that manual labor helped
improve one's karma, and thereby reduced one's time on the wheel
of rebirth. 34 Similarly, the Court made it excruciatingly clear that
the history of the Amish as a "highly successful social unit" was
indispensable. Other parents whose religions were less than one
hundred years old (or that were not suitable material for National
Geographic) should not trouble their school boards with requests
for exemption s.3 3  As Justice Harlan posed the question in Sher-
bert, is there any more inappropriate function for a Court to per-
form than to pass judgment on the pedigree or social value of a
religion? 36
The case of Thomas v. Review Board3 3 7 has been noted in refer-
ence to the Court's reluctance to resolve theological controver-
sies. 338 The case illustrates that the affirmative action approach
will intensify rather than diminish the need to make the distinc-
tions the Court said it wanted to avoid. In Thomas the Court for
the first time made it explicit that "only beliefs rooted in religion
are protected by the Free Exercise Clause. 33 9 It then becomes crit-
ical to determine whether the beliefs held by people like Welsh
3 40
333. 406 U.S. 205.
334. For a discussion of karma see 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Hinduism 875 (15th ed.
1974). For the importance of the spinning wheel to Gandhi's political and religious beliefs,
see E. ERIKSON, GANDHI'S TRUTH: ON THE ORIGINS OF MILITANT NONVIOLENCE 260 (1969).
335. Although the Court's primary target is groups whose objections are based on "pro-
gressive" i.e., secular beliefs, it is not simply a religious/secular distinction. The Court also
spends considerable time stressing the historical tradition represented by the Amish, sug-
gesting that even a group with religious reasons for preferring the Amish form of existence
might have difficulty under the Court's standards if their views were of recent origin. See
406 U.S. at 235.
336. See supra text accompanying note 317. The Court's analysis would not be misplaced
if it were in response to a legislative determination that the Amish be exempted from other-
wise valid laws. Exemptions as a matter of legislative grace (which still must be enforced
nondiscriminatorily) are considered below. See infra text accompanying notes 341-50.
337. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
338. See supra text accompanying notes 106-10.
339. 450 U.S. at 713 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972). This statement should come as no surprise, since one could
hardly contend that the first amendment, whose guarantee is the protection of the free exer-
cise of religion, could create freedom for actions not based upon religion.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05.
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or Seeger s4' are religious. The beliefs of Seeger and Welsh were
treated as religious for purposes of interpreting Congress's intent
in enacting the Selective Service Act.3 42 Seeger and Welsh exem-
plify the Court's aversion to differentiating among theistic religious
beliefs, nontheistic religious beliefs, beliefs which "occupy the
same place"3 43 in one's life as traditional religious beliefs and non-
religious beliefs. If this is so, what is to be done with the Court's
requirement that for free exercise purposes the belief must be reli-
gious? Consider the following passage:
One can, of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly
nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under
the Free Exercise Clause; but that is not the case here, and the guar-
antee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all
of the members of a religious sect.3 44
It seems unlikely that someone like Welsh, who refused to claim
that his beliefs were religious, would qualify for free exercise ex-
emption. But if a person uses the magic word "religious," does the
Court's standard shift the burden of proof to the state to show an
individual's belief to be "bizarre" or "clearly nonreligious in moti-
vation"? How can that determination avoid significant entangle-
ment? Would Paul Tillich's students345 be qualified to form expert
opinions as to which concerns are sufficiently "ultimate" for first
amendment protection?
C. Recent Trends
As noted above, the Court has recently begun to question the
soundness of the holding in Sherbert.3 46 The rejection of the Army
captain's claim for an exemption in Goldman v. Weinberger347
might be attributable to the unique circumstances of the military.
However, in Bowen v. Roy,3 48 a divided Court refused to exempt an
341. See supra text accompanying note 91-102.
342. Justice Harlan could not agree that Congress intended to exempt persons with be-
liefs like Welsh's, but felt that the "neutrality" principle required that no distinction be
made between religious and nonreligious conscientious objectors. Welsh v. United States 398
U.S. 333, 356 (1970).
343. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187 (1965).
344. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 700, 715-16.
345. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 120-24.
347. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
348. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
[Vol. 24:253
RELIGION CLAUSES
American Indian from the requirement that applicants for AFDC
benefits obtain a Social Security number for their dependent chil-
dren. Roy, who had applied for benefits, told the court that his
religious beliefs led him to the conclusion that issuing a unique
number to his daughter would "rob [her] spirit" and prevent her
from attaining greater spiritual power. 49 When it turned out that a
number had already been assigned, Roy asked for (and received
from the trial court) an injunction restraining the use or dissemi-
nation of the assigned number, and a further injunction requiring
continuation of AFDC payments. Writing for eight members of the
Court,350 Chief Justice Burger wrote that the free exercise clause
"simply cannot be understood to require the Government to con-
duct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the reli-
gious beliefs of particular citizens."3 5
1
Writing for himself and Justices Powell and Rehnquist, the
Chief Justice maintained that Roy should not be exempted from
the requirement of supplying the Social Security number when ap-
plying for AFDC benefits. "[D]enial of such benefits by a uni-
formly applicable statute neutral on its face is of a wholly differ-
ent, less intrusive nature than affirmative compulsion or
prohibition, by threat of penal sanctions, for conduct that has reli-
gious implications. '352 Chief Justice Burger attempted to distin-
guish cases such as Sherbert and Thomas as involving a kind of
discriminatory animus in refusing to grant an exemption.353 Here,
on the other hand, the state had simply used a reasonable means
to promote a legitimate and important public interest.
As previously discussed,354 the Court in the Indian Cemetery
case attempted to align its approval of the Forest Service's devel-
opment plan within the reasoning of Bowen v. Roy:355 no private
citizen can expect to dictate the "internal affairs" of the govern-
ment. However, there is nothing to distinguish the Indians' claim
for protection of their burial sites from Mrs. Sherbert's demand for
unemployment compensation. In both cases the government was
349. Id. at 696.
350. Although he dissented from the holding in Sherbert, Justice White apparently felt
that until that case was overruled, it could not simply be ignored. Id. at 733 (White, J.,
dissenting).
351. Id. at 699.
352. Id. at 704.
353. Id. at 708.
354. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
355. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
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asked to change its procedures in order to accommodate the reli-
gious claimant's special needs. Sherbert was not a case of discrimi-
nation, in which state action is constitutional so long as it does not
single out religious groups for worse treatment than secular
groups.3 56 Rather, the issue is whether the state must change its
policies because of the differential impact on religious minorities.
Sherbert held that it must;357 Roy held that it need not.358
D. Can Theological Reckoning Be Avoided?359
If weaknesses have been exposed in the reasoning and results
found in the Court's "affirmative action" approach to the free exer-
cise cases, it may be thought that neutral, nondiscriminatory crite-
ria could be fashioned to achieve "correct" results without the em-
barrassing gaffes detailed in the cases discussed. Yet no such
criteria have been suggested. In fact, it seems inescapable that an
approach designed to take into account the peculiar needs of a reli-
gious body will require a court to analyze the theological require-
ments of an individual and in some way to balance the secular
goals of the state against the asserted theological goals of the indi-
vidual claiming a free exercise right.3 60 Any decision by a court fol-
lowing such an inquiry is bound to compromise the separation be-
tween church and state.
For example, is there any doubt that the Court in Thomas cor-
356. South Carolina would deny unemployment benefits to a mother unavailable for work
because she was unable to get a babysitter. Thus, we do not have before us a situa-
tion where a State provides unemployment compensation generally, and singles out
for disqualification only those persons who are unavailable for work on religious
grounds.
Sherbert v. Verner 374 U.S. 398, at 416 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring); accord, id. at 419-20
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
357. 374 U.S. 398.
358. 476 U.S. 69.
359. Many of the difficulties with the court's current approach to free exercise are dis-
cussed in Marshall, supra note 100. That article proposes to subsume free exercise claims
within the broader ambit of freedom of expression. This article would follow that approach
with the exception of permitting exemptions for religious claimants only, as a matter of
legislative grace, where certain conditions apply. See infra text accompanying notes 432-56.
360. This point is more or less conceded by many who defend the court's free exercise
approach, but it is treated as an inescapable cost of protecting religious liberty. See, e.g.,
Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327, 343-44 (1969); Pepper,
Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 325-35 (1986); Note,
General Laws, Neutral Principles, and the Free Exercise Clause, 33 VAND. L. REv. 149, 171
(1980) (criticism of court's treatment of free exercise clauses nonetheless suggests that "[iln
balancing the competing interests" the factors to be considered must always include "the
harm done to religious belief").
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rectly limited the coverage of the first amendment to "religious"
beliefs? Aside from the textual limitation of the first amendment,
how could courts cope with claims of "conscientious objection" to a
wide variety of features of the modern regulatory state? If in fact it
is the religious nature of the belief that is crucial, can the Court
avoid inquiry into how the individual's theology incorporates the
command or prohibition? Suppose, for example, that a bank em-
ployee decides to quit her job because the bank has refused to
divest itself of investments in South Africa, or because it loans
money to abortion clinics, or because she feels a "calling" to spend
more time with her children? If she asks for unemployment com-
pensation3 61 how should the unemployment benefits board treat
the claim (under Sherbert) that her action was conscientiously/re-
ligiously motivated? As Professor McConnell points out:
Religions recognize degrees of righteousness in various forms of con-
duct. Not all actions are necessarily required (duties) or forbidden
(sins); religion addresses what is "better" as well as what is "good."
... It may be difficult, however, for an outsider to distinguish reli-
gious duties from other religious practices .... A person in one reli-
gious tradition may feel a religious motivation not a "duty" to en-
gage in a particular action; a person in another tradition might
understand the same motivation as a divine calling, the neglect of
which would be unfaithful.3 62
Identifying whether the claimant falls within one tradition or the
other is unavoidable under an "affirmative action" test. The pro-
cess invites a court to consider how long the particular religion has
been in existence, how long the individual claimant has practiced
it, and whether the rituals and doctrine of the religion conform to
what is usually considered religious. When the Court in Thomas
referred to claims which are "clearly nonreligious in motivation,"
how is a court to make such a determination unless it engages in
theological inquiry?
Even if a set of beliefs could be readily identified as religious, it
seems inescapable that the court must also consider the temporal
and other claimed consequences visited upon those who violate the
religious command or prohibition. While the distinction between
361. Assuming that the statute providing for unemployment compensation limits cover-
age to situations where the employee leaves involuntarily.
362. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 27 (1985).
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direct and indirect interferences with religious practice seems to
have been lost,363 the decision of whether to grant an exemption
seems inevitably influenced by the kind of consequences that
would follow from granting or denying the exemption. For exam-
ple, if only the state's "administrative convenience" is at stake, it
will be outweighed by financial loss to the believer. 64 If the state's
interest in education is at stake, it requires something more sub-
stantial, such as evidence that an entire religious culture is at
risk. 65 If the state's interest is in national defense, not even the
imposition of imprisonment for fidelity to one's beliefs will suf-
fice.366 One might fashion a rule which forbids inquiry into the
type of consequences that are alleged to flow from the violation of
a theological principle, but if that rule requires state accommoda-
tion of any claimed theological injury, no matter how de minimis,
claims can be expected to increase geometrically.
On the other hand, one might attempt to make the standard de-
pendent solely upon the nature of the state's interest. Where the
state's interest is merely administrative, it must bow; where the
state's interest is more weighty, it need not. Such a standard might
reduce the amount of theological reckoning, but would produce
strange results. For example, the application of this standard pre-
sumably would have doomed the claim in Yoder,6 7 but might have
supported the claims in Prince3 6 8 or Braunfeld.3 9 An announced
rule that mere administrative convenience will always bow to a free
exercise claim, with no inquiry into the merits of the free exercise
claim, might open the floodgates to claimants. Additionally, there
is considerable difficulty in determining the nature of the state in-
terest at stake. Even a "compelling state interest" test is subject to
manipulation, because "[t]he level of generality at which the inter-
363. It would have been possible, before Sherbert, to limit the scope of the free exercise
claim to those cases where there was a "direct" collision between the religious command and
secular duties. See supra text accompanying notes 302-11. While such cases would still
arise, they would be far less numerous than the number of instances where the state action
simply makes the practice of religion more onerous or expensive. Sherbert extended consti-
tutional protection to indirect conflicts between religious and secular duties. Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
364. Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398.
365. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
366. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
367. 406 U.S. 205.
368. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); see supra note 289.




ests are defined often determines the outcome.M7 0
Given the cost to state neutrality of a rule based on the effects of
state action upon particular religious groups, it is time to explore
whether a rule based on neutral treatment can be articulated Qnd
defended.
VI. THE NONDISCRIMINATION ALTERNATIVE
If in fact the "affirmative action" interpretation of the religion
clauses creates unacceptable entanglement in its application, does
the nondiscrimination principle promise any relief? An early criti-
cism of Kurland's approach was that the "religion-blind" principle
would lead to patently unacceptable results,'M and beyond that,
did not eliminate the need to define religion.37 2 To meet these crit-
icisms, it is necessary to demonstrate two things: first, that the re-
sults produced by the nondiscrimination principle, although occa-
sionally different from those reached by the Court to date, are not
inconsistent with our understanding of the purpose of the religion
clauses and the fourteenth amendment;37 3 and second, that the
method of resolving these cases will minimize, if not eliminate, the
forbidden "entanglement."
As a general proposition, the nondiscrimination principle pro-
vides easy solutions to formerly hard cases (e.g., parochial aid and
the free exercise cases), but it creates a new set of "hard cases."
Unless these "hard cases" are explained successfully, they will
370. Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond: Alternatives for the Free Exercise Clause,
1981 UTAH L. REV. 309, 341 (citing Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law-A reply to Profes-
sor Mendelson, 51 CAL. L. REV. 729, 746-49 (1963); Frantz, The First Amendment in the
Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962)). As Justice Blackmun noted,
I have never been able fully to appreciate just what a "compelling state interest" is. If
it means "convincingly controlling," or "incapable of being overcome" upon any bal-
ancing process, then, of course, the test merely announces a result, and the test is no
test at all. And, for me, "least drastic means" is a slippery slope and also the signal of
the result the Court has chosen to reach. A judge would be unimaginative indeed if he
could not come up with something a little less "drastic" or a little less "restrictive" in
almost any situation, and thereby enable himself to vote to strike legislation down.
Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188-89 (1979) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted).
371. See Pfeffer, supra note 59, at 406.
372. See Mansfield, supra note 25, at 216.
373. The need for continuity is a very powerful one, as eloquently expressed by Justice
Scalia in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890, 916 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting):
"It is not right- it is not constitutionally healthy-that this Court should feel authorized to
refashion anew our civil society's relationship with religion, adopting a theory of church and
state that is contradicted by current practice, tradition, and even our own case law."
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make the nondiscrimination alternative as unacceptable as affirma-
tive action. To summarize the conclusion reached in this section,
most of Kurland's critics ignored an important element in his ini-
tial formulation 1 4 of the nondiscrimination principle. Although
"government cannot utilize religion as a standard . . . either to
confer a benefit or to impose a burden, '3 75 Kurland cautioned that
"the principle offered is meant to provide a starting point for solu-
tions to problems brought before the Court, not a mechanical an-
swer to them. ' 371 Most commentators who have considered Kur-
land's thesis3 77 have assumed that he intended an absolute
prohibition on any classification based on religion. Instead, the
presence or absence of classification is a first approximation of
neutrality, which begins, but does not end, the determination of
whether in fact the state action is neutral in its treatment of
religion. 78
A. The Easy Cases: Nondiscriminatory, Facially Neutral State
Action
As noted, the Kurland principle would simiplify resolution of
formerly hard cases. It would virtually end the constitutional37 de-
374. Professor Kurland would undoubtedly prefer to have his principle thought of as sim-
ply an articulation of pre-existing conceptions of the religion clauses, rather than a new way
of looking at them. While no earlier source can be found for this formulation of the "reli-
gion-blind" principle, arguably it was the principle applied in Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145 (1878) and Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), among other cases. See supra
note 131.
375. Kurland, supra note 13, at 6.
376. Id. (emphasis added).
377. See, e.g., Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding
of Religion under the First Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 805, 808-809 (1978) (although
Kurland's neutrality principle "lends coherence and simplicity to religion-clause doctrine" it
does so "only at a cost of almost total emasculation of the free exercise provision"); Pepper,
supra note 370, at 347 (nondiscrimination principle's "primary weaknesses are an absence of
support in the text or history of the clauses and its evisceration of the free exercise clause");
Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692
(1968).
378. This does not mean that individual cases will be decided on the "ad hoc" balancing
process criticized above; rather, the presence or absence of a religious classification must be
analyzed to see whether the state is acting in a content-neutral fashion. For example, even
though the school board resolution in Everson allocated money to the public high schools
and the "Catholic Schools," the state action in that case was in fact neutral because it was
based upon a secular category-all schools in the school board's geographical area. Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Similarly, provision of chaplains to the military,
though arguably based on a religious classification, are in fact neutral because of the more
inclusive secular category (needs of soldiers) which the state is otherwise subsidizing.
379. It would not, of course, end the question of whether it is wise to aid private schools
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bate on most of the troublesome cases involving aid to private
schools and claims for special treatment because of religious be-
liefs. To be more precise, where there is no allegation of discrimi-
natory motive on the part of the state in distributing benefits or
burdens, a facially neutral statute, whose purpose is also neutral
with respect to religion, could not be challenged simply because it
has an effect which "disproportionately" aids or hinders a particu-
lar religion. Thus, since the legislative motive for attempting to aid
private schools has never been seriously challenged, 380 the fact that
some religious groups would be "aided" in their religious mission
would become irrelevant. Similarly, those who demand a constitu-
tional exemption 81 from laws which were admittedly passed for
nondiscriminatory reasons would receive short shrift. So long as
the challenged statute or state action was not intended to disable
or inhibit any religious group, the neutrality principle is satisfied,
and the exemption is properly denied. Thus, the major criticism
presented in this article-the necessity of determining the exis-
tence, fervency, sincerity, and social worth of religious beliefs-is
eliminated. Secular government is expected to direct its efforts to-
ward secular goals, and it need not, and in most cases should
not,382 modify its course because of its impact upon religious be-
liefs. The autonomy of religious institutions and of secular govern-
ment is thus protected.8
or to provide exemptions for religious objectors, but that is another matter. For the argu-
ment that government funding would compromise the integrity of religious schools, see, e.g.,
Capps & Esbeck, The Use of Government Funding and Taxing Power to Regulate Religious
Schools, 14 J.L. & EDuc. 553 (1985).
380. See supra note 177.
381. Whether the state may choose to make exemptions to accommodate religious believ-
ers is considered below. See infra text accompanying notes 432-56. It is significant that as a
matter of constitutional law, an exemption would never be required. If the statute was
passed for discriminatory reasons, as discussed infra text accompanying notes 406-17, the
remedy would be to strike down the statute in its entirety, rather than require exemption
from it for religiously motivated objectors.
382. The state may, however, be under an obligation to consider a request for exemption
based on religious grounds where it would otherwise grant an exemption for secular reasons.
See infra note 451 and accompanying text.
383. This attitude may strike the reader as proposing the devaluation of religion and an
emasculation of the free exercise clause. However, it is simply an affirmation of the primacy
of the neutrality concept. As important as religion may be to individuals and to the culture
as a whole, those who favor neutrality suggest that government aids it most when it concen-
trates on accomplishing secular ends.
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B. The Moderately Difficult Cases
1. State Action Recognizing Religion but Employing Secular
Criteria
It would be unrealistic to think that government could function
without ever mentioning religion or a religious institution. A state
library may purchase religious books, or sign a lease with a church
for a parking lot. A state court may enter a judgment against a
church for a slip-and-fall on its sidewalk, or in its favor for en-
forcement of a construction contract. None of these cases appears
to violate the principle of neutrality because the state is not basing
its decision on a religious classification, but rather on neutral secu-
lar principles. In fact, it was such "neutral principles" that re-
quired special rules for the church control cases considered
earlier.38 4
Two recent cases considered by the Court can also be subsumed
under this principle. In Lynch v. Donnelly385 the Supreme Court
ruled on the constitutionality of the City of Pawtucket's ownership
and display of a nativity scene as part of its Christmas decorations.
In Edwards v. Aguillard88 the Court ruled on the constitutionality
of a Louisiana statute requiring "equal time" for creation sci-
ence." " Each case required careful factual analysis.
The Court noted in Lynch that paintings of the Nativity are also
hung in the National Gallery88 with no apparent objection; pre-
sumably they hang there to promote art, not Christianity. The fact
that many viewers may derive religious meaning from the paint-
ings, and that religion is thereby promoted, does not and should
not cause the paintings to be excluded.38 9 Pawtucket made a simi-
lar contention about its creche. The creche was not chosen to pro-
mote religion, but rather as one of a number of symbols that evoke
the "Christmas spirit" (something with its origin in religion but by
384. See infra text accompanying notes 421-31.
385. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
386. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
387. Similar cases confronted by the Court include Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968), in which the Court struck down a state statute that prohibited altogether the teach-
ing of evolution in public schools because of the clear intent to advance religion, and Stone
v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), in which the Court struck down a requirement that the Ten
Commandments be posted in each public school classroom.
388. 465 U.S. at 677 n.4.
389. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the
Constitution, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 847, 881-82 (1984).
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now a secular phenomenon distinguishable from it), conducive to
retail sales. Whether the decision reflected secular criteria, or was
motivated by the desire to advance religion, must be determined
by the trier of fact. The fact that religion is thereby advanced or
inhibited is not decisive.390
A similar approach, although leading to an opposite conclusion
on the merits, was used in Edwards."9 ' The Court examined the
Louisiana Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolu-
tion-Science in Public School Instruction Act, and found that, de-
spite the professed secular reasons for requiring creation science to
be taught alongside evolution, the true purpose was "to restructure
the science curriculum to conform with a particular religious view-
point.' '392 One might easily quarrel with the finding in this case,3 93
but the process itself cannot be avoided. Where an individual or
group claims that state action departed from neutral treatment be-
cause of race, sex, or religion, such state action must be examined
to determine whether it was based upon neutral criteria or upon
impermissible animus favoring or opposing a protected group.
Suppose, for example, the United States Attorney in Boston
hires a disproportionate number of Catholics. Is he discriminating
on the basis of religion, or are his choices based on neutral crite-
ria?394 These are difficult factual questions, but because procedures
390. Lynch held that Pawtucket's display did not violate the establishment clause. 465
U.S. at 668. The most controversial question in Lynch, one not addressed by any of the
opinions in the case, is whether it was constitutional to celebrate the Christmas holiday in
the first place. The answer is by no means obvious. The state may have independent secular
reasons for doing so. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); see supra text accom-
panying notes 289-300. But if it is conceded that the state may constitutionally celebrate
Christmas in an official capacity, it would be anomalous-indeed, discriminatory-to strip
from the holiday any reference to its religious roots. See infra text accompanying notes 472-
98. The problem of whether and how to celebrate religious holidays is particularly acute in
public schools. See infra note 493.
391. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
392. Id at 593.
393. Justice Scalia's dissent, joined by the Chief Justice, was particularly critical of the
confusion between individual legislators' motives (ranging from the sublime to the ridicu-
lous) and the legislative intent of the collective body. Id. at 636-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The finding of improper motivation should be made sparingly, not only because it strikes at
the heart of the democratic process but also because it is unclear how the legislature can
subsequently deal with the perceived problem (in this case a bias in the educational process)
with "purified" motives. In the employment context the act of discrimination can be identi-
fied and remedied, but the legislature's allegedly discriminatory motive would prove much
more elusive. See infra note 395.
394. More difficult is the hypothetical of a United States Attorney who refuses to hire
anyone who will not work on Saturdays. Is this a neutral decision, or one based on prejudice
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are already in place in other areas of the law to ferret out discrimi-
nation, 95 courts can be expected to handle such cases without seri-
ous conceptual difficulty. Moreover, any theory of the religion
clauses s39  will be required to provide a similar framework or
process. 9
Not only is it constitutional to aid religion where such aid comes
as an indirect result of the pursuit of some neutral secular policy,
but the Supreme Court has also repeatedly held that in some cir-
cumstances not to do so would be non-neutral and therefore un-
against Sabbatarians? If the nondiscrimination principle suggested in this article is adopted,
the issue would be whether secular criteria were used in making the choice, not whether the
choice interferes "too much" with a particular individual's exercise of religion. However, the
unwillingness of the state to make reasonable accommodations (such as would be made for
secular reasons creating the same need for accommodation) may suggest discriminatory ani-
mus rather than devotion to secular principles. See infra text accompanying note 450 (it is
unlawful for a state to deny religious claimants any benefits granted to secular claimants).
395. For example, in sex discrimination cases, the plaintiff must present a prima facie
case that suggests discrimination; the employer then has the burden to articulate a nondis-
criminatory reason for its action, and finally the plaintiff has an opportunity to show that
the proffered reason was mere pretext. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981).
396. Justice Scalia's dissent in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) recommended
abandonment of the purpose test. 482 U.S. at 639; see supra note 393. Justice Scalia's frus-
tration with the inconsistent use of the purpose test is understandable, but it is hard to
believe he would do without it altogether. His position would need to address such cases as
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), in which "religious gerrymandering" was used
against a religious group. See infra note 417. Unless one plans to use an effects test to ferret
out religious discrimination whose outcomes are even more uncertain a purpose test of some
kind is required. Moreover, the purpose test in this sense would be no different from a
prohibition against content-based discrimination in the context of a right to free speech.
See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-5 (1978).
397. Unfortunately, the Court recently abandoned the Lynch approach in County of Alle-
gheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989). In a fractious set of opin-
ions, a plurality found that public display of a menorah was constitutional, but a creche was
not, because the menorah, unlike the creche, is not central to its religion. 109 S. Ct. at 3096-
97. Rather than examining whether the county's action displayed a discriminatory animus
favoring Christianity (a close factual question, given the record), the Court adopted Justice
O'Connor's special concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). See infra note
483. Justice O'Connor suggested that the standard should be whether the governmental ac-
tion "constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion," as determined by how it would
be perceived by an "objective observer." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690-94.
Although the five-member majority (for certain purposes) in Allegheny refused to join
Justice Blackmun's opinion in which he specifically relied upon Justice O'Connor's concur-
rence in Lynch, it did rely upon a finding that "[n]o viewer could reasonably think that [the
display] occupies [a central location] without the support and approval of the government."
109 S. Ct. at 3104-05. Thus, the Court engaged in a form of analysis referred to in some
circles as deconstructionist, in which the message conveyed by a speaker (in this case the
state) is in effect severed from what the speaker intended. The Court should have focused
instead upon what the state intended to communicate, informed, (but not determined) by
what various observers thought was being communicated.
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constitutional. For example, in Widmar v. Vincent,3 9 the Supreme
Court considered a state university's denial of facilities for a stu-
dent group to hold worship services. The Court held that to ex-
clude religious speech from an otherwise open forum would consti-
tute content-based discrimination, and therefore would be
unconstitutional.3 99 Similarly, in any collection of library books or
works of art, religious themes would have to be consciously ex-
cluded to avoid representation. As Justice Jackson noted in his
concurring opinion in McCollum v. Board of Education,40 0 "Music
without sacred music, architecture minus the cathedral, or painting
without the scriptural themes would be eccentric and incomplete,
even from a secular point of view."' 401 Thus, where some neutral
secular category includes religion as one of its constituent ele-
ments, the principle of neutrality would require inclusion, not
exclusion.402
The law of zoning also illustrates how religion has been taken
into account as part of a neutral secular determination.4 3 Profes-
sor Giannella suggested that there is a "secularly relevant religious
factor" that should be considered when devising a master zoning
398. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
399. Id. at 267.
400. 333 U.S. 203, 236 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
401. Id. In a rare case of overt discrimination against religion, the Tennessee constitution
provided that no "[m]inister of the Gospel, or priest of any denomination whatever" could
be elected to the state legislature. The Supreme Court found this provision unconstitutional.
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978). In a concurring opinion Justice Brennan noted that
"the exclusion manifests patent hostility toward, not neutrality respecting, religion." Id. at
636 (Brennan, J., concurring). Although Justice Brennan's opinion cited Kurland's neutral-
ity thesis, id. at 639, it did so only to comment that such "a unitary principle ... [has] been
tempered by constructions upholding religious classifications where necessary to avoid '[a]
manifestation of... hostility [toward religion] at war with our national tradition as embod-
ied in the First Amendment's guaranty of the free exercise of religion.' "Id. at 638-39 (quot-
ing McCollum, 333 U.S. at 211-12). Professor Marty commented that "[i]t would be pleas-
ant, if unrealistic, to think that McDaniel represents a reformation, that its use of a
generally neutral concept reflects a 'striving toward doctrinal coherence.'" Marty, Of Dart-
ers and Schools and Clergymen: The Religion Clauses Worse Confounded, 1978 Sup. CT.
REv. 171, 183 (quoting R. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 208 (1972)).
402. Similarly, in making child custody decisions, the state is entitled to take religion into
account where the child has a preference and the child's welfare can thereby be promoted;
the court can avoid entanglement by determining religious preference as an objective phe-
nomenon rather than by inquiry into the merits of the particular religious beliefs. Note, The
Establishment Clause and Religion in Child Custody Disputes: Factoring Religion into the
Best Interest Equation, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1702 (1984).
403. For a recent review of cases involving first amendment challenges to zoning regula-
tions, see Pearlman, Zoning and the Location of Religious Establishments, 31 CATH. LAW.
314 (1987).
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plan.4 04 Many comprehensive plans traditionally have treated
churches and synagogues differently from such places as shopping
centers or single family dwellings. In fact, this is appropriate be-
cause churches and synagogues are different from any other classi-
fication used in zoning. Nonetheless, so long as the classification is
based on secular criteria (the amount of parking required or the
traffic and noise patterns associated with it, in short, the "fit" of
the building with neighboring uses) neutrality is preserved by
"special" criteria for churches.40
2. State Action that is Facially Neutral, but Discriminatory
One of Professor Kurland's acknowledged limitations on the
neutrality principle is that "actions of the state must be carefully
scrutinized to assure that classifications that purport to relate to
other matters are not really classifications in terms of religion."406
In many ways, this is simply the mirror image of the issue posed in
the previous section,407 where the analogy was drawn to cases of
race or sex discrimination. Statutory discrimination is less likely
because it is difficult to single out a religious group in terms that
are facially neutral. However, some cases will undoubtedly arise.
For example, in Davis v. Beason °0 the Supreme Court affirmed a
statute that required voters to deny association with any religion 09
404. See Giannella, supra note 238, at 528-41.
405. Id. The case of Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982), raised some of these
issues, but the Court had difficulty recognizing them. Petitioners challenged the state liquor
authority's practice of giving neighboring churches and hospitals a "veto power" over the
issuance of a liquor license. The Court held that doing so impermissibly granted secular
power to religious authorities. Yet, if the case had been treated essentially as a zoning prob-
lem, a more satisfactory result could have been achieved. To be sure, it may be inappropri-
ate for the state to delegate power on such terms to any private body, whether religious or
not. But if the state were simply taking into account the secular needs of the church (for
quiet neighbors) in a way that would have been done for any secular institution (e.g., a
hospital) that claimed the same needs, the church's religious identity would not be adding
to or subtracting from its secular rights, and therefore the state's action would be neutral.
406. Kurland, supra note 13, at 5. The Supreme Court has recognized this possibility.
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971) ("The question of governmental neutral-
ity is not concluded by the observation that § 60) [of the Military Selective Service Act of
1967] on its face makes no discrimination between religions, for the Establishment Clause
forbids subtle departures from neutrality, 'religious gerrymanders,' as well as obvious
abuses.").
407. See supra note 395 and accompanying text.
408. 133 U.S. 333 (1890); see Kurland, supra note 13, at 8-11.
409. The statute could have achieved facial neutrality by avoiding the term "religion."
For example, the statute could have required voters to certify that they were not associated
with any organization that advocated polygamy. This is a good illustration of the ease with
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that advocated polygamy. Without naming Mormons, the statute
had the effect and the design of discouraging Mormons from vot-
ing.410 Or suppose the Hare Krishna sect argued that a municipal
statute forbidding the wearing of orange-colored clothing was
designed to discriminate against them, and the city replied that its
purpose was to make construction workers more identifiable to
promote their safety; what should be the outcome under the neu-
trality rule?
The proposed standard would treat this case as analogous to the
hiring discrimination case. The issue would be whether the statute
reflected a discriminatory animus against the religious group in
question. 411 Although such determinations are not easy, the Court
has made difficult determinations in the past.412 It would be appro-
priate for a court to consider such factors as how closely related
the state action was to its purported purpose; whether the state
action preceded or followed the appearance of the alleged discrimi-
natory animus;413 and what cost might accrue to the state by fore-
going the action.41 4 These considerations resemble the factors cur-
rently used by the Court in resolving free exercise cases, but they
are only tools for determining the presence or absence of a discrim-
inatory animus. The proposal thus places a high burden upon
those who challenge facially neutral laws. Moreover, there is no
need to consider the extent of the burden upon the religion or its
practice, nor the perceptions of some hypothetical "reasonable ob-
server." 415 Since the choice of the trial court would either be to
find that the statute is nondiscriminatory, and thereby allow the
state action to stand, or to find that it is discriminatory and there-
which discriminatory animus can be disguised by clever draftsmanship.
410. The Court's affirmance was based upon the proposition that the statute was aimed at
suppressing the commission of crime, and that advocacy of the commission of crime could
be the basis for denying the franchise to vote. It made no clear distinction, however, be-
tween the advocacy of the benefits of polygamy or a statement of its divine origin which
would presumably be protected speech and the advocacy of present violation of the law
prior to its repeal. Although the two are not always easily distinguished, any constitutional
ban must attempt it.
411. See supra text accompanying notes 289-300.
412. See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 104.
413. As noted above, see supra note 269, it might have been decisive in Reynolds that
laws against polygamy long predated any alleged hostility toward the Mormon religion.
414. These are essentially the same considerations as would be used in the employment
discrimination cases. See supra note 395.
415. By contrast, the current standard implicitly measures the spiritual damage which
would be sustained by the state action. See supra text accompanying notes 360-69.
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fore void,4 16 there would be no need to determine the religious
character, sincerity or social worth of the objector's beliefs.417
C. Hard Cases: The Permissible Use of Religion as a Basis for
Classification
The prior categories of cases all fell, after some reformulation,
within the principle that neutral secular criteria should be used to
grant benefits or impose burdens. In other words, the first approxi-
mation of true neutrality is content-neutral rules. However, Justice
Scalia has accurately noted that religion clause jurisprudence is to
some extent "unavoidably content-based because the Freedom of
Religion clause is content-based. '41 ' Taken to its logical extreme, a
fully content-neutral interpretation of the religion clauses would
strip them of any independent content, since the press and speech
clauses of the first amendment go a long way toward forbidding
discrimination based upon the content of the spoken or printed
word. 419 Recognition of the special characteristics of religion does
not necessarily require the kind of jurisprudence, criticized in sec-
tions IV and V of this article, that makes the constitutionality of
state action contingent upon the content of various religions. In-
stead, it is possible to base the special treatment of religion (where
appropriate) upon the "secularly relevant"42 characteristics of reli-
gion, rather than upon the content of the theology itself. This sec-
tion considers those cases where religion might be an acceptable
classification, so that "mechanical answers" to religion clause con-
troversies do not replace true neutrality. These cases are essen-
416. Once the act is struck down, however, it would be possible to re-enact the statute
with exceptions for religious objectors. See infra text accompanying notes 432-56.
417. The Supreme Court followed an approach similar to the one proposed here, in Lar-
son v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). In Larson, the Unification Church attacked an amend-
ment to a Minnesota statute requiring registration of all charitable organizations; the
amendment limited a previously universal exemption of religious organizations to only those
churches that received more than fifty percent of their contributions from members or affili-
ated organizations. The court noted that this "is not simply a facially neutral statute, the
provisions of which happen to have a 'disparate impact' upon different religious organiza-
tions. On the contrary, section 309.515, subd. 1(b), makes explicit and deliberate distinctions
between different religious organizations." Id. at 246 n.23. The court also noted the legisla-
tive history of the statute, in which "[o]ne State Senator explained that the fifty percent
rule was 'an attempt to deal with the religious organizations which are soliciting on the
street and soliciting by direct mail, but who are not substantial religious institutions in . ..
our state.'" Id. at 254.
418. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890, 915 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
419. Id.
420. See supra note 404, and accompanying text.
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tially of three types: (1) the special treatment for "church control"
cases previously considered in section III; (2) the special exemp-
tions from some burden, such as taxes or military service, other-
wise imposed on the population at large; and (3) the state's provi-
sion of "space" to religion, on a basis not necessarily available to
other forms of speech.
1. Special Treatment to Avoid Entanglement
The "church control" and "religious belief" cases, considered in
section III,421 developed special rules to deal with cases involving
religious doctrine or belief. The nondiscrimination version of neu-
trality would preserve this special treatment. The rationale is two-
fold. First, for the reasons developed by the courts in the church
control cases, government abstention preserves the separate auton-
omy of church and state. When judges attempt to resolve questions
of religious doctrine, religious autonomy is inhibited and govern-
ment authority is weakened. Second, those who join a church do so
with an express or implied consent to the manner in which the
church operates. It is appropriate for government to enforce a
church procedure, no matter how unfair it might appear, because
the members are held to have previously consented to that proce-
dure when they joined the church. Thus, ordinary principles of
contract law would dictate that one who consents to be bound by a
procedure cannot later challenge the procedure as unfair. 2 Al-
though the reviewing court must determine whether the group is
religious, therefore requiring judicial abstention, it is because of
secular criteria such as the doctrine of consent that the abstention
is required.
A related principle applies to cases like United States v. Bal-
lard423 where tort or criminal claims are brought against those
whose representations or actions are claimed to be false or tortious.
A person who joins a church presumably does so in the hope that
the doctrine and practice of the church will improve his lot, either
421. See supra text accompanying notes 65-110.
422. The right to organize voluntary religious associations ... is unquestioned. All who
unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government,
and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent ... if any one ag-
grieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them
reversed.
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728-29 (1871); see Comment, Religious Torts: Applying the
Consent Doctrine As Definitional Balancing, 19 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 949 (1986).
423. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
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temporally or otherwise. Many believers, as Justice Jackson ob-
served, find themselves bitterly disillusioned by "false
prophets."424 But a preacher's assertion that the end of the world
is at hand should not be subject to civil or criminal penalties in the
event that the millennial hour passes without incident. Again, the
principle of consent is appropriately invoked. Presumably, those
who are advised of the spiritual nature of an actor's enterprise
should be on notice of the limitations on the state's ability to en-
force promises. Even where earthly benefits are promised as an ex-
tension of the spiritual teaching, liability should not follow because
religion is a unique beast. Religious "truths" or "promises" are dif-
ferent from a representation that a parcel of land is beachfront
property or that the developer will install sewer lines.4"' If a
preacher promises that faith will bring miracles, and the believer
then dies of cancer, does anyone contend that a cause of action will
arise for detrimental reliance? Not only is the principle of no-en-
tanglement implicated, but ordinary principles of contract or tort
law apply.426
It may be objected that the special treatment of religion granted
for purposes of this rule will simply recapitulate the difficulties
demonstrated with respect to the court's current approach to the
free exercise cases. 427 The significant difference is that the religious
nature of the enterprise and thereby the qualification for exemp-
tion from ordinary principles of fraud should be based upon the
perceptions of the participants. The court need not determine
whether the defendant is in truth a religious figure or a charlatan;
it must only determine whether he was perceived to be a religious
figure by his alleged victims. Thus, Ballard would probably have
424. The chief wrong which false prophets do to their following is not financial. The col-
lections aggregate a tempting total, but individual payments are not ruinous. I doubt
if the vigilance of the law is equal to making money stick by over-credulous people.
But the real harm is on the mental and spiritual plane. There are those who hunger
and thirst after higher values which they feel wanting in their humdrum lives. They
live in mental confusion or moral anarchy and seek vaguely for truth and beauty and
moral support. When they are deluded and then disillusionied, cynicism and confu-
sion follow. The wrong of these things, as I see it, is not in the money the victims
part with half so much as in the mental and spiritual poison they get. But that is
precisely the thing the Constitution put beyond the reach of the prosecutor, for the
price of freedom of religion or of speech or of the press is that we must put up with,
and even pay for, a good deal of rubbish.
Id. at 94 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
425. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
426. See supra note 422 and accompanying text.
427. See supra text accompanying notes 360-69.
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succeeded in establishing that he was in fact perceived as a reli-
gious figure, 428 even if the judge and jury saw him as a swindler,
and even though Ballard should later confess that he wasinsincere.429
As a second qualification, it must be noted that the doctrine of
consent for purposes of this rule has the same limitations as it has
in other contract or tort cases, namely that it does not extend to
practices outside the scope of the consent. A believer may consent
to disappointment from the preacher's unprovable and hence un-
enforceable promise of miracles, but he does not thereby consent
to the preacher's embezzlement of his or the church's funds. A be-
liever may consent to the fact that his or her "counseling" with the
minister is not to be held to the standard of care of secular coun-
seling,430 but he or she does not thereby consent to sexual abuse.431
428. See supra note 84.
429. Heins, supra note 90, at 191.
Where a patient, consumer, or adherent is fairly on notice that the relief offered ad-
dresses the spiritual aspects of physical ills, failure to cure or lack of medical support
for the theory of cure advanced should not, even in the absence of statutory exemp-
tion, be actionable as breach of contract, fraud, or practicing medicine without a li-
cense, no matter how emphatic or hypocritical the assurances of the religious healer.
Id.
430. In Nally v. Grace Community Church, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1147, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215
(1987), rev'd, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 763 P.2d 948 (1988), the California appellate
court failed to recognize this distinction. The case arose from the suicide of Kenneth Nally,
a 24-year-old counselee of defendant church. Nally's parents sued the church under various
theories, including the church's failure to refer Kenneth to a secular counselor after he had
disclosed his intention to commit suicide. On two occasions the California Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint. In the second reversal, the
court found that a compelling state interest in the prevention of suicide justified a require-
ment that religious counselors as well as secular counselors place suicidal individuals "in the
hands of those best able to prevent these counselees from killing themselves." 194 Cal. App.
3d at -, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 229. Implicit in the appellate court's standard was the judgment
that religious counselors must defer to the superior abilities of secular counselors. The court
did not consider the possibility that individuals who seek religious counseling may have
decided that religious answers to questions about the meaning of life might be preferable to
those provided by the local mental health clinic. The court need not reach the question of
whether religious counseling is more likely to inhibit suicide; the question is whether the
counselee has expressly or impliedly consented to accept the outcome of religious counsel-
ing, for better or worse. If he did so, the courts have no more authority to second-guess that
decision than they do to second-guess whether Ballard's followers would have done better
investing in a mutual fund.
The case was reversed by the California Supreme Court on nonconstitutional grounds. 47
Cal. 3d at -, 763 P.2d at 964, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 113 (defendant owed no duty to plaintiff).
For an analysis of Nally and similar cases, see Note, Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress by Spiritual Counselors: Can Outrageous Conduct Be "Free Exercise"?, 84 MICH.
L. REv. 1296 (1986) (suggests that free exercise interest of religious group be "balanced"
against state's interest in preventing harm to group members).
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Determining the scope of the consent will be a difficult factual
matter, but it promises fewer intrusions into sensitive first amend-
ment areas, and at the same time it permits courts to reach just
results in the majority of cases. In short, the principle of consent,
like the principle of nondiscrimination generally, provides a start-
ing point rather than a mechanical answer to particular cases.
2. Exemptions, as a Matter of Legislative Grace, to Promote Sec-
ular Ends
A second type of case for special treatment of religion arises
where the state chooses to make an exemption solely for religiously
motivated objectors. For example, in enacting a military draft,
Congress provided that certain persons were exempt from service
upon proof that they possessed religious scruples against military
service. Does such a provision comport with the nondiscrimination
principle? This article suggests that it does. While it is true that
the statute uses religion as a classification in distributing benefits
and burdens, this should not end the discussion. However, the jus-
tification for this exception must be carefully developed.
An implied recognition of the free exercise claim,432 the usual
justification for the exception, is of course unavailable under the
nondiscrimination principle. The nondiscrimination principle, un-
like the affirmative action approach, does not recognize a duty of
government to comply with the dictates of private conscience, so
long as the government action is not a form of content-based
discrimination. 3
431. See the discussion of such cases in Esbeck, Tort Claims Against Churches and Ec-
clesiastical Officers: The First Amendment Considerations, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 87-88
(1986).
432. Justice White discusses this possible justification in his dissenting opinion in Welsh
v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 369-70 (1970) (White, J., dissenting).
433. However, there could be cases where the government's failure to accommodate reli-
gious concerns on a par with secular concerns betrays a discriminatory animus. See Menora
v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1982). In Menora, a member of a high
school basketball team was forbidden to wear a yarmulke because it was in violation of the
association's rules. Judge Posner insisted that each party make efforts to find a common
ground for proceeding without the religious conflict. Where a logical solution exists permit-
ting both the state and the religious group to harmonize their goals, the state's failure to
implement the compromise may betray religious bias:
[I]f the Association proves to be so obdurate-if it refuses to accommodate the indis-
putably sincere beliefs of a religious group though it can do so at no cost to the only
objective, safety, that the rule in question is claimed to have-it will be standing on
constitutional quicksand. Even if the interest in participating in interscholastic bas-
ketball is a slight one, a question we need not decide, it would by definition outweigh
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However, a different question arises where government chooses
to exempt persons on the basis of religious belief. As in the area of
choosing a religious painting or a religious book, the state's motiva-
tion may be critical. One immediate suspicion is that the state's
purpose is to discriminate on the basis of religion.43 4 If Congress
levied a $200 tax on every person, but exempted Episcopalians, one
would be entitled to worry that Episcopalians in Congress had
used the device of exemption to place a discriminatory tax on non-
Episcopalians, thus violating the principle of neutrality. But it is
obvious that Congress' purpose in exempting religious pacifists was
not to confer a benefit upon them; on the contrary, it was to raise
an effective fighting force.435 Congress has known from the time of
the burden on the state of accommodating that interest if there were no burden at all.
Id. at 1034.
434. This article by no means denies the importance of religion to a sound body politic.
George Washington's farewell address is frequently quoted on this point:
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and mo-
rality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriot-
ism who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest
props of the duties of men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious
man, ought to respect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connec-
tions with private and public felicity. Let it simply be asked where is the security for
property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths,
which are the instruments of investigation in courts of justice? And let us with cau-
tion indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion.
Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar
structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can
prevail in exclusion of religious principle.
Quoted in W. BERNS, supra note 87, at 13. But aware as the Framers were of the importance
of religion, they stopped short (at least at the federal level) of direct support of religion
conditioned only on its positive secular effects. If that were to become the standard, then,
particularly given the sentiments just quoted, no meaningful line could be drawn short of
direct support of religious institutions.
The state is not entitled to base its actions upon judgments (positive or negative) of reli-
gion's value to the state, but rather must act neutrally, i.e., in terms of the secular expres-
sions of religious tastes. The idea of neutrality is that the state should attempt to treat
groups and individuals without regard to their religious identity. That does not mean ignor-
ing the existence of religion, but rather preserving a sense of neutrality (agnosticism, if you
will) about whether any particular religious belief is true or untrue, beneficial or pernicious.
The state can and must recognize that religious beliefs have secular expressions which must
be accounted for. Zoning plans must take into account the desire of citizens to attend wor-
ship services; selective service systems must include the fact that some citizens are conscien-
tiously opposed to war. Education subsidies must recognize that a substantial amount of
higher education, as well as primary and secondary education, takes place at institutions
with religious affiliations. To advance its interests, the state may sometimes help, and some-
times hinder, particular religious purposes. This is perfectly consistent with the principle of
neutrality.
435. "Exemption was not extended to [conscientious objectors] to further religious belief
or practice but to limit military service to those who were prepared to undertake the fight-
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the Continental Congress that there are some individuals who will
refuse to fight. Thus, Congress made the tactical decision that
throwing religious pacifists in jail would sap the war effort to a
greater extent than giving them an exemption.43 The question is
whether this tactical decision is constitutionally foreclosed by the
principle of neutrality. Justice Harlan's concurrence in Welsh v.
United States,4s7 argues that "having chosen to exempt, [Con-
gress] cannot draw the line between theistic or nontheistic reli-
gious beliefs on the one hand and secular beliefs on the other. '438
If one were to attempt a defense of the exemption on the basis
of the superior value to society of religious as opposed to secular
beliefs, Justice Harlan's dictum would be dispositive. It would in-
deed violate the principle of nondiscrimination. Yet, it seems clear
that Congress made a distinction based upon the secular effects of
the beliefs, not their theological merit. Just as Professor Giannella
suggested that a "secularly relevant religious factor" could -be used
in zoning decisions,43 9 Congress was simply recognizing the secular
impact of religious beliefs, and protecting the nation's interests ac-
cordingly. Otherwise, Congress would have been forced to choose
between two equally unattractive alternatives: either end the ex-
emption for all, and incur costs for increased prison facilities, loss
of productive capacity, and ill will toward the government; or open
the exemption to anyone "conscientiously opposed" to war, which
would lead to even less desirable consequences.440 Consider Welsh
himself, who based his objection on the ground that "in our failure
to recognize the political, social, and economic realities of the
world, we, as a nation, fail our responsibility as a nation."'44 The
Armed Services Committee might appreciate the difficulty of ex-
plaining to the soldier in the foxhole that Welsh was not beside
him because of Welsh's more acute perception of the political, so-
cial, and economic realities of the world. If forced to choose be-
ing that the armed services have to do." Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 369 (White,
J., dissenting).
436. Exemptions for religious objectors may serve the state's interest by "preventing the
kind of harm caused by the eighteenth amendment [Prohibition]: widespread disobedience;
disproportionate investment of enforcement resources; and loss of respect for the law." Gar-
vey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L. REv. 779, 795-96 (1986)
(footnote omitted).
437. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
438. Id. at 356 (Harlan, J., concurring).
439. See supra text accompanying note 404.
440. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 459-60 (1971).
441. 398 U.S. at 342 (emphasis omitted).
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tween exemptions for all and exemptions for religious objectors
only, Congress might elect to abolish the exemption altogether.442
Secular reasons for refusing government orders stand on a differ-
ent footing from religious reasons.443
The case of draft exemptions may be sui generis simply because
of the unique nature of the need for military service. Since the
Constitution is not "a suicide pact, '444 and since the draft itself is
a unique invasion of personal liberties, perhaps any rule will re-
quire allowances and exceptions. 445 But there are other examples.
When Prohibition was adopted in this country, the importation
and use of sacramental wine was exempted from the otherwise ab-
solute prohibition of the use of alcohol. 446 If the legislature could
not have used such exemptions, it would be confronted with the
unacceptable alternatives of either facing massive opposition to its
efforts to control alcohol consumption, or abandoning those efforts
altogether. Limiting exemptions to those whose religious beliefs re-
quire them to be exempted would seem to further the state's secu-
lar purposes. Also, suppose a state required vaccinations against
certain diseases. It might take into account the fact that some reli-
gious groups hold such vaccinations to be sinful. The legislature
might decide that the public health interest superseded any pri-
vate scruples, thus requiring all individuals to be vaccinated. On
the other hand, the legislature might conclude that the program's
success would be greater if a confrontation with the religious mi-
nority groups could be avoided.447 As in the draft case, the legisla-
ture might find that the secular effect of religious convic-
tions-their failure to deter religious objectors, and their tendency
to create martyrs-may require a treatment different from that ac-
corded to nonreligious beliefs (for example, doubts about the effi-
442. Conklin, Conscientious Objector Provisions: A View in the Light of Torcaso v. Wat-
kins, 51 GEo. L.J. 252, 282 (1963).
443. If a person says that God forbids him from wearing a tie, we might think he is crazy,
but we will experience less personal affront than if he tells us that wearing ties is a symptom
of phallic insecurity. Analogously, the Armed Services Committee might find it more palat-
able to exempt some from service for reasons unrelated to the merits of the war being
fought namely, because of a belief that God -forbids war of any kind.
444. "[W]hile the Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a
suicide pact." Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).
445. Some of this reasoning affected the opinion in the recent case of Goldman v. Wein-
berger. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
446. Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 314.
447. See generally Comment, An Evaluation of Immunization Regulations in Light of
Religious Objections and the Developing Right of Privacy, 4 U. DAYTON L. Rav. 401 (1979).
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cacy or advisability of inoculation).448
A slightly different problem is posed by statutes designed to pre-
vent religious discrimination. For example, in TWA v. Hardison,4 9
the Court considered the constitutionality of an administrative
regulation requiring employers "to make reasonable accommoda-
tions to the religious needs of employees and prospective employ-
ees where such accommodation can be made without undue hard-
ship on the conduct of the employer's business."'45 The court held
that the prevention of religious discrimination is distinguishable
from requiring discrimination in favor of religious claimants. For
example, while it is unlawful for a school board to deny paid leave
for religious purposes when it provides paid leave for secular pur-
poses,45 it is unconstitutional to require the state to single out reli-
gious reasons for preferential treatment.45 2 Such regulations do not
in fact grant special treatment for religious objectors, but instead
require employers to treat their employees equally. Such statutes
could be seen as imposing upon private employers an obligation
already imposed upon state employers: not to indulge any discrimi-
natory animus against religious beliefs.
One of the advantages of permitting the state to offer exemp-
tions as a matter of legislative grace rather than requiring them as
448. One traditional area of difficulty involves religious sects that disapprove of tradi-
tional medical care and instead practice some form of "faith healing." Although adults are
generally free to accept or reject medical care, parents who withhold lifesaving medical care
from their children may violate laws prohibiting child abuse. Many states have provided
limited exemptions for parents whose religious beliefs forbid the use of medical care. See
Note, Faith Healing Exemptions to Child Protection Laws: Keeping the Faith versus Med-
ical Care for Children, 12 J. LEGIs. 243 (1985). The approach taken by this article would
permit such exemptions but not require them; however, there may be other constitutional
interests, separate from the religion clauses, that would protect a child's interest in the con-
tinuity and supremacy of his parents' custody, so long as there is no imminent life-threaten-
ing condition. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 91 (1979).
449. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
450. Id. at 72 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1968)). An employee claimed that he had been
improperly fired when he refused to work on Friday nights or Saturdays pursuant to his
religious beliefs. On appeal the court held that the employer had made a reasonable effort to
accommodate the employee and therefore no statutory violation had occurred. Id. at 63. For
a criticism of the narrowness of the Supreme Court's holding, see Wheeler, Establishment
Clause Neutrality and the Reasonable Accommodation Requirement, 4 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 901 (1977).
451. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 71 (1986).
452. Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985). "This unyielding weighting in favor of
Sabbath observers over all other interests contravenes a fundamental principle of the Reli-
gion Clauses ...." Id. at 710.
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a free exercise right is that it permits the legislature more flexibil-
ity to discover what kinds of exemptions can be practically permit-
ted. Many of the determinations as to whether an exemption can
be granted, and if so on what terms, must be a function of careful
prudential judgments. As Dean Calabresi has noted, a constitu-
tional ruling cannot be adjusted by legislative or administrative
bodies when changed circumstances would otherwise suggest
amendments.45
Lest the exemption principle appear to swallow up the general
neutrality rule, its limitations should be carefully enumerated. The
state should be permitted to grant exemptions for reasons of reli-
gious belief only where: (1) its motive in doing so is to advance a
legitimate secular interest rather than the interests of the religious
group affected;4 54 (2) there is a significant cost imposed upon the
state if the legislation were implemented without such an exemp-
tion; and (3) the exemption is scrupulously neutral as between
religions.
As with the case of exemptions to prevent entanglement, the
definition of religion may still be required for purposes of adminis-
tering exemptions from state laws. The question, however, is a
practical one of whether the legislature can administer the exemp-
tion without discrimination 455 or excessive entanglement. Fortu-
nately, under this approach the state has the option of retaining
the exemption if it proves workable or abandoning it if it does not.
By contrast, creating a constitutional right to exemption allows
much less flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances. 4 5
453. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 11 (1982).
454. This can be demonstrated where the exemption covers only a minority of the popula-
tion. It is obvious, for example, that where Congress is raising an army but exempts religious
pacifists, it is extending an exemption to a group that is politically weak, otherwise Congress
would not be raising an army from which exemption is needed. Therefore, it can be con-
cluded that the majority is granting the minority a special concession. Since this presumably
works to the benefit of both majority and minority, it is hard to understand wherein the
constitutional harm lies.
455. See supra text accompanying notes 320-36.
456. Finally, there is the question of a nonreligious claimant's standing to challenge ex-
emptions asserted by religious claimants. A lgitimate question can be raised as to whether,
in the absence of religious claimants, the state would grant an exemption to any objectors.
If, as Justice White noted in Welsh, the treatment of the nonreligious objector would be the
same either with or without the exemption for religious objectors, there may be no injury,
and hence no standing:
Even if Welsh is quite right in asserting that exempting religious believers is an es-
tablishment of religion forbidden by the First Amendment, he nevertheless remains
one of those persons whom Congress took pains not to relieve from military
1990]
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A unique category for exemptions arises in .the area of taxation.
The first case to challenge tax exemptions granted to religious or-
ganizations was Walz v. Tax Commission.4 57 However, the statute
attacked in Walz did not limit its exemption to religious institu-
tions, but rather extended the exemption to charitable institutions
irrespective of religious ties.458 In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bul-
lock4 59 the Court considered a challenge to a Texas statute that
exempted only religious periodicals from state sales tax.460 A plu-
rality found that the statute lacked both a secular purpose and a
neutral effect, because "Texas' sales tax exemption for periodicals
promulgating the teaching of any religious sect lacks a secular ob-
jective that would justify this preference along with similar bene-
fits for similar benefits for nonreligious publications or groups, and
because it effectively endorses religious belief, .... ."46
The plurality in Texas Monthly failed to consider the otherwise
broad discretion given to taxing authorities to devise a scheme of
taxation that fairly distributes the burden of raising revenues.462
Just as a zoning scheme may provide for different treatment of
churches than for shopping centers, libraries, or museums, a taxing
authority may legitimately view the sale of Bibles and religious
tracts as presenting a significantly different vehicle of taxation
when compared with the petitioner, Texas Monthly. Such factors
as the amount of revenue raised compared to the headache of tax
collection, the relative ability of the taxpayer to pay, and the risk
of entanglement between church and state,46 might militate in
duty....
[F]or as long as Welsh is among those from whom Congress expressly withheld the
exemption, he has no standing to raise the establishment issue even if § 60) would
present no First Amendment problems if it had included Welsh and others like him.
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 368 (1970) (White, J., dissenting). This conclusion
depends upon the assumption that Congress' motive in choosing not to exempt nonreligious
pacifists was not based upon a discriminatory animus. That assumption appears to be
correct.
457. 397 U.S. 664 (1970), see supra text accompanying notes 111-13.
458. 397 U.S. at 672-73.
459. 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989).
460. Id. at 892. The statute exempts "[pleriodicals that are published or distributed by a
religious faith and that consist wholly of writings promulgating the teaching of the faith and
books that consist wholly of writings sacred to a religious faith. TEx. TAX CODE ANN. §
151.312 (Vernon 1982) (amended 1989).
461. 109 S. Ct. at 901.
462. The plurality also failed to honor the distinction advanced in Walz between direct
subsidies and "simply abstain[ing] from demanding that the church support the state."
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970).
463. Consider the practical dimensions of collecting taxes for religious publications. Many
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favor of an exemption for religious groups that would not be avail-
able to nonreligious groups, leaving aside the theological merit of
the activity. In other words, it is perfectly plausible that the State
of Texas chose to exempt religious groups from taxation for rea-
sons having nothing to do with an "endorsement" of religion. Since
no tax code has yet been characterized as a seamless web of per-
fectly consistent principles, it is inevitable that some similarly situ-
ated taxpayers will have significantly different tax liabilities. Just
as the different traffic, noise, and use patterns of a church demand
treatment distinct from any other category of landowner, the par-
ticular revenue patterns of churches may suggest that unique taxa-
tion patterns may also be appropriate.
The plurality in Texas Monthly also suggested that striking
down the statute furthered the interest of neutrality by avoiding
an examination into "whether some message or activity [of the tax-
payer] [was] consistent with 'the teaching of the faith.' ",464 While
the thesis of this article has been the desirability of avoiding such
inquiries, taxing authorities are inevitably confronted with claims
for exemption on a variety of issues that may be insincere or fraud-
ulent. The line drawn by the statute clearly differentiates the Bible
and the Texas Monthly. The degree of entanglement caused by
the statute is clearly dwarfed by the potential for entanglement
caused by routine tax collection from parish halls and tract
publishers." 5
In summary, exemptions granted on the basis of legislative grace
frequently serve secular ends. When they do, the state should be
able to further its own legitimate secular purposes, even where an
incidental benefit to religion is conferred as a result.
publications are given away free, but with a suggested "donation" to cover printing costs.
Are such transactions "sales" for purposes of sales tax? In what amount? Again, the unique
characteristic of the distribution of religious publications defy traditional taxation catego-
ries, unlike the sale on a newsstand of the Texas Monthly.
464. 109 S. Ct. at 902 (citations omitted).
465. In Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of California, 110 S. Ct. 688
(1990), the Court rejected the argument that imposing state sales and/or use taxes on reli-
gious publications would violate the free exercise clause. Although consistent with the neu-
trality principle, the case illustrates two principles stressed in this article: (1) it is artificial
to separate the analysis of a case into two separate components, alternately considering free
exercise and establishment clause concerns; and (2) the Court should provide a wider chan-
nel between Scylla and Charybdis to allow states to determine whether an exemption for
religious purposes is workable and/or desirable. Instead of asking whether the state had
struck the perfect balance between establishment clause and free exercise clause concerns,
the Court should have limited its inquiry to whether the state had acted neutrally, that is,
without a discriminatory animus, in formulating and applying its tax policy.
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3. Providing "Space" to Religion
The most controversial category of cases includes what might
appear to be direct support of religion. The military's provision of
chaplains is the paradigmatic example. Additional cases include a
state's employment of a legislative chaplain or an invocation at a
high school graduation ceremony. A religious painting or a reli-
gious book can be purchased and displayed because of artistic or
literary merit rather than religious content,46 in effect subsuming
the religious aspect of the item in question within larger secular
principles. But there may be cases where assistance is given to reli-
gion with a conscious recognition of its religious nature. Can such a
practice ever be found consistent with the neutrality principle?
The short answer is "yes." Although one can say that a library
purchases books about religion because they are books and not be-
cause they are about religion, eventually it must be recognized that
some books are chosen precisely because they are about religion.
That is, when a librarian selects the range of books to fill the
shelves of a library, he or she looks to the vast range of appetites
for books. Public libraries contain mystery novels, car repair
manuals, children's stories, atlases, stock market reports, phono-
graph records, cookbooks, political manifestoes, photography col-
lections, literary classics, and so forth. It would comprise a strange
collection if there was no attempt to satisfy the library patrons'
appetite for religion (not just the scholarly study of religion, but
the desire for inspiration, even salvation). Just as a patron checks
out a mystery novel to entertain himself (not to engage in a schol-
arly study of the mystery novel), it would not be surprising to find
that some patrons check out religious books in order to promote
their faith. The fact that every public library subsidizes this en-
deavor should not be shocking. Nor would it be an appropriate
subject of constitutional challenge. Indeed, a librarian who, in rec-
ognition of this phenomenon, excluded books about religion or lim-
ited their use to "nonreligious purposes" would be guilty of reli-
gious discrimination, even if the purpose was to avoid offending
the establishment clause. 46 7
Similarly, it can be demonstrated that when the military pro-
vides soldiers with what is in essence a total environment, what
466. See supra text accompanying notes 385-405.




one commentator has called a "pervasive governmental pres-
ence," 4 8 it would be anomalous to provide eating and sleeping
quarters, recreation, education, sanitation, and health facilities,
but no place for religious exercise. Thus, the fact that the military
pays for the chaplains or rabbis is no more surprising than the fact
that it pays for cooks or surgeons. This is not to say that there will
not be conflicts and difficulties in determining how many chap-
lains, and of what denominations, will be supplied to a given group
of soldiers,46 9 but the general concept that the military supplies re-
ligious needs because religion is part of the "total world" the mili-
tary undertakes to supply should require little more justification
than the expenditure of public library funds for religious books.
Indeed, in both cases the deliberate exclusion of religious catego-
ries from state funding would be distinctly non-neutral.
In a technical sense, religion has become a classification by
which state funds have been awarded; the chaplain's salary will be
a distinct line item in the budget, just as religion is a classification
within the Dewey Decimal System in the library. Some form of
classification is unavoidable, and therefore the choice must be
made as to whether inclusion is more or less neutral than exclu-
sion. Based on the above analysis, inclusion is certainly the more
neutral path in terms of substantive fairness. Moreover, the selec-
tion of chaplains or library books poses far less danger of entangle-
ment than the determination of "sectarianness ' 0 or the degree of
theological injury;471 here again, as with the special rules to avoid
entanglement, the state can take expressions of belief at face value
rather than being forced to analyze and evaluate them. The libra-
rian can purchase books on the basis of patron requests, and chap-
lains can be assigned based on the expressed religious preferences
468. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U.L REv. 146, 161
(1986).
469. It is conceivable that the military could supply space, but no more, leaving the selec-
tion, retention and pay of its chaplains to private groups. As one commentator has pointed
out, depriving the military of the ability to coordinate the chaplaincy would entail serious
logistical difficulties. Herrmann, Some Considerations on the Constitutionality of the
United States Military Chaplaincy, 14 Ass. U.L. REv. 24, 36 (1964); see also Giannella,
supra note 238, at 525. Even a recent criticism of the military chaplaincy program recog-
nizes that the military should pay for chaplains; the only complaint is that the current sys-
tem "impermissibly subordinate[s] religious interests to military concerns." Kaplan, Mili-
tary Mirrors on the Wall: Nonestablishment and the Military Chaplaincy, 95 YALE L.J.
1210, 1218 (1986).
470. See supra notes 125-262 and accompanying text.
471. See supra notes 263-370 and accompanying text.
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of soldiers. By contrast, a decision to exclude all religious books or
to forbid subsidies for chaplains would require extensive evalua-
tion of which books are in fact religious and which forms of accom-
modation within the military constitute a "subsidy."
a. Extensions of the Principle to Schools
Virtually all commentators, even those who advocate "strict sep-
aration" or "strict neutrality," have conceded that military chap-
lains are indeed constitutional.472 Although most have rationalized
this obvious subsidy to religion as a requirement of the free exer-
cise clause, the practice itself is not perceived as a violation of
state neutrality toward religion. If the justification offered here is
valid, the question naturally arises as to whether it can be ex-
tended to other settings that are analogous to the "total world"
created by the military. Some commentators have suggested that
public schools also contain aspects of the "pervasive governmental
presence; 4 73 schools take away freedom of action from students
who are required by law to be there. While the governmental pres-
ence is not nearly as intrusive as that of a military base or a prison,
it cannot be said that the operative principle disappears altogether.
Moreover, aside from the fact that compulsory education has an
intrusive and displacing effect upon the lives of school-age children
somewhat analogous to the military, there is the additional analogy
to the public library. Schools purport to provide an introduction
into all phases of adult life, including physical education, litera-
ture, science, the arts, home economics and shop. There ought to
be a place in this collection for religion. "[I]t is a proper, if not an
indispensable, part of preparation for a worldly life to know the
roles that religion and religions have played in the tragic story of
mankind. 4 74 It is no secret that, at least until quite recently,
schools have neglected this task.475
However, it is not entirely clear what sort of place religion ought
to have. Justice Jackson agreed with the majority in McCollum v.
Board of Education that it was improper for schools to permit pri-
vate religious groups to conduct religious instruction on school
property during school hours, but he expressed doubt that a mat-
472. See, e.g., L. PFEFFER, RELIGION, STATE AND THE BURGER COURT 158-59 (1984).
473. McConnell, supra note 468, at 162-63.
474. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 236 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
475. See the studies cited in McConnell, supra note 468, at 162 n.70.
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ter of such subtlety could be resolved by the court's becoming "a
super board of education for every school district in the nation.
47 6
Nonetheless, general principles ought to be stated to provide
school boards with reasonably detailed guidance about the consti-
tutionality of particular practices. The major practices at issues
are: (a) space for student religious groups to meet during "student
activity" periods; (b) space for religious instruction as part of the
school curriculum; and (c) space for prayer.
b. Space for Student Religious Groups
The case of Widmar v. Vincent417 established that university
student religious groups were entitled to the same facilities af-
forded other student groups. The issue was then raised as to
whether the same principle should be extended to high school
groups. In Bender v. Williamsport Area School District,478 the
Court declined to reach the merits4 79 of a case in which a high
school religious group, Petros, had been refused the right to meet
on campus as a club. However, the case was widely discussed, and
along with other similar cases, prompted Congress to enact the
Equal Access Act.4 80 The major objections to an extension of
Widmar to high school students have been based upon the argu-
ment that, whereas college students would perceive the use of an
"open forum" by a religious group as an act of neutrality, high
school students would perceive the use of school classrooms as an
act of endorsement of religion by the school. 481 This argument is
no stronger than the converse, which is that the school's refusal to
provide space would similarly appear as an act of hostility.48 2 In
476. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 237 (Jackson, J., concurring).
477. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
478. 475 U.S. 534 (1986).
479. The district court had ruled in favor of the students; the school district did not ap-
peal, but one member of the school board filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit. Id. at 539. The Third Circuit held that the practice of permitting prayer
clubs to meet on school premises violated the establishment clause, and reversed. Id. at 540.
The Supreme Court held that the school board member lacked standing to appeal the deci-
sion, and therefore vacated the Third Circuit's opinion. Id. at 549.
480. 20 U.S.C. § 4071-4074 (Supp. 1985). For a discussion of the Equal Access Act see
Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by
Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1986).
481. Teitel, The Unconstitutionality of Equal Access Policies and Legislation Allowing
Organized Student-Initiated Religious Activities in the Public High Schools: A Proposal
for a Unitary First Amendment Forum Analysis, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 529, 572-73
(1985).
482. Laycock, supra note 480, at 19; Strossen, A Constitutional Analysis of the Equal
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any event, according constitutional rights on the basis of largely
unprovable perceptions is a dangerous business.8 s Where the
school is excluding a religious group on the basis of content, as
opposed to time, place and manner, first amendment values are
plainly jeopardized, as Widmar established.484 Particular cases will
obviously raise issues of time, place, and manner, as well as claims
of discrimination either in favor of, or against, religion. But no
generalized prohibition appears defensible.485
c. Space for Religious Instruction
The second area of concern is when the school itself undertakes
to teach religion. The Supreme Court addressed this issue as early
as 1948. In McCollum v. Board of Education48 6 and Zorach v.
Clauson,487 the Supreme Court considered so-called "released
time" programs that had been initiated in many schools. In Mc-
Collum, the schools initiated a program where once a week stu-
dents were assigned, based on parental choice, to one of four
groups: Protestant, Catholic, Jewish or "Other." Each of the first
three groups went to a classroom where a teacher supplied by that
group provided thirty to forty-five minutes of religious instruction.
Students in the "Other" group were required to remain at school
Access Act's Standards Governing Public School Student Religious Meetings, 24 HARv. J.
ON LEGis. 117, 146 (1987).
483. Justice O'Connor suggested in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), that the test
of governmental purpose should be "whether the government intends to convey a message
of endorsement or disapproval of religion." Id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra
text accompanying notes 385-401. Justice O'Connor's approach, and the following it has
generated, is carefully analyzed and rejected. Smith, supra note 25. One of the central
problems is in the lack of an objective standard for "whose perceptions count." Id. at 291;
see also McConnell, supra note 322, at 48 ("objective observer" standard "serves merely to
avoid stating what considerations inform the judgment that a statute is constitutional or
unconstitutional"). Unfortunately the "objective observer" test was relied upon at least in
part in the Allegheny County case. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union,
109 S. Ct. 3086, 3104-05 (1989); see supra note 397. For a more sanguine view of the
O'Connor approach, see Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion
Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight,
64 N.C.L. REV. 1049 (1986); Marshall, supra note 17, at 550 ("Establishment exists when a
governmental action symbolizes improper state endorsement of religion").
484. See Mawdsley, Prohibition of Student Religious Activities on Public School Prem-
ises: Unreasonable Content-Based Restriction, 4 COOLEY L. REV. 117, 156 (1986).
485. One commentator's analysis of Bender and the Equal Access Act concludes that
schools must engage in a case-by-case analysis of equal access claims by student groups. See
Strossen, supra note 482.
486. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
487. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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engaged in some other form of study. The Court struck down this
program as a "utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported
public school system to aid religious groups to spread their
faith."4 " In addition, the Court cited the use of "the State's com-
pulsory public school machinery" to encourage student
attendance."'
In Zorach the school district released children from school on
written request of the parents to enable attendance at religious in-
struction or devotional exercises off campus. As in McCollum, stu-
dents who were not released were required to remain at school, al-
though classes were not conducted during that time. A majority of
the Court found the program in Zorach constitutional, on the
ground that it was indistinguishable from a case where individual
students requested a release from school for religious training.
However, Justice Jackson in his dissent complained that the school
then "serves as a temporary jail for a pupil who will not go to
Church."4 90
Virtually every commentator has declared these cases irreconcil-
able.491 Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in McColum, 492
points out a troubling fact: if in fact the schools are permitted,
perhaps even obligated, to teach about religion, can we reasonably
expect public school teachers to handle the task? "[H]ow one can
teach, with satisfaction or even with justice to all faiths, such sub-
jects as the story of the Reformation, the Inquisition, or even the
New England effort to found 'a Church without a Bishop and a
State without a King,' is more than I know. '493 The risk, of course,
is that schools will simply ignore the potentially controversial sub-
ject of religion altogether.4 94 Recent research suggests that this has
488. 333 U.S. at 210.
489. Id. at 209-10.
490. 343 U.S. at 324 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
491. See, e.g., Kurland, The Regents' Prayer Case: "Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying
." 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 32; Laycock, supra note 480, at 33; Note, The "Released Time"
Cases Revisited: A Study of Group Decisionmaking by the Supreme Court, 83 YALE L.J.
1202, 1233 (1974) ("more than twenty years of repeated discussion of McCollum and Zorach
by Justices of the Supreme Court have failed to elucidate the distinction between them").
492. See supra note 401 and accompanying text.
493. 333 U.S. at 236. Any reader confident of the schools' ability to teach neutrally on the
subject of religion should consider the cases litigating the constitutionality of Christmas
programs. See Smith & Hayes, A Christmas Carol Revisited: Humbug in the Sioux Falls
Schools, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 359 (1980); Pevar, Public Schools Must Stop Having Christmas
Assemblies, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 327 (1980); Note, Religious-Holiday Observances in the
Public Schools, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1116 (1973).
494. Indeed, some have suggested that it is impossible to read or study the Bible without
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in fact occurred.495 Rather than attempt the herculean task of de-
signing a curriculum that treats each aspect of religion with
scrupulous neutrality,496 a school board might permit parents to
designate from among several alternatives a curriculum concerning
religion that is in harmony with those parents' beliefs. This ap-
proach might be particularly appropriate for such topics as AIDS
education and other "value" issues where schools are expected to
provide instruction but suffer from a lack of consensus on how best
to teach the subject.497 If parents are free to choose a viewpoint
that complements their own, the school may be able to fulfill its
obligations to teach controversial subjects without being forced to
take a position on sensitive issues. Although such programs would
appear to conflict with McCollum,498 the primary vice in that
case,499 creating a "jail" for uncooperative students, could easily be
its becoming an act of devotion. L. PFEFFER, CHURCH STATE AND FREEDOM 448 (rev. ed. 1967).
See generally Comment, supra note 43.
495. See supra note 475.
496. For example, to avoid preferring either Catholicism or Protestantism, a public school
discussion of the Reformation would stress the political, social and economic bases of
the movement, deemphasizing the doctrinal religious controversy; and to the extent
that the theological dispute were considered it would be treated in an even-handed,
neutral manner, as a subject upon which reasonable men may reasonably differ. This
secular treatment unavoidably tends to belittle both Protestant and Catholic dogma
and hence may perhaps be characterized as indoctrinating antireligionism or secular
religionism.
Schwarz, supra note 377, at 700.
497. At one time the National Education Association recognized that in the area of sex
education "[flathers and mothers are the best judge of how much information to give their
own children." In addition, it advised that "[m]any questions that children ask about sex
can be answered constructively in a religious framework. Some fathers and mothers preface
all explanations with the statement that God made it possible for mothers and fathers to
have babies." Quoted in Farris, NEA's Push for Sex Education Builds Home-School Senti-
ment, Spokesman-Review, Oct. 16, 1988, at A17, col. 3. If the most effective AIDS education
is that given in a religious context (whatever the religious preferences of the parents, includ-
ing a preference for no religion), and if the schools have difficulty providing the religious
context directly, then a McCollum-type program, administered under the guidelines sug-
gested, might most effectively accomplish the state's secular purposes without violating the
neutrality principle.
498. 433 U.S. 203.
499. The other vice cited in McCollum, that the programs advanced religion, would be
cured by requiring the programs to teach a subject that is otherwise legitimately incorpo-
rated into the curriculum. There is nothing unconstitutional about requiring every student
to learn about sex, or evolution, or religion, for that matter. Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) ("Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of
the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of educa-
tion, may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment"); see also Note, Teaching
the Theories of Evolution and Scientific Creationism in the Public Schools: The First
Amendment Religion Clauses and Permissible Relief, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 421, 459 (1982)
(arguing creation should be presented, not as a scientifically valid alternative, but as one of
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avoided by requiring that one such class be available to every stu-
dent. Parents dissatisfied with the range of ideological choices
would be invited to offer their own.
d. Space for Prayer
The most controversial religion clause cases have been those that
prohibited organized prayer in public schools. If the military can
supply chaplains, can the public schools provide space for prayer
at the beginning of the school day? Even those who see the analogy
to the military agree that there are important differences. 00 How-
ever, the generic problem remains the same: balancing competing
needs, religious-and secular, in a neutral fashion. Some have sug-
many creation stories of the world's religions).
Although it has been suggested (see, e.g., Vieira, School Prayer and the Principle of Un-
coerced Listening, 14 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 763 (1987)) that parents have a right to protect
their children from any teaching that they find objectionable, this argument is a function of
the incoherent "balancing" test described supra in section V. Ultimately the state must be
ceded the authority to require all children to master certain skills and to be exposed to
certain facts. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 1029 (1988); see Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict
Between Authority and Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1661
(1986) (absent clear free exercise claim it is "unlikely that parents can exempt their children
from certain courses to which they may object").
Tolerance of alternate methods of providing the core of state citizenship (e.g., Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), should not be confused with a parent's purported
right to protect the child from exposure to any and all ideas that the parents find objection-
able. See supra text accompanying note 150. States may of course choose to permit parents
to remove their children from various courses to which the parents object, but under the
analysis presented in this article, no such exemption procedure is required. For a contrary
view, see Leedes, Court-Ordered Exemptions to Secure Religious Liberty, 21 U. RICH. L.
REV. 335 (1987); Note, The Constitutionality Under the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment of Compulsory Sex Education in Public Schools, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1050 (1970).
The school has no authority to teach which world views are good or bad, but it does have
the right to insist that all of its citizens know facts that it believes are important to good
citizenship, including the causes of AIDS, the birthdate and basic philosophy of important
figures in world religion, and theories about the origin of life on earth. It can hardly be
contended that such instruction should wait until students are "mature" enough to handle
religious differences with ease. It is also unrealistic to think that there are completely "neu-
tral" ways to handle such subjects as AIDS, evolution, and transubstantiation. If a third
grader is required to listen to a presentation of the AIDS crisis (or the origin of species or
the Reformation) that directly conflicts with what he learns at home, the educational pro-
cess and the child are likely to suffer. Hirschoff, Parents and the Public School Curriculum:
Is There a Right to Have One's Child Excused from Objectionable Instruction?, 50 S. CAL.
L. REV. 871, 908 (1977). The suggested approach allowing the school to customize the curric-
ulum to harmonize with parental values makes it possible for students to learn potentially
discomfiting facts, or to hear about conflicting world views, in a context that promotes the
educational process as a whole.
500. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 468, at 160-63.
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gested that, since schools are secular institutions, they are justified
in excluding religion.510 Yet, there may be circumstances in which
exclusion is discriminatory.
e. The Privatization of Prayer
One suggested solution to the problem of competing religious
tastes has been a "moment of silence," giving students an opportu-
nity to pray or meditate. In Wallace v. Jaffree502 the Supreme
Court considered an Alabama statute that provided for a one-min-
ute period of silence "for meditation," and an amendment that
provided the same period "for meditation or voluntary prayer. '50 3
The Supreme Court struck down the amendment, but not the un-
derlying statute. The ruling was ultimately based on the fact that
the district court had found no secular purpose to the amendment.
The case unfortunately suffered a strange procedural history,5 4
and although the Court did not proscribe moment-of-silence stat-
utes, it warned that it would find them unconstitutional if they
went so far as to "expre[ss] the State's endorsement of prayer ac-
tivities for one minute at the beginning of each schoolday [sic]. 5 °5
The Court did not make clear, however, whether it is permissible
for the state to recognize the existence of religious needs as the
military does when it supplies chaplains and then to attempt to
accommodate them. Part of the difficulty lies in the symbolic na-
ture of the state's action, and the court's adoption of Justice
501. Id.; see also Teitel, When Separate Is Equal: Why Organized Religious Exercises,
Unlike Chess, Do Not Belong in the Public Schools, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 174, 182 (1986)
(rejecting the views in Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status
of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 N.W. U. L. REv. 1 (1986)).
502. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
503. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20 (Repl. Vol 1987).
504. The parent of three children in the Alabama public schools sued to enjoin the opera-
tion of the two statutes noted above, plus an additional amendment passed in 1982 that
authorized public school teachers to lead "willing students" in a voluntary prayer. 472 U.S.
at 40 n.3. After conducting an evidentiary hearing regarding the statute's legislative intent,
the district court granted a preliminary injunction based on the lack of a clearly secular
purpose. Id. at 41. Four months later, after a trial on the merits, the district court dissolved
the injunction, after concluding that "the establishment clause . . . does not prohibit the
state from establishing a religion." Id. at 45. As the Supreme Court noted with admirable
restraint, the Eleventh Circuit "not surprisingly" reversed. Id. at 46. The plaintiff had aban-
doned his claim that the original statute was unconstitutional, and by an earlier order the
Supreme Court had affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's ruling that the 1982 statute was uncon-
stitutional. Thus, the only remaining issue was whether the amendment to add "or volun-
tary prayer" was constitutional. Id. at 46-48.
505. 472 U.S. at 60.
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O'Connor's suggestion in Lynch50 6 that perceptions of endorsement
are an index of constitutionality vel non.507 At some point the
politicization of the issue creates a "message" that the legislature
never intended.0
In Engel v. Vitale50 9 and Abington Township v. Schempp,510 the
Supreme Court expressed concern that in the public school context
peer pressure makes it difficult for children to enjoy true religious
liberty, even where formal compulsion is lacking.51' These concerns
are attenuated but not eliminated by converting an opening prayer
into a "moment of silence." Where the state is forbidden from sup-
plying content to this exercise, the effect of peer pressure will be-
come even stronger.5 1 2 One would hope that the Court would ac-
knowledge the legitimacy of the schools' efforts to accommodate
the religious needs of school children, but one would also hope that
administrators would have something more to offer than a moment
of silence. Where space for an optional religious exercise is pro-
vided, and children are truly free to attend or not,51 3 the concerns
of Engel and Schempp are virtually eliminated, and religious needs
more fully accommodated than through a compulsory moment of
506. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
507. See supra note 483.
508. In its zeal to prevent even the least suggestion that religion might be a preferred
form of activity during the moment of silence, the Court curiously ignored its prior cases
where it recognized the state's right, even a duty, to make special accommodations for the
fulfillment of religious duties. Note, A Moment of Silence: A Permissible Accommodation
Protecting the Capacity to Form Religious Belief, 61 IND. L.J. 429 (1986).
509. 370 U.S. 421 (1962); see supra text accompanying note 211.
510. 374 U.S. 203 (1963); see supra text accompanying notes 211-13. Schempp involved
devotional Bible reading, rather than prayer, but the issue is essentially the same: does any
type of religious exercise have an appropriate place in public schools or functions?
511. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 60 n.51.
512. One commentator suggested solving this problem by prefacing the moment of silence
with a statement concerning religious freedom. Laycock, supra note 480, at 65.
513. However, religious differences cannot be concealed altogether, and some !'peer pres-
sure" is unavoidable. The fact that a high school quarterback or a school cheerleader be-
longs to a religious club may incline other students to join (or not to join, for that matter),
but such subtle influences cannot doom an otherwise constitutional program. It is another
matter, however, if a second grader is banished from his classroom because his religion does
not permit attendance at some activity. This was an important reason for the court's disal-
lowance of school prayer in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Even
though some students might benefit, the practice of compulsory school prayer required
small children to make painful choices about whether to remain true to their (parents')
religious convictions or to "go along" with their classmates. See Stone, In Opposition to the
School Prayer Amendment, 50 U. CHL L. REv. 823, 836-38 (1983). For a semi-satirical view
of the problem, see the Art Buchwald column quoted in Loewy, School Prayer, Neutrality,
and the Open Forum: Why We Don't Need A Constitutional Amendment, 61 N.C.L. REv.
141 n.2 (1982).
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silence.5 14 In the current climate, the moment of silence is more
neutered than neutral.
Of course there will be situations such as a high school gradua-
tion, where it is not feasible to provide facilities for a separate ser-
vice or to offer a variety of different experiences to suit all religious
tastes. Only one invocation or benediction is usually practical in
such settings. The choice must then be made as to whether to in-
clude some form of generic prayer that attempts to satisfy the reli-
gious needs of the vast majority of those who want to pray. Some
have argued that under no circumstances should government in-
volve itself with such matters. 15 The question is not without diffi-
culty. However, it must also be recognized that the failure to pro-
vide a prayer under such circumstances may deprive many
students and parents of an important experience. For many, grad-
uation will be incomplete unless accompanied by an invocation of
divine blessing. 6 Although some have tried to rescue such prac-
tices by characterizing prayers under these circumstances as "cere-
monial occasions that bear no resemblance to obviously religious
exercises, ' 51 7 it should not be necessary to sustain the constitution-
ality of such exercises only by denying that they have any signifi-
cant religious content.1 8 In fact, it is precisely because many par-
514. See supra notes 478-79, for a discussion of Bender.
515. In Engel, the state of New York had devised the "Regent's Prayer," designed for use
by its public schools. It read "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee,
and we beg Thy Blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." 370 U.S. at
422. The Supreme Court struck it down, holding that "in this country it is no part of the
business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to
recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government." Id. at 425. However, this
generalization is subject to challenge. If chaplains for the military are permissible, they may
well develop a "book of common prayer" that is transferred from unit to unit. As noted
above, there are difficulties associated with satisfying the wide variety of religious tastes.
See supra text accompanying note 469. Standing to complain lies with any person who feels
that government has not acted neutrally in its choices. The fact that government becomes
involved in selecting which chaplains, of what denominations, will be provided on what oc-
casions, or what prayers will be used, does not by itself offend the neutrality principle. See
also infra text accompanying note 520, for a discussion of Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983).
516. DuPuy, Religion, Graduation, and the First Amendment: A Threat or a Shadow? 35
DRAKE L. REV. 323, 364 (1985-86) ("In seeking to retain the meaningful time-honored reli-
gious elements of graduation, today's students may be merely asking that this consummate
moment in their educational experience not be rendered, by judicial fiat, eccentric and
incomplete").
517. Note, Daily Moments of Silence in Public Schools: A Constitutional Analysis, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 364, 379 (1983).
518. Note, Invoking the Presence of God at Public High School Graduation Ceremonies:
Graham v. Central Community School District, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1247, 1266 (1986).
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ents and students want to connect the graduation ceremony with
their religious beliefs that an invocation and/or benediction are
sought.
On a more mundane level, a football player who is about to be
subjected to high physical and emotional stress may want the op-
portunity to engage in collective prayer with his teammates.5 19
Careful factual analysis is required in order to balance the religious
convictions of all relevant parties and to provide continued assur-
ance that religion is being treated neutrally. Presumably, those
who think that religion is mere mumbo-jumbo are not significantly
harmed by having to wait while others discharge their ritualistic
duties. On the other hand, a child with his own religious scruples
about how prayer is to be conducted might experience significant
harm by feeling compelled to absent himself until the exercise is
over. Thus, while daily prayers in a primary school cannot be justi-
fied as a neutral accommodation, an invocation at high school foot-
ball games might, depending upon the facts, be acceptable. While
sensitivity is required, the mere possibility that such harm might
occur should not doom all religious exercise as a matter of abstract
principle. Careful weighing by the state officials charged with deci-
sion making authority should suffice to balance the needs of differ-
ing religious and nonreligious perspectives. Ultimately, the stan-
dard should be the same as suggested earlier with reference to the
creche cases: has the state acted neutrally, or does its conduct be-
tray discriminatory animus?
4. Odd Cases: Historically Sanctioned Practices
In addition to the hard cases cited above, there is a group of
cases that are difficult to resolve except by reference to their his-
torical pedigree. For example, in Marsh v. Chambers20 a Nebraska
state legislator challenged the legislature's practice of hiring a
chaplain to open each session with prayer. He claimed that both
the practice of doing so, and particularly the chaplain's salary,
were an establishment of religion. Significantly, in upholding both
the practice and the payment, Chief Justice Burger's opinion did
not even mention the Lemon test.52 1 It proceeded directly from the
519. Individualized prayer or opportunities for it may not suffice; for example, the prayer
that is said at the beginning of the meal is not substituted for by a prayer at an earlier time
of the day; the contemporaneous "blessing" of the food or the activity has a unique value.
520. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
521. The district court found the prayers constitutional, but not the payment. Id. at 785.
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fact that the same Congress that adopted the first amendment's
religion clauses appointed paid chaplains only three days later.2 2
The Court seemed to say that, while much of the meaning and in-
tent of the first amendment is murky, one thing we do know is that
it does not prohibit paid legislative chaplains. Although there is
some appeal to the argument that "time makes ancient good un-
couth," '23 it is difficult to strike down as unconstitutional a prac-
tice with such formidable pedigree. There are other instances of
the leftovers of an era in which public expressions of piety were
viewed by the population with greater equanimity.524 In consider-
ing the Sunday Closing Law cases, 52 5 the Court noted the overlap
between the religious reasons for keeping Sunday as a day of rest
and the secular reliance that had grown up around it. "The cause
is irrelevant; the fact exists. ' 526
But this sentiment is not universally shared. Professor Laycock,
otherwise hospitable to the place of religion in society, has sug-
gested that many of these leftovers are unconstitutional:
The government should not put "In God We Trust" on coins; it
should not open court sessions with "God save the United States
and this honorable Court"; and it should not name a city or a naval
vessel for the Body of Christ or the Queen of the Angels. Perhaps
religious minorities should not waste political capital on minor viola-
tions such as these. But neither should the Supreme Court legiti-
mate such violations.52 7
If such an absolutist position were adopted, many cities, including
Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, and St. Louis, would be re-
quired to change their names. Presumably such practices as the
observance of Christmas as a legal holiday would be unconstitu-
tional. Neutrality makes no such unconditional demands; the stan-
dard would be whether or not the refusal to change the city's name
betrays a discriminatory animus. Whatever harm is caused by the
imposition of offensive religious symbols must be balanced against
The Eighth Circuit applied the Lemon test and held that neither practice could survive
even one of the three prongs of the test. Id. at 786.
522. Id. at 788.
523. James Russell Lowell, The Present Crisis, in POEMS OF JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL 98
(Oxford 1912); see also supra note 31 (Professor Giannella's caution about original intent).
524. Marshall, supra note 17, at 507-08 ("[r]eligion is simply a fact of public life").
525. See supra text accompanying notes 289-300.
526. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 452 (1961).
527. Laycock, supra note 480, at 8 (footnotes omitted).
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the costs, quite substantial, if Professor Laycock is correct, im-
posed by rooting out all governmental acknowledgements of reli-
gion's role in society. "Religion, by virtue of history and tradition,
is so enmeshed in American culture that the establishment clause
cannot entirely sever government from religion." 528 Even assuming
that some practice, if judged de novo according to the non-discrim-
ination principle suggested above, would not pass muster, weight
must be accorded to the secular inconvenience of removing it.
Moreover, in many cases such as the legislative chaplaincy, there
may be justifications irrespective of their historical pedigree. 29 In
any event, the search must be for true neutrality, not for mechani-
cal procedures that obviate the need for further analysis.
V. CONCLUSION.
Section III of this article referred to a table in the appendix of
the major religion clause cases. In proposing the non-discrimina-
tion alternative, this article has described how an alternative test
would dispose of the same kinds of cases. Table 2 presents the
same cases as those listed in Table 1, with the addition of a column
showing "proposed holding." In only a few cases would the rule
provide for an outcome different from the holding in the case; most
of these cases involve the provision of aid to private schools or
claims for exemption based on religious scruples. In all such cases
a number of the justices, perhaps now a majority, would have
voted for the proposed holding.
This article has detailed a significant weakness in the "affirma-
tive action" approach to the religion clauses: its requirement that
"theological impact" be measured to assure equality of treatment.
Far from maintaining a "wall of separation" between church and
state, this approach threatens the most important guarantee of the
first amendment, autonomy of religion and government.
The principle of non-discrimination provides a better starting
point for a neutral interpretation of the religion clauses. A consis-
tent and intelligent application of the principles expressed in this
528. Fairchild, Lynch v. Donnelly: The Case for the Creche, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 459, 466
(1985).
529. In the case of legislative chaplains, the same argument can be made as was made for
religious observances in the military and public schools: where there is a "pervasive govern-
mental presence," some place must be made for religion. Whether this argument would oth-
erwise be sufficient to justify legislative chaplains in the absence of the historical record is of
course problematic.
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article will significantly reduce the need to resolve conflicts be-
tween church and state, and will promote both governmental au-
thority and religious independence. Although the Supreme Court
has clung to a case-by-case determination and a "balancing" of the
"tension" between the two clauses, a majority of the justices have
expressed the need for a more principled approach. As Professor
Marty has said of the neutrality approach, it "at least invokes a
principle and does its tempering or compromising on the basis of
it."530 Through the elaboration of sensible rules and distinctions,
the beginnings of which are suggested in this article, courts can
move closer to the ideal of protecting religious liberty.
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